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POUCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE:
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO A
PRIVATELY INITIATED NUCLEAR TEST
MONITORING PROJECT AS A CASE
STUDY IN NATIONAL SECURITY
DECISION-MAKING
BY
PHILIP

I.

G.

SCHRAG*

INTRODUCTION

Through his book Essence of Decision, 1 Graham Allison2
revolutionized the way that academics analyze major foreign
and defense policy decisions. 3 Before Allison's book was
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is deeply grateful to
Dr. Thomas Cochran, S.Jacob Scherr, and David Wirth of the staff of the
Natural Resources Defense Council, to Walter Nicks of the University of
Nevada-Reno, and to numerous federal officials, for the substantial
amounts of time that they made available for interviews. The author is
also indebted to FrederickS. Young, his tireless research assistant, for his
extensive labors in the library and in the field, and to Ellen Schaffer, Georgetown University's International and Foreign Law Librarian, for her
help in tracking down documentary sources. The author appreciates the
many helpful suggestions on the manuscript made by Dr. Christopher
Paine and by Professors Lisa G. Lerman, David A. Koplow, and Peter
Schuck. In 1989, this work will be published by Westview Press as a book
entitled LISTENING FOR THE BoMB: A STUDY IN NucLEAR ARMS Com-ROL
VERIFICATION Poucv.
1. G. Al.uSON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971}.
2. At the time he wrote the book, Allison was a professor at Harvard
University. He later became Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. See Keller, Thinker-in-Residence Brought from Harvard, N.Y. Tunes,
Aug. 15, 1985, at B8, col. 3.
3. Since the publication of his book, Allison's view of foreign policy
making has received wide reception and recognition. "The bureaucratic
interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional \\isdom."
Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?, in PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN FoREIGN Poucv 410 (C. Kegley & E. Wittkopt eds. 1983}. See also R. CoULA1>1,
ILLUSIONS OF CHOICE: THE F-111 AND THE PROBLEM OF WEAPONS ACQ.UISITION REFORM 6-34 (1977}; I. M. DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND
FoREIGN Poucv 52-82 (2d ed. 1974}.
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published in 1971, even the leading writers on foreign policy4 tended to describe and explain governmental decisions
almost exclusively as if governments were rational human
beings making carefully considered choices among available
options. 5 Political scientists did not generally ferret out detailed information regarding the process of arriving at particular governmental decisions. They knew only the actions
that were ultimately taken. From these actions, they characteristically reasoned backward to explain governmental
choices.6
Allison suggested that this classical mode of analysis was
incomplete or even misleading, in that it suggested that governments had become irrational or their decisions incomprehensible. Terming this type of thinking "Model I" or the
"Rational Actor Model," Allison went on to describe two
other ways of looking at governmental decisions. Drawing
from the literature of organization and management theory,
he described, as "Model II," an "Organizational Process"
paradigm. The Model II analyst describes governmental decisions not as rational choices by governments or their leaders, but as the natural outcomes of standard bureaucratic operating procedures. 7 Elaborating on the theory implicit in
Neustadt's Presidential Power, 8 Allison characterized, as
"Model III," a conception of governmental decision as the
outcome of political bargaining among individuals, each of
whom holds some degree ofpower. 9 Thus, government de4. Allison quotes the works of such major figures as Hans Morgenthau, Stanley Hoffman, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas Schelling and signif·
icantjournalistic analyses such as those of the New York Times. G. ALLISON,
supra note I, at I0-26.
5. Allison quotes many typical examples of this kind of analysis, such
as the following statement from A. WHITING, CHINA CROSSES THE YALU
159 (I960): "In sum, it was not the particular problems of safeguarding
electric power supplies in North Korea or the industrial base in Manchuria
that aroused Peking to military action. Instead, the final step seems to
have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities within China's doorstep. At the least, a military response might
deter the enemy from further adventures." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at
22.
6. G. ALLISON, supra note I, at I3. A more detailed description of this
"Model I" thinking appears infra section III.
7. For a more detailed description of Model II, see infra section IV.
8. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (I960).
9. A more detailed account of Model III is set forth infra section V.
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cisions can be looked at in terms of policy, procedures, or
people. Although the information necessary for Model II or
Model III analysis is often difficult to obtain, genuine understanding of governmental decision-making requires an examination from all three perspectives. 10
Allison tested his theory with a case study of the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis. Subsequent writers have applied the
Allisonian models (or variants of them) to a variety of policy
decisions, including the rise and fall of the multilateral nuclear force,u the U.S. 1967 decision to deploy an antiballistic
missile system, 12 the U.S. decision to acquire missiles with
multiple independendy-targetable warheads, 13 the Japanese
decision to attack the United States in 1941, 14 the major
Continental powers' decisions to enter World War 1,15 and
the U.S. program to acquire the Trident submarine.16 These
studies tend to confirm the value of looking beyond the Rational Actor Model for an explanation of governmental action.17
10. "Only in comparative analyses of this sort can models be systematically diversified and mental images of the decision-making process significantly improved." Weil, Can Bureaucracies be RatiorzalActors?, 19 INT'L STUD.
Q 432, 433 (1975).
11. j. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION (1974).
12. M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
AND FOREIGN POUCY (1974).
13. Allison & Morris, Exploring the Detmninants of Military Weapons, 104
DAEDALUS 99 (1975).
14. Hosoya, Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Systcn in
japan, 26 WoRLD PoL. 353 (1974).
15. Levy, Organizational Routines and the Causes of IJ~r. 30 INT'L STUD. Q
193 (1986).
16. Steinbruner and Carter, Organizational and Political Dimensions of the
Strategic Posture: The Problems of Reform, 104 DAEDALUS 131 (1975).
17. For example, Model I tends to describe the reasons for major U.S.
strategic weapons acquisitions in terms of reactions, based on doctrines
such as the need for "mutual assured destruction," to various real and
anticipated Soviet threats. But a more careful analysis, taking account of
Models II and III, also emphasizes the goals and procedures of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, which are "rarely" controlled by political officials; the
tendency of these services to sponsor weapons systems that are essentially
marginal improvements to their existing systems; and the political bargaining among services, design laboratories, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the defense contractors, and members of Congress. Allison &
Morris, supra note 13. But see Maoz, The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision
Analysis Applied to Crisis Behavior, 25 j. OF CONFUCT REsOLUTION 677 (1981)
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Virtually all of the published studies have chosen to focus on a foreign or defense policy decision or series of decisions that can be characterized as "m<Uor." They involve, for
example, national or international crises, 18 procurement of
major weapons systems, 19 or major international negotiations.20 Understandably, few scholars have chosen to examine the process of governmental decisions in which much
less is at stake. Yet a careful examination of more routine,
second-level21 decisions is also needed for several reasons.
(concluding that "in this particular case the predictions of the analytic
model fit much better the observed choice processes at both the individual
and group levels"). Maoz acknowledges that "these findings run contrary
to most of the evidence regarding choice processes under crisis condi·
tions, and may suggest that decision-making in the Entebbe crisis is the
exception rather than the rule." !d. at 704.
18. Indeed, "[s]tudies of decision-making under crisis conditions have
become a booming enterprise over the last two decades." Maoz, supra
note 17, at 677. Maoz' own study of the Entebbe rescue is an analysis of
this type, as is Allison's EssENCE OF DECISION, supra note 1.
19. SeeR. CouLAM, supra note 3; E. BEARD, DEVELOPING THE ICBM: A
STUDY IN BuREAUCRATIC PoLmcs (1976); N. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A.
KANTER, supra note 12; Allison & Morris, supra note 13; J. STEINBRUNEtt,
supra note 11; and Stein bruner & Carter, supra note 16.
20. See, e.g., R. NEUSTADT, ALLIANCE POLITICS (1970); I.M. DESTLER, H.
FUKUI & H. SATO, THE TEXTILE WRANGLE (1979). For an original essay
applying Allison's models in a completely different context-the control of
white collar crime-see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE LJ. 1090 (1976).
21. There is no clear dividing line between major and second-level decisions, but some characteristics that divide some decisions from others in
terms of their significance may exist. A "second-level" American foreign
policy decision perhaps may be identified as one that receives some treatment in major newspapers (thus distinguishing it from completely routine
or trivial actions, such as the holding of an otherwise unimportant diplomatic lunch, or providing an additional military attache to an embassy),
but which meets all of the following tests: (I) human life was not imminently at risk; (2) the President of the United States was not personally
involved; (3) no military mobilization was contemplated; (4) less than $100
million was involved. The following decisions, for example, may be characterized as second-level matters: (1) a change in the U.S. bargaining position for an arms control negotiation regarding the percentage of weap·
ons that should be eliminated during a particular phase of a treaty's life;
(2) a decision regarding whether to position a new surveillance satellite to
emphasize coverage of the Soviet Union or of other areas of the globe; (3)
a decision to reprogram $50 million of foreign aid from one country to
another; (4) a decision to revoke the accreditation of a foreign diplomat
suspected of spying; (5) a decision to ask an African country for permis-
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First, national security decisions are critical, so that even second-level decisions will affect, to some extent, the
probability that the United States will eventually be involved
in armed conflict, conventional or nuclear. Second,
although small governmental decisions are by definition less
important, there are obviously many more of them and cumulatively, their impact is very great. Third, a consequence
of.Model II is that big decisions are likely to be the product
of many small ones. For example, the "lengthy process from
which weapons emerge involves hundreds of important, relatively independent decisions that no one political official can
possibly oversee." 22 Fourth, many scholars lvriting about
American foreign policy outside of crisis contexts continue
to rely on Model I, treating governments as if they were single, rational persons. 23 Finally, studies of second-level governmental decisions may shed new light on the application of
decision theory to major policy choices as well. 24
sion to allow U.S. Navy ships to refuel at its ports; and (6) a determination
that a third-world nation friendly to the U.S. is engaged in systematic repression of human rights.
22. Allison & Morris, supra note 13, at 123.
23. See, e.g., Kanost, The American Perfonnance in Micronesia: A Retrospective Appraisal, 12 AMERASIA]. 57, 72, 76, 79 (1985) ("In the long run, the
United States was more willing to make substantial concessions on economic issues than to compromise its future regarding strategic control
over the area.... [r]he United States has assumed that its permanent
control over the area must be assured"; Lindsay, Trade Sanctions as Policy
Instruments: A Re-examination, 30 INT'L STUD. Q 153, 156-58 (1986) ("Two
strategies were used to determine the [countries'] objectives .... [T]he
initiator's publicly stated goals were taken as objectives ... though where
information about the decision was scarce, these goals were imputed ....
The Saudis' announced objective was to pressure the US to force Israel to
withdraw.... [The] Saudis also intended the embargo to increase international support for the Palestinians"); Fischer, Decisions to Use the InttTTiational Court ofjustice, 26 INT'L STUD. Q 251, 275-76 (1982) (research on
motivation to invoke World Court conducted by sending questionaires to
officials asking about the assessments made by "your government" and
the views of "your state").
24. In addition, while Allison focused on govemmetrtal decision-making,
his models are also applicable to the decisions ofindustrial and other large
bureaucracies. Indeed, he derived his paradigm for Model II from the
literature of organization theory. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 69-78.
Studies ofless critical governmental decisions, therefore, also may be valuable for their insight into the more routine choices of corporations, labor
unions, and other private bureaucratic entities.
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This Article applies the Allisonian framework to the U.S.
Government's response to a private arms control initiative
undertaken in 1986 by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), an environmental organization. This case lends
itself to fruitful analysis for several reasons. First, while it fits
the criteria for second-level decisions, 25 it also involves a
critical area of international relations-the control of nuclear
weapons. Second, the involvement of numerous government agencies in the project presents ample opportunity to
examine processes within and among agencies. Third, the
reaction of the United States appears, at first blush, to have
been ambivalent or inconsistent, for the U.S. Government in
tum assisted, impeded, and again assisted the NRDC's effort.
This curious response invites the analyst to see to what extent, if any, Models II and III can usefully contribute to understanding why the Government acted as it did.
While the type of analysis that Allison pioneered nearly
two decades ago has become a mainstream tool for social
scientists, it is virtually unknown to lawyers and legal academics. Indeed, with the exception of a single student-written note, 26 law reviews, legal treatises and even the administrative law case books simply do not make use of Allison's
comparative modeling. The aim of this exposition is to better enable lawyers to understand bureaucratic decision-making in other contexts. This study may even be more relevant
than Allison's original work to lawyers' needs in this respect,
for most bureaucratic problems that lawyers face will be second-level decisions rather than major national crises. In addition, lawyers and legal scholars may benefit particularly
from the discussion of Model II, for it treats the application
of statutes and regulations to bureaucratic problems as but
one way in which standard operating procedures emerge as
constraints on official behavior.
The first section describes the NRDC initiative and the
Government's response. The next three sections describe in
detail each of Allison's models and apply them to the government's responsive actions. The fifth section considers the
models in terms of their contributions to understanding the
Government's actions in this case and speculates about the
25. See supra note 21.
26. See supra note 20.
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relatively greater significance of one of the models to other
national security decisions of like magnitude. The sixth section considers how multi-model analysis can be of practical
use to legislators and lawyers. The final section describes
the NRDC project in the two years after the events that are
analyzed in this study.
II. THE NRDC PROJECT
In May 1986, the Natural Resources Defense Council, a
non-profit environmental organization,27 signed a novel
agreement with the Academy of Sciences (SAS) of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 2s Under this agreement, each
organization would send scientists to the territory of the
other organization's country to install and operate sophisticated seismic monitoring equipment near the host country's
primary site for nuclear weapons testing. When implementation of the agreement began less than two months later, the
NRDC accomplished what the U.S. Government, since the
Eisenhower Administration, had tried and failed to achieve:
it put American scientists on Soviet soil with types of equipment that could help to verify Soviet compliance with limitations29 on nuclear weapons testing.
The events leading up to this agreement, the steps taken
to implement it, and the Government's response to NRDC
requests for various types oflicenses are set forth later in this
section.3 ° First, a description of the historical context of the
NRDC-SAS agreement is necessary.
A. Background: Thirty Years

of Test-Ban Negotiations

The NRDC initiative took place in the context of nearly
thirty years of sporadic efforts by governments to negotiate
27. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, FIFTEEN-YEAR
1970-1985 (1985).
28. The Academy, founded in 1724, is composed of the Soviet Union's
leading scientislS. The main coordinating body for research, the Academy
direclS more than 260 laboratories and research stations. 1 NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDIA 50-51 (15th ed. 1987).
29. These limitations could be either unilateral, as in the case of the
Soviet Union's self-imposed moratorium on testing in effect at the initiation of the project, or reciprocal, as would be the case under present or
future treaties.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 66-89.
REPORT
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prohibitions on nuclear weapons tests, efforts which had
often floundered, at least in major part, over disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union over whether
compliance with proposed agreements could be monitored
effectively. 31 In 1958, after the health dangers associated
with fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing had become a
matter of world concern, scientists representing the United
States and the Soviet Union concluded that seismic and
other technology then available would "make it possible to
detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield
nuclear explosions (1-5 kiloton (kt))." 32 President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev began formal
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB)3 3 and entered a testing moratorium which lasted until 1961. After a
promising initial period, the negotiations became stalemated. The U.S. delegates reported to their Soviet counterparts "new data" suggesting that the experts had been too
optimistic in their estimates of the verifiability of a treaty.34
Desultory negotiations continued after this event. 35 But
when the Eisenhower Administration ended, the two countries were far apart on numerous issues, including operation
of the control system of monitoring stations and the number
of on-site inspections that each side would be allowed to
31. The advantages and disadvantages of treaties restraining nuclear
testing are beyond the scope of this study. Two very balanced and well·
researched analyses of this issue have been published. See NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
204-23 (1985) [hereinafter NAS]; H. YORK & A. GREB, THE CoMPREHEN·
SIVE NuCLEAR TEST BAN (1979) (California Seminar on Arms Control and
Foreign Policy Discussion Paper No. 84). Herbert York was President
Carter's Ambassador to the comprehensive nuclear test ban negotiations
of 1979-80.
32. NAS, supra note 31, at 188. Yields of nuclear weapons are expressed in terms of kilotons (kt) or megatons (mt) of TNT-equivalent.
33. In arms control parlance, and in this study, the term "comprehensive test ban" and its acronym CTB refer to a prohibition on tests of nuclear weapons in all environments: in the air, under water, in space and
under ground.
34. NAS, supra note 31, at 189.
35. For a detailed documentary description of the negotiations through
1961, see U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, GENEVA CoNFERENCE ON THE DiscoNTINU·
ANCE OF NucLEAR WEAPON TESTS (1961) [hereinafter GENEVA CoNFER·
ENCE).
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conduct in order to resolve seismically suspicious events. 36
The Kennedy Administration continued the negotiations, but its efforts in 1961 were also bogged down in controversy about verification. For example, the United States
sought to have the detection system in the Soviet Union operated by personnel from other countries, while the Soviets
wanted it to be run mostly by Soviet citizens. The United
States insisted on twelve to twenty annual on-site inspections. The Soviets were willing to concede only three. 37 In
any event, the negotiations and temporary moratorium on
testing collapsed when, in August 1961, the Soviets resumed
testing, citing the failure of the United States to adhere to
the 1958 experts' conclusions and the continued nuclear
testing of a U.S. ally, France. sa
By the spring of 1962, the Soviet position on verification
had become more rigid. The Soviets insisted that any ban be
monitored only by "national" means of detection, thus excluding Americans from any monitoring posts on Soviet
soil.3 9 Mter the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to
the brink of nuclear war, 4 CTB negotiations intensified, but
the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to resolve their differences concerning verification.41

°

36. NAS, supra note 31, at 190. Eisenhower considered his failure to
achieve a CTB his greatest regret about his presidency. H. YoRK & A.
GREB, supra note 31, at 8.
37. NAS, supra note 31, at 191.
38. Broadcast of Radio Moscow, August 30, 1961, summarized in GENEVA
CoNFERENCE, supra note 35, at 171-72. In fact, the Soviets had warned the
previous May that continued French testing might compel the Soviets to
end their moratorium, but the French did not test between May and August. Statement by Charles C. Stelle, Acting U.S. Representative to the
Geneva negotiations, id. at 629-33.
39. NAS, supra note 31, at 192.
40. SeeR. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS (1969).
41. Late in the fall of 1962, Soviet Premier Khrushchev agreed to "two
to three" annual onsite inspections as part of a CTB agreement. He was
apparently under the misimpression that this number would be acceptable
to President Kennedy. In the opinion of British Labor Party Leader (later
Prime Minister) Harold Wilson, this misimpression probably resulted
from the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to the Geneva negotiations was
"often vague." G. SEABORG, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND THE TEST BAN
178-81 (1981). Kennedy eventually offered to reduce the U.S. demand for
annual inspections to seven, but the two leaders were unable to agree to
the obvious compromise at five. Available evidence suggests that each
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At this time, however, a new verification concept entered the debate. U.S. and Soviet scientists, meeting as private citizens rather than as government representatives at
the Tenth Pugwash Conference in September 1962, had discussed installing a number of unmanned automatic seismic
stations in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet concerns about espionage would be alleviated by the fact
that personnel from other countries would not have to be
stationed permanently on Soviet soil. In December, the Soviets expressed their willingness to have such stations installed in the Soviet Union. 4 2
In the spring of 1963, Premier Khrushchev accepted
President Kennedy's proposal to negotiate a ban on nuclear
tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in space, since
compliance with a ban on tests in these environments could
be verified without in-country seismic instrumentation or onsite inspections. The Limited Test Ban Treaty4 3 signed in
August of that year forced testing underground. Since the
political opposition to testing had been rooted primarily in
fears about fallout from atmospheric testing, rather than in
opposition to the development of more advanced nuclear
weapons, the opportunity to prohibit all nuclear testing
passed. 44
leader was dealing with powerful domestic opponents to any further compromise. NAS, supra note 31, at 193. Even if the sides had been able to
compromise on five inspections, however, they would have remained far
apart on other verification issues, such as the rights of the inspectors and
the establishment of seismic control posts to monitor the events from
which the inspectors would select what they wanted to see.
42. NAS, supra note 31, at 177. The fact that the 1962 Pugwash Conference produced an idea that later became a foundation for governmentto-government negotiations was an important precedent for the NRDCSAS initiative nearly 25 years later. See infra text accompanying note 59.
43. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 41 (1980) (ratified
by U.S. Senate Sept. 24, 1963; entered into force Oct. 19, 1963).
44. Even during the final Moscow negotiations on the Limited Test
Ban Treaty, the U.S. representatives tried to persuade Khrushchev to
agree on "the nature and number of the inspections" so that "we can get a
comprehensive agreement on the end of all nuclear testing" in those talks.
Hand-delivered letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev in Ambassador Harriman's files, quoted in G. SEABORG, supra note 41, at 240-41. Khrushchev
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After entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to
test nuclear weapons at "a high rate" and "added significandy to the variety and sophistication of their nuclear weapons."45 Eleven years passed before negotiations resumed on
further restrictions on nuclear weapon testing. 4 G
The Nixon Administration concluded a Threshold Test
Ban Treaty (TTB Treaty) with the Soviet Union to prohibit
underground nuclear tests with yields greater than 150 kt
(approximately ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb).47
This particular threshold was selected both because explosions in this range could be readily detected and identified
without seismic stations in the Soviet Union or onsite inspections and because this yield level "was related to our present
test program at the time." 48 Accordingly, the Treaty relied
on long-distance seismic measurements, satellite photography and other "national technical means" 49 of verification,
plus two cooperative measures agreed upon in the Treaty's
Protocol. Each side agreed that for the purpose of calibrating data collected teleseismically, it would supply the
other side ·with data on the geological characteristics of its
refused. Glenn Seaborg, then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, later wrote that "I regard the failure to achieve a comprehensive
test ban as a world tragedy of the first magnitude," and Ambassador Harriman said that "[w]hen you stop to think of what the advantages were to
us of stopping all testing in the early 1960s when we were still ahead of the
Soviets it's really appalling to realize what a missed opportunity we had."
G. SEABORG, supra note 41, at 242.
45. Id. at 288.
46. The 1974 negotiations were initiated not because of environmental
concerns or strong political demand in the United States or in other nations, but because President Nixon, bedeviled by the Watergate scandal
and unable to complete the SALT II Treaty in time for a long-scheduled
summit, wanted to conclude quickly an arms control treaty that would not
be controversial. NAS, supra note 31, at 197.
47. Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, july
3, 1974, reprinted in U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra
note 43, at 167 [hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty].
48. Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties: Htarings on
Executive N Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
49 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings/Exec N/95] (testimony of Vice Admiral
Patrick]. Hannifin on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
49. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 47, Art. 11(1).
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nuclear test sites, 50 and that it would provide the yield, time,
depth, and coordinates for two nuclear weapon tests at each
test site. 5 1 A companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
concluded by the Ford Administration in 197652 (PNE
Treaty) similarly banned underground explosions for
"peaceful" purposes at yields greater than 150 kt. This second treaty was necessary to reinforce the TTB Treaty since
weapons information can be obtained from tests at a given
magnitude regardless of their purpose. 53
By the time of the NRDC initiative, twelve years after the
TTB Treaty was signed, these Treaties had still not been ratified. The Ford Administration did not want them debated
in the middle of a Presidential election campaign, the Carter
Administration gave them low priority because it was trying
to negotiate more important strategic arms and CTB treaties, and the Reagan Administration took the view that reliance on teleseismic verification of compliance with the
threshold was inadequate. 54
Both sides stated that they were complying with the
threshold limit during this long hiatus55 despite President
Reagan's allegations, in a statement to Congress (disputed
by the Director of Livermore National Laboratory which designs approximately one-half of the U.S. nuclear weapons}, 56
that the Soviets had "likely" exceeded the limit on several
occasions. 57
50. Specifically, each would provide information on "the rock characteristics of geological formations and the basic physical properties of the
rock; i.e., density, seismic velocity, water saturation, porosity and the
depth of the water table." Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,
supra note 47, at 169.
51. !d.
52. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So·
viet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful
Purposes, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra
note 43, at 173.
53. Hearings/Exec N/95, supra note 48, at 2 (1977) (testimony of Philip
C. Habib, Undersecretary of State).
54. NAS, supra note 31, at 199; SENATE CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES TREATY, S.
Exec. Rep. No. I, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT].
55. REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
56. R. Batzel, A View of Some Issues Related to Potential Soviet Violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, reprinted in REPORT, id. at 10-11.
57. !d. at 4.
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The Carter Administration revived President Kennedy's
effort to negotiate a ban on all nuclear testing. During two
years of negotiations at Geneva, delegates of the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union made significant progress on many issues, 58 including two critical verification
questions. The three nations agreed that ten unmanned stations with specified high-quality seismic equipment and "sophisticated encryption devices to ensure authenticity of
data" would be emplaced at designated locations in the
United States and the Soviet Union. They also concluded
that onsite inspections could be handled by "challenges,"
·without quotas. Any request for an inspection that was denied by the suspected party would "have to be taken into
account in assessing the probability that an alleged test had
occurred."59 But the CTB Treaty was not concluded. The
Carter Administration's SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation)
Treaty proved unexpectedly controversial, and the Administration did not want to complicate its already problematic
ratification process by concluding another nuclear arms control agreement at the same time. In addition, although the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded, at least for the public
record, that it could "with some less efficiency" accept a
CTB Treaty, 60 "senior military officers, whose support was
critical to the ratification of SALT II, were known to be concerned about the consequences of a ban." 61
After the election of President Reagan, the U.S. Government chose not to resume CTB negotiations. The Government took the view that "as long as the United States ...
must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression . . .
some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required. " 62
As a senior Reagan administration official stated, "it is diffi58. The official public report of the progress of the negotiators is the
Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament, CD/130 (July 30,
1980), reprinted in Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing (HJ. Res. 3): Hearings
Before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 169 (1985).
59. NAS, supra note 31, at 201.
60. Hearings/Exec. N/95, supra note 48, at 46 (testimony of Admiral
Hannifin).
61. NAS, supra note 31, at 199-200.
62. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. POUCY REGARDING LIMITATIONS
ON NucLEAR TESTING [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT No. 150] (Special Report No. 150, August 1986).
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cult to envision circumstances where some level of testing
would not be necessary to insure the safety, reliability, effectiveness, and survivability of our nuclear weapons."63 In response to the argument that a CTB would cause the Soviets
to have the same weapons degredation that the United States
experienced, the Administration suggested, in 1985, that because verification could not be perfected, the Soviets could
cheat:
We cannot be certain that a CTB would equally
constrain the Soviets .... [I]t is quite possible that
the Soviet military nuclear technology base and
most of their nuclear stockpile could be preserved
and maintained indefinitely with tests of a few tens
of kilotons in violation of a total testing ban.
Equally important, or perhaps more important in
this context, are verification uncertainties .... Even
with monitors on Soviet soil and on-site inspections,
verification of a CTB would involve considerable
uncertainties . . . especially if we were largely dependent upon remote teleseismic monitoring. All
experts agree that there is some lower limit below
which nuclear tests in hard rock cannot be detected
with remote seismic monitors; the usual figures
cited are one, two, or at most a few kilotons .... By
exploding a device inside a hollow underground
cavity [larger tests can be made to appear smaller].
A militarily significant nuclear test program conducted in this way could be unrecognized by a network of remote teleseismic monitoring stations. 64
In addition, the Reagan Administration also concluded
that even the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty should not be
ratified because the verification provisions negotiated by the
Nixon Administration were not adequate. "[W]e cannot effectively verify Soviet compliance with the !50-kiloton
63. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 99th Gong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986) (testimony of H. Allen Holmes, Director, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State). Mr. Holmes
added that "the United States sees objective security risks" even in resuming the negotiations. /d. at 8.
64. Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing: Hearings Before the House Commillee 011
Foreign Affairs, 99th Gong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (1985) (testimony of Donald M.
Kerr, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory) (emphasis added).
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threshold. The remote seismic techniques we must rely on
today to monitor Soviet tests do not provide yield estimates
with the accuracy required for effective verification of compliance."65
The issue of nuclear testing restraints stood at this juncture at the end of 1985. Reversing nearly 30 years of stated
policy, the Reagan Administration was refusing even to try to
negotiate a CTB, and it was citing verification concerns as
one basis for its opposition to a CTB and as the sole basis for
its opposition to the decade-old TTB Treaty. In the context
of the Reagan policy, the NRDC took action.
B. NRDC's Initiative
The Natural Resources Defense Council has the largest
staff oflawyers and scientists of any American environmental
organization.5 6 During the nuclear arms buildup of the Reagan Administration, NRDC became directly involved in issues related to nuclear weapons. In 1981, the NRDC began
publishing a series of Nuclear Weapon Databooks 67 and
Working Papers 68 compiling from available technical literature what is known about American and Soviet nuclear weapons and their testing. In 1983, it co-sponsored the conference at which scientists first discussed the concept of a postwar "nuclear winter."69
Thomas B. Cochran, a physicist on the NRDC staff,
stood at the center of the organization's projects related to
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The idea of installing
65. SPECIAL REPORT No. 150, supra note 62, at 2.
66. NATURAL REsouRCES DEFENSE CouNCIL, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT
1970-1985 2 (1985) [hereinafter NRDC]. The Council has offices in New
York, San Francisco and Washington. /d. at 32.
67. 1 T. CocHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HoENIG, NucLEAR WEAPONS
DATABOOK: U.S. NucLEAR FoRCES AND CAPABILmES (1984); 2 T.
CocHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HoENIG, NucLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK: U.S.
NucLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX (1984).
68. See, e.g., SANDS, A REviEW OF SoviET MILITARY PowER 1985 (Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 85-2, 1985); R. NoRRIS, T.
CocHRAN & W. ARKIN, KNoWN U.S. NucLEAR TESTS, jULY 1945 TO 31 DECEMBER 1985 (Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 86-2, 1986);
SANDS, R. NoRRIS & T. CocHRAN, KNowN SoviET NucLEAR ExPLOSIONS
1949-1985, PREUMINARY LIST (Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 86-3, 1986).
69. NRDC, supra note 66, at 18.
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seismic stations around the U.S. and Soviet test sites evolved
out of efforts by Cochran and his colleagues to publish
databooks listing the sizes and dates of all Soviet and American nuclear tests. The Government announced many tests,
and the U.S. Geological Survey reported others, but it became clear that some classified tests at low yields (one to two
kilotons) had taken place without detection by any independent sensors. Cochran's colleague William Arkin jokingly
suggested that NRDC install its own seismic station in Nevada to monitor these low-level tests. The idea remained
only a joke because it seemed somehow unpatriotic for
NRDC unilaterally to release information which the U.S.
Government was, for some reason, keeping secret, but then
another colleague suggested monitoring Soviet tests as
well. 70
In February 1986, Cochran conceived of the idea of
writing letters to President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, in which the NRDC would ask the "approval" of each government to set up, near each country's
test site, seismic stations which would be "mannedjointly by
a limited number of U.S. and Soviet seismologists, other
scientists, and technicians who are not affiliated with the nuclear weapons programs" of the two countries. 71 But
Cochran scrapped this version of the idea when a Soviet embassy official in the United States unofficially advised him
that Gorbachev was unlikely to be receptive, since the proposal would require Soviet governmental approval of a verification plan that had no limits on testing. 72
Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists
suggested, as an alternative, that NRDC work with the Soviet
Academy of Sciences rather than with the Soviet embassy.
Shortly thereafter, Professor Frank von Hippe} of Princeton
University discussed the idea with Yevgeny P. Velikhov, a
vice-president of the SAS and Gorbachev's unofficial science
advisor. Velikhov agreed to host an SAS symposium on test
ban verification in May 1986, and von Hippe} proposed that
70. Lin, Gaining Ground Zero, SIERRA MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 33.
71. Undated draft letters to President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, in files of NRDC.
72. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 5,
1987).
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Velikhov invite Cochran, NRDC Board Chairman Adrian
DeWind (a New York attorney), and Professor Charles Archambeau, a University of Colorado seismologist who had
been advising Cochran about the idea of mutual seismic
monitoring. 73
The SAS indeed extended the invitations to Moscow.
After two days of discussions between the Americans and Soviet Academy members, the Soviets agreed to the NRDC
proposal. DeWind and Cochran quickly drafted a two-page
agreement providing that NRDC and SAS would establish
"three seismic stations adjacent to each of the principal nuclear weapons testing sites in the two countries" which
would be "manned and operated jointly" by the two organizations. The document stated that the parties agreed that
"the current state of geophysical knowledge gives reasonable
confidence in the detectability, using practical seismic networks, of nuclear weapons tests down to yields at, or below,
one kiloton." It also stated that the findings of the project
would help to demonstrate "verification procedures to be
used during a test moratorium or under a nuclear test ban
treaty." The Soviets insisted on writing into the agreement,
that commencement of the project was to begin before the
end ofJune "if possible. " 74 Why the Soviets insisted on so
much speed is not clear, but the Soviet Government's oneyear self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing was due to
expire on August 6th, and those in the Soviet hierarchy who
favored extending the moratorium, together with those who
hoped to put pressure on the U.S. Government to join it
before it expired, may have wanted to demonstrate some
progress before that date.
The one-month provision for commencing the project
put enormous pressure on the NRDC. The Council had to
select the equipment to install in the Soviet Union, put together a team of scientists willing to live in a remote area of
the Soviet countryside while operating the stations, raise
hundreds of thousands of dollars to obtain the equipment,
73. Lin, supra note 70, at 34.
74. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before tlze Senate Comm. on Fortigr1 Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 285-86 {1986) [hereinafter Nuclear Testing Hearings] (Agreement between the National Resources Defense Council and
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., May 28, 1986).
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and obtain from the U.S. Government any licenses necessary
to take the equipment to Kazakhstan, near the Soviet test site
at Semipalatinsk. Once those licenses were granted, the
NRDC would also have to prepare for the Soviet's reciprocal
enterprise in Nevada, by helping the Soviet scientists obtain
visas, scouting appropriate sites for seismic stations near the
Nevada Test Site, and obtaining any permits necessary for
the establishment of the Soviet stations.
The agreement between the two groups was treated as
significant news by the U.S. press. The New York Times covered it on page three the next day, 75 and other major
magazines and newspapers gave the story prominent attention. 76 Prestigious foundations supported the project by
speedily providing one million dollars. The Council assembled a seismological team 77 and, in one of the events examined in detail in this study, the U.S. Government granted
the necessary export licenses before June 30th, enabling the
NRDC to meet its contractual obligation to the Soviet Academy.
The U.S. team of nine scientists arrived in Moscow on
July 4th, and two days later, it established its first station
near Karkaralinsk, just 120 miles west of the Semipalatinsk
test sit~. 78 In this first phase of the project, the team brought
75. Taubman, New Yorkers Sign Soviet Test Pact, N.Y. Times, May 29,
1986, at A3, col. I.
76. See, e.g., Palca, Private Diplomacy Emergent, 321 NATURE 638 (1986);
Duffy, Public Squabbles, Private Deal, TIME, July 14, 1986, at 25; Spiegel,
Monitoring Nuke Tests, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 34; Cowen, Amassing
Data to Help Monitor Nuclear Tests, Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1986,
at 4, col. 4.
77. The team included Dr. Charles Archambeau, a University of Colo·
rado expert on seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions, and Drs. John
Berger and James Brune of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography at the
University of California-San Diego. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Slide Show Script, December 16,
1986 [hereinafter NRDC Slide Script]. See also telephone interview with S.
Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988).
78. Despite their pressure on NRDC to begin the project by the end of
June, the Soviets needed a few extra days to prepare to host the Americans. Presentation by S.Jacob Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, to a meet·
ing of the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, D.C.
(Dec. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Presentation by Scherr]. See also telephone
interview with S. Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988).
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relatively unsophisticated surface seismometers. ' 9 But in the
second phase, it substituted extremely sensitive equipment
that had to be installed in boreholes drilled three hundred
feet into the earth's surface and that could record waves at
several different frequencies simultaneously. The team installed the first surface seismometers and took its first recordings-of earthquakes-on its first day at the site.so U.S.
scientists remained in the Soviet Union for the next year, and
by the end of the first summer, they had selected the locations for all three sites and had monitored nuclear explosions detonated in Nevada.s 1
Meanwhile, the NRDC prepared to receive the Soviet
scientists who would establish three similar stations near the
Nevada Test Site. The NRDC identified some potential locations from which the Soviets might choose. It prepared scientific briefings and meetings for the Soviets similar to those
the Americans had attended in Moscow. Additionally, the
NRDC intervened with the State Department regarding acquisition of the necessary visas for the Soviet scientists. 8 2
In another aspect of the project analyzed in this article,
the U.S. Government did not grant the Soviets the visas they
requested that would have permitted the Soviet scientists to
79. A seismometer is a mechanical device consisting of a casing on the
outside and a heavy mass on the inside which is supported by springs.
When the earth vibrates, the casing and the mass move relative to one
another, and electronic instruments measure the differential movement.
That movement provides a measure of the earth's motion. Broad, U.S.
Group Checks Soviet Atom Site, N.Y. Times, july 14, 1986, at A1, col. 5.
80. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77.
81. The Soviets continued their moratorium on nuclear tests until early
1987. As a result, no Soviet tests were recorded in 1986, and when Soviet
testing resumed, the Soviets required NRDC temporarily to tum off its
equipment. At the time the agreement was signed, the Soviets had gi\•en
no assurances that NRDC would be allowed to monitor tests in the e\'ent
that testing was resumed. Presentation by Scherr, supra note 78. See also
telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988). In june 1987,
NRDC and SAS reached a new agreement under which more stations
would be built that would be allowed to record Soviet nuclear tests, but
these stations would have to be operated by Soviet scientists and moved
further from the Soviet test site. Natural Resources Defense Council and
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, USA-USSR Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Agreement (June 25, 1987).
82. Interview with Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 5, 1987).
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visit the proposed sites. Instead, the United States gave the
Soviets two choices. The scientists could travel to the United
States under U.S. Government (rather than NRDC) auspices,
in which case they would be required to visit the Nevada Test
Site, observe a nuclear weapon test, and either observe a
demonstration of a yield-measurement device known as
CORRTEX or measure the yield of the blast with similar
equipment of Soviet origin. 83 If the Soviets selected this option, they could go anywhere else they wanted, including the
potential seismic site locations. Alternatively, the Soviet
scientists could travel as private citizens invited by NRDC,
but in that case they could stay for only one week, and could
go only to New York, Washington, La Jolla (site of the
Scripps Institution of the University of California), and Dallas (where the seismometers are manufactured). 84
The Soviets accepted the second option. At La Jolla,
their NRDC hosts presented them with rock samples and geological maps from which the Soviets selected three potential locations for seismic stations. After one week, however,
the Soviets left, never having seen the station sites, much less
set up camp as the American team had done in Kazakhstan.
A subsequent request to visit the selected sites was similarly
conditioned by the State Department in February 1987. The
Soviets were given only the choices of an unrestricted visit
under government auspices including observation of a nuclear test, or a seven-day trip during which they would again
be barred from the proposed sites. 85 They elected to stay
home. 86
Despite this development, the Soviets did not terminate
the project, and NRDC sought to establish stations for the
Soviets at the locations they had selected. Even if the Soviet
scientists were never permitted at the sites, if permission
could be obtained to establish the stations near the Nevada
Test Site, the U.S. scientists could make the seismic recordings and send the recordings to Moscow either by mailing
83. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram No. 305164 from
Secretary George Schultz to European and other Embassies (Sept. 27,
1986).
84. !d.
85. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 1987).
86. Telephone interview with S. Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988).
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the computer tapes or by transmitting the data via satellite.s 7
But all three of the sites were on federally owned land. 88
Consequendy, the stations could not be constructed8 9 without U.S. Government permission. In the third of the aspects
of this project considered in greater detail below, the United
States granted the requisite authorization.
In summary, the U.S. Government had to respond to
NRDC requests for export licenses, travel visas, and permits
to set up stations on federal land near the Nevada Test Site.
The United States granted the export licenses very quickly,
conditioned the visas in a manner so unacceptable to the Soviets that they never went to the potential station sites, and
granted the station permits. The Allison framework may
help to explain this apparently inconsistent government reaction.
III.

MODEL

I

Model I, 90 embodying the "central tradition in the social
sciences, " 91 is the domain of the armchair analyst. The student of governmental policy begins with observed outcomes
and reasons backwards to discover explanations for those
outcomes. In so doing, the observer makes three critical assumptions. First, the relevant unit to observe is the nation,
87. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77.
88. Ninety-five percent of the land in the State of Nevada is owned by
the federal government. Telephone interview with Annette jameson, Bureau of Land Management, Department of the Interior, by Frederick S.
Young Uuly 21, 1987). Of the privately held land, two thirds is owned by
railroads. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design
Engineer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (Apr. 21,
1987). Much of the land near the Nevada Test Site is unsuitable for seismic research because of the lack of granite outcroppings or the presence
of surface noise. As a result, setting up a seismic research station near the
test site simply by purchasing a few acres is particularly difficult. /d.
89. Under the design for sophisticated stations as agreed by the NRDC
and the SAS, station construction would have to include drilling a 300foot borehole in which some of the seismometers would be located. A
borehole minimizes surface noise. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77.
90. In using the term "model," Allison is careful to note that he does
not mean to imply that political scientists have yet developed any empirically sound theory; the word "model" in this context means only "conceptual scheme." G. ALusoN, supra note I, at 4. This Article uses the term
with the same meaning as does Allison.
91. /d. at 28.
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or, in a variant of Model I, a nation's ruling clique. 92 Second, nations have goals, and they act rationally to achieve
them. Events do not just happen nor do they emerge chaotically from other events. Rather, "[t]he nation ... conceived
as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent ... [and
the] agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank
highest in terms of his goals and objectives." 93 Third, the
nation makes its rational decisions not incrementally but at a
particular time.94
Thus, the actors in the international arena are both national and rational, and they make unitary decisions to maximize value, not unlike the utilitarian concept of individual
human choice. The analyst of a policy decision, then, has a
clear task: "[i]f a nation performed a particular action, that
nation must have had ends toward which the action constituted a maximizing means .... The puzzle is solved by finding the purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be
located as a value-maximizing means. " 95
Applying this model to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison
constructs rational responses that may answer the m<Uor
questions raised by that set of events. Why did the Soviet
Union install nuclear missiles in Cuba? The Soviet Union's
motive may have been to force U.S. missiles out of Turkey,
or to provoke the United States into attacking Cuba so that
the Soviets could attack Berlin, or to defend Cuba, or to
show the world that the United States was "too liberal to
fight," or to double Soviet offensive missile power. 96 Why
did the United States respond with a blockade? Allison concludes that the blockade was a "middle course" between a
diplomatic response and an air strike or ground invasion, it
forced the Soviets to make the first warlike move, it took advantage of U.S. naval strength, and it kept the confrontation
non-nuclear. 97
From the perspective of Model I, the United States (or
the Reagan Administration) muSt have made a rational deci92. "Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by
the nation or national government." /d. at 32, 37.
93. Id. at 32-33.
94. /d. at 33.
95. !d.
96. !d. at 43-54.
97. See id. at 61.
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sion about how to respond to the NRDC's test ban verification project. We should now be able to deduce why the
United States acted as it did by concentrating on the outcome and asking what values were thereby maximized.
A first pass at such an analysis is simple enough. The
United States quickly granted the NRDC's export license application in order to obtain unique seismological data that
would supplement U.S. intelligence activities. Neither the
U.S. Government nor any U.S. citizen had ever been able to
install seismic sensors near the Soviet test site. The NRDC
project could yield several types of valuable information.
First, if the Soviets continued their announced testing
moratorium (which in fact lasted until February 26, 1987),98
the United States would have a powerful resource with which
to detect noncompliance with the Soviets' stated policy. 99
While the precise abilities of the three NRDC stations would
depend on the "noise level" (i.e. ground noise) at the station
locations, "such a network, if well-sited and stringendy operated, could reduce the detection threshold at the Semipalatinsk test site and environs during the period of operation."100 More particularly, the United States realized that
the "network should be able to detect well-coupled events
considerably below a kiloton at the Soviet test site." 10 1
98. See Strobel and Dorsey, Soviets Expected to Conduct Nuclear Test by End
Wash. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at 3A, col. 4.
99. Indeed, the President was concerned that the Soviets might not be
living up to their proclaimed suspension of testing, for he later said that
"there were numerous ambiguous events during this period [the Soviet
moratorium] that can neither be associated with, nor disassociated from,
observed Soviet nuclear test-related activities." President's Message to
the Congress and the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with
Arms Control Agreements, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 239, 242 (Mar.
10, 1987). Of course, distant seismic sensors could detect large Soviet
tests at Semipalatinsk, but the NRDC instruments would be able to detect
tests at much smaller yields.
100. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Natural Resources
Defense Council Proposal to Place Seismic Monitoring Stations Ncar the
Soviet Nuclear Test Site 3 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter DARPA Memorandum] (Memorandum to Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy).
101. Memorandum to Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy, from E.V. Badolato, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Security Affairs 5 (July 2, 1986} [hereinafter DOE Memorandum].

of Week,
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Second, if the Soviets announced an end to their moratorium ,and allowed NRDC to monitor its tests, the United
States would reap two benefits. To begin with, the United
States would learn a great deal about close-in monitoring
near Semipalatinsk which would be relevant if the United
States and the Soviets eventually negotiated a CTB Treaty
which included in-country seismic monitoring. At the very
least, the NRDC experience would help the United States to
formulate its negotiating position in those negotiations, because the Government would know much more about the
problems of monitoring seismic events in that area. 10 2 Perhaps more importantly, such monitoring could help to end
the considerable uncertainty surrounding Soviet adherence
to their pledge to abide by the TTB Treaty during the extended pendency of its ratification. Consideration of this last
possible advantage requires an explanation of the "bias"
problem.
Compliance with the TTB Treaty's yield limit of 150 kt
was never possible to verify by examining the designs of the
weapons exploded. Weapons design remains, for each side,
a closely guarded secret. The yields of nuclear explosions
can only be measured indirectly. Certain cooperative measures might make this task easier. For example, the Soviets
might allow U.S. scientists to visit the Soviet test site during
weapons tests and take samples of the radioactive debris left
behind. 103 The 1974 treaty provided, however, that each
side would rely on verification by "national technical
means," 104 which includes all available intelligence sources
I 02. The United States would obtain "measurements of seismic noise
levels, data to evaluate propagation and attentuation of seismic waves at
regional distances, and data applicable to research on discrimination between earthquakes and explosions." DARPA Memorandum, supra note
100, at 4.
103. This debris would enable the U.S. scientists to make quite accurate
measurements of yield, and would also enable them to obtain considerable
information about the nature of the weapons and the purposes of the tests,
and for this reason neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has ever proposed
this type of sampling for purposes of TTB verification. See Threshold Test
Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (testimony of Lt. Gen.
Dale A. Vesser, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff,
on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
104. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 47, Article Il(l).
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but in this case refers primarily to the monitoring of the
waves from an explosion at seismic stations beyond the borders of the country being monitored. lOs
Yields of nuclear explosions detected by teleseismic
means are estimated by comparing the observed amplitudes
of certain seismic waves with a calibrating ratio. This ratio is
obtained by correlating the known yields of U.S. tests with
the amplitudes of the waves the tests produce at teleseismic
distances. 106 The validity of the comparison using the yield/
magnitude ratio based on results emanating from the Nevada Test Site rests on the assumption that the seismic waves
from Nevada propagate in a manner similar to the ones from
Semipalatinsk. In fact, they do not. Soviet explosions detected on seismic monitors appear to be larger than U.S. explosions of the same yield. 107 This difference is called the
systematic "bias" in measuring Soviet yields, and it appears
that using the Nevada calibration curve exaggerates the yield
of Soviet tests by 40 to 50%. 108 But experts disagree about
the precise degree of this bias. 109 In addition, the peculiar
105. In the hard rock of the Semipalatinsk test site, explosions can reliably be teleseismically detected and identified at yields down to 1 kt without
any seismic measurements from Soviet stations. Nuclear Testing Hearings,
supra note 74, at 249 (prepared statement of Lynn R. Sykes, Higgins Professor of Geological Sciences, Columbia University).
106. Executive N, 94-2, Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings/Exec N/100] (statement of
Milo Nordyke, Leader, Treaty Verification Research Program, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories).
107. Hearings/Exec N/100, supra note 106, at 68 (testimony of Dr.
Nordyke).
108. /d.
109. The dispute among the experts has generated considerable argumentation in the technical and popular literature. Compare Alewine &
Bache, Monitoring a Threshold Test Ban Treat)', 64 EOS, TRANSAcriONS, AM.
GEOPHYSICAL UNION 193 (1983) (abstract) with Sykes & Cifuentes, Yields of
Soviet Underground Nuclear Exp!lJsions from Seismic Surface Waves: Compliance
with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 81 PRoc. NAT'L ACAo. Scr. 1922 (1984)
and Evernden & Sykes, Nuclear Test Yre/ds, 223 Scr. 642 (1984). The principal difference between Alewine (who is the head of the geophysical sciences office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and
Sykes is that Alewine uses "a correcting factor half that employed by
Sykes." Wilke, Doubt Cast on Soviet Violations, Wash. Post, june 3, 1983, at
A23, col. 1.
This difference of opinion has also had important political ramifica-
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geophysical aspects of any particular test can cause the deviation to be greater or smaller than average, leading to a random bias on top of the systematic bias. 110 Not surprisingly,
soon after U.S. and Soviet observance of the ITB Treaty
limits began, certain Soviet tests raised questions about
whether the Soviets were observing the 150 kt limit, and that
with the passage of time, charges were heard that the Soviets
were engaged in massive cheating on their commitment. ttl
If the Soviets allowed the NRDC to monitor nuclear
tests from the Project stations near Semipalatinsk, some of
the uncertainty about Soviet yields might be resolved, and
the charges of Soviet cheating, which tend to inhibit further
progress toward arms control agreements, might abate.11 2
Even if the Soviets did not test, however, NRDC's recordings
from Kazakhstan might help to resolve the question of bias.
The NRDC stations in the Soviet Union would record nutions. President Reagan charged that the Soviets probably had tested at
yields higher than the limit, the President's Unclassified Report on Soviet
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (March 10, 1987), reprinted
in Soviet Compliance with Anns Control Agreements: Hearings Before tlze Suhcomm.
on Anns Control, International Security and Sciences of the House on Foreign Affairs,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 10, at 284 (1987), while "most" members of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that "the United
States has been able to ascertain that the Soviet record has been consistent
with compliance." REPORT, supra note 54, at 16.
110. !d. at 67-68. Furthermore, a previously untested type of nuclear
device designed to produce a yield of exactly 150 kt might actually produce a larger yield, due to miscalculation. To permit each country to de·
sign tests to produce yields as large as 150 kt, the parties to the ITB
Treaty agreed that "one or two slight, unintended breaches per year
would not be considered a violation of the Treaty," although they would
be a cause for concern. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
supra note 43, at 166.
111. See, e.g., Sen. James A. McClure, 24 Soviet Violations of the Tllreshold
Test Ban Treaty, reprinted in REPORT, supra note 54, app. I, at 85-90.
112. Specifically, the thought was that "[i]f Soviet testing resumes and
the stations are allowed to record, the data may provide a means of calibrating the site using Lg waves [one of several types of waves observable
on seismographs] and comparing these relatively close in measurements
with more distant ones. These close-in stations with their probable azi·
muthal distribution may provide useful information about the mechanisms
affecting surface wave yield estimates." DOE Memorandum, supra note
101, at 6. The DARPA Memorandum, supra note 100, at 6, suggests sev·
eral technical reasons that the results might remain ambiguous despite
NRDC monitoring.
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clear explosions of known yield at the Nevada Test Site.
Scientists might be able to use the amplitude of signals from
Nevada, as recorded in Kazakhstan, to compute how well signals are transmitted between those places, and might, therefore, be able to estimate with greater reliability the degree of
attenuation of explosion-generated seismic waves originating in Kazakhstan and recorded in Nevada.rrs
A further possible advantage to the United States of the
NRDC project was one that NRDC itself claimed for its work.
U.S. and Soviet negotiators in 1978 had discussed at length
the idea of establishing reciprocal seismic monitoring stations. No treaty resulted, however, and no one had ever
tested whether the Soviets would actually allow Americans to
establish seismic stations in the Soviet Union. 114 The NRDC
project could help to pave the way for further restraints on
nuclear testing by demonstrating that the Soviets really
113. As DARPA stated, "[d]ata could be useful ..• to promote general
understanding of geological structure and seismic wave propagation in the
area" of Semipalatinsk. DARPA Memorandum, supra note 100, at 5.
"Some estimate of regional bias (as opposed to test site bias) may be
formed but extrapolating it to the test site will introduce additional uncertainty over and above that which may exist due to the variations among the
three stations." DOE Memorandum, supra note 101, at 6. Indeed, a group
of University of Nevada scientists who studied the first recordings from the
NRDC-SAS stations in Kazakhstan found that the apparent magnitudes of
distant earthquakes recorded at those sites were considerably greater than
the apparent magnitudes of the same events as recorded at other locations. They concluded that the total bias of the Kazakhstan sites was twice
as great as the bias assumed in the U.S. Government's official estimates of
Soviet test yields. "[T]he low bias estimate could inflate yield estimates of
!50-kiloton explosions by about 100 kilotons." Kerr, Geoph)·sics Smorgasbord was Spread in Baltimore, 236 Sci. 1425, 1426 (1987).
114. Despite the Reagan Administration's coolness toward resuming negotiations, the Soviets had remained publicly committed both to negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty and to monitoring compliance by using, among other devices, in-country seismic monitoring stations. Su, e.g.,
Press Release of the Soviet Embassy to the United States Uune 23, 1987).
The press release contains the text of a Soviet draft CTB Treaty which
includes, among other verification provisions, a clause providing that "a
network of seismic stations with standard specifications shall be established on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of the States-Parties to the Treaty, to ensure the continuous international exchanges of
level II seismic data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form
an integral part of the Treaty. These stations shall operate with the participation of observers from among the members of an international inspectorate." !d.
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would allow the necessary in-country monitoring. Furthermore, this instance would be the first occasion on which U.S.
scientists would develop working relationships with their Soviet counterparts in the installation and staffing of such stations and the collection and distribution of the data. 11 5
While the foregoing discussion illustrates why the U.S.
Government might have wanted to encourage the NRDC
project, at least by expeditiously granting a license to export
the seismometers, there are also reasons why the United
States might have wanted to obstruct the project.
First, improved monitoring of Soviet tests might succeed too well. For example, marginal gains in reducing the
degree of uncertainty about yield bias might mislead the
American public into thinking that the bias problem had
been solved. 116 Worse, the public might erroneously think
that all nuclear test verification problems had been solved
and that the United States should, therefore, be willing to
sign a CTB Treaty that included provisions for in-country
seismic verification. The project "may increase international
perceptions that the Soviets will be reasonable or cooperative in permitting adequate verification of a CTB" Treaty,
115. The Reagan Administration recognized the value of joint U.S.-Soviet research projects in nuclear test detection and identification. "Upon
review of a number of possible scientific disciplines, it was concluded that
... nuclear testing issues appear to offer the most promising avenues for
... 'scientific' cooperation and data exchange." U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, VERIFYING NucLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONs: PossiBLE US-SoviET CooPERATION
1986 (Special Report No. 152), reprinted in REPORT, supra note 54, at 44.
The Administration's report gives the following example of cooperation:
':Joint Soviet-US efforts could resume on the criteria for the location and
operation of [remotely operated seismic] stations to include characterization of the sites which would have to be available to ensure accurate instrument operation. Such an effort would have to include data gathering
from potential sites for remote stations in the Soviet Union and should
include installation of research instruments to validate that such instruments can operate reliably, to include data transmission, throughout the
broad range of environmental conditions within the Soviet Union." Id. at
56. While the NRDC project does not have these precise aims or requirements, it is an effort along the lines the Administration was suggesting.
116. "[D]ata will likely be used, regardless of other scientific interpretations, to support argument that seismic waves from STS [Semipalatinsk]
are biased to produce larger signals for a given yield than those from U.S.
calibration explosions at NTS [Nevada]." DARPA Memorandum, supra
note 100, at 6.
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and it "will be exploited to increase international pressure
for [a] moratorium.... Ambiguities and normal scatter in
data will likely permit selection of data to portray easy monitoring of U.S.S.R."ll7
In addition, the reciprocal aspect of the project-the stations near the Nevada Test Site-threatened to reveal the
full degree of U.S. testing. The United States apparently
sought to deny the Soviets easy access to information about
some low-level U.S. tests. 118 The Soviets would not necessarily pick up data regarding these tests through teleseismic
monitoring, but sophisticated NRDC-SAS stations ringing
the Nevada Test Site would end this secrecy and probably
give the Soviets information not only about the existence of
such tests, 119 but about test yields as well.
With this information in mind, the Model I analyst can
explain why the U.S. Government quickly granted the NRDC
export license application, but denied the Soviets permission
to go to Nevada under the terms they sought. On balance,
the United States wanted seismic data from Kazakhstandata to confirm Soviet adherence to the moratorium and perhaps to help resolve the bias issue-more than it feared that
such data would be misinterpreted. But the United States
117. /d. at 4. Indeed, the Soviets might even deliberately try to cawe
NRDC to report false seismic data, thereby misleading the technical community with respect to the ability of such stations to detect and identify
tests. "Opportunities to alter (falsify) [sic] technical data would depend
upon preventive measures such as procedural and technical controls. We
do not know enough about the NRDC/SAS operational plans and equipment to speak definitively to this point." DOE Memorandum, supra note
101, at cover letter.
118. According to "one federal official," the Government now classifies
tests with yields less than five kt. Broad, Some Atomic Tests Being Kept Stcrtl
by Administration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 3. In january 1988,
an NRDC study revealed that the U.S. had concealed at least 117 nuclear
explosions at the Nevada Test Site, 20% of the total number of tests, and
that nearly all of the secret tests had yields smaller than 1 kiloton. Broad,
Seismic Data Show 117 Secret U.S. Atom Tests, N.Y. Times, jan. 13, 1988, at 1,
coL 3.
119. An official at Livermore National Laboratory has suggested that the
Soviets already know about the existence of every U.S. test becawe each
one requires the movement of hundreds of technicians and many vans,
and the Soviets can observe these movements through satellite photography. Broad, Some Atomic Tests Being Kept Secret by Administration, supra note
118.
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did not want the Soviets to have stations at the Nevada Test
Site. The Soviets had urged NRDC to install equipment in
Kazakhstan right away, but were not planning a reciprocal
visit until three months later. By expediting the export license, the United States could obtain data from the Soviet
Union for three months, including recordings of tests in Nevada, before having to tip its hand regarding the Soviet visas.
Then the United States could deny the visas (or impose conditions likely to be unacceptable) so that the stations in Nevada would never be established. The Soviets might close
down the Kazakhstan stations in retaliation, but the United
States would already have data from those stations.
This "first pass" Model I explanation, however, does
not withstand closer analysis. First, the Soviets did not have
the same need for the Nevada data that the United States had
for the Kazakhstan data. The U.S. Geological Survey maintains a network of unclassified seismic stations throughout
the country and publishes the data it collects. Some of these
stations are closer to the Nevada Test Site than the NRDC
stations are to the Semipalatinsk test site. 120 Even if the Soviets wanted data on the number and yields of all U.S. tests
and were not able to get such information from published
sources, denying or conditioning the Soviet visas would not
effectively deny them the information. The NRDC would be
able to set up the stations on its own and simply provide the
data to the Soviets}21
120. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design Engineer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (April 21,
1987). These stations pick up most U.S. tests, whether announced or
unannounced. The stations do not, however, detect the very smallest tests
that the more sophisticated NRDC-SAS equipment would surely registe1·.
From 1980 to 1984, the United States conducted between four and eleven
unannounced tests which were not detected by any unclassified monitoring system. T. CoCHRAN, R. NORRIS, W. ARKIN & M. HOENIG, UNAN·
NOUNCED U.S. NucLEAR WEAPONS TEsTs, 1980-1984 (Nuclear Weapons
Databook Working Paper 86-1,January 1986).
121. The NRDC might have chosen not to do so. After all, the discomfort with the appearance of unilaterally aiding the Soviets led Cochran to a
seismology exchange rather than a Nevada Test Site monitoring project in
the first place. The fact that the Soviets were supplying data to the NRDC,
however, meant that it did not seem unpatriotic for the NRDC to supply
data to the Soviets, and the NRDC did in fact plan to operate the stations
without the Soviets after the visa incident.
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In addition, since the United States did offer to let the
Soviets go to Nevada if they also observed a U.S. test and
measured its yield, the United States could not have been
very fearful of Soviet monitoring of the Nevada site. The Soviets might have accepted the condition and established their
Nevada stations while also obtaining additional nonseismic
information. This additional unsought-after data would in
no way reduce the quality of the seismic information they
later obtained. Finally, the "first pass" explanation cannot
account for the granting of the station permits, enabling
NRDC to emplace the seismic stations on federal land so that
it could provide the Soviets with the data.
A second, somewhat different version of this explanation of the U.S. ·response takes public opinion into account.
The dealings among NRDC, the Soviet Academy, and the
U.S. Government were hardly taking place in a sealed chamber. Indeed, the negotiations were widely reported in the
press. 122 All facts considered, it is reasonable to posit that
the United States preferred that the NRDC project not be
carried out (because the disadvantages of obtaining misleading data, generating unwarranted public enthusiasm for a
CTB, and exposing secret U.S. tests outweighed the intelligence value of the data that would be collected from the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, the United States wanted the Soviet Government, rather than the U.S. Government, to be
blamed in the court of world opinion for the failure of the
NRDC effort. In that event, a good U.S. strategy might have
been to appear to be fully cooperative with the venture, by
granting the export licenses, imposing only reasonable conditions on the Soviet visas, and granting the station permits.
Regarding the visas, the United States might even have offered the Soviets an invitation that appeared to give them
more access to Nevada than the Soviets originally sought, so
that the Soviets could not persuasively claim that the United
States was denying them the right to participate in the seismology exchange. If the United States could be confident
that the Soviets would reject both sets of conditions imposed
upon them, at least one of which appeared reasonable, the
United States could torpedo the project without taking the
public heat for doing so.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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The attractiveness of this explanation depends, however, on U.S. confidence that the Soviets would in fact reject
both offers, and if they did reject the offers, they could not
successfully characterize the U.S. response as a thinly disguised refusal of the visas. Both assumptions are sufficiently
weak as to cast doubt on this theory of U.S. motivation.
While dependence on NRDC to provide the seismic data was
obviously less attractive to the Soviets than being able to operate stations in Nevada, the dependence was nevertheless
better than nothing. The Soviets had no reason to think that
NRDC would provide less than full and accurate data (particularly since simultaneously recorded U.S. Geological Survey
data might reveal any gaps). Furthermore, the Soviets under
General Secretary Gorbachev had proved particularly adept
at test ban public relations, and the United States could not
confidently have counted on packaging a rejection as a generous offer.
A third and somewhat more sophisticated variant of the
Model I analysis focuses on the CORRTEX issue. By 1976,
when the PNE Treaty was signed, U.S. scientists had developed an electronic sensing device that would be used as one
step in a process to measure the yields of Soviet peaceful explosions which qualified for U.S. monitoring under the Protocol to that treaty.l 23 Between 1976 and 1981, scientists at
123. Hearings/Exec N/95, supra note 48, at 92 (testimony of Alfred D.
Starbird, Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research
and Development Administration). The Protocol provided that for any
"peaceful" nuclear explosion (one conducted away from a designated
weapons test site) consisting of individual blasts, each of which was below
150 kt in yield but which, in the aggregate, exceeded 150 kt, the party
carrying out the explosion had to notify the other party in advance and to
permit it to make its own on-site measurements of yield. Protocol to the
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, art. VI, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 43, at 179-87. No SUCh requirements were imposed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Possible
explanations for the different approaches to verification in these two companion treaties are (1) that tests at designated test sites could easily be the
subject of focused intelligence efforts, such as satellite photography,
whereas tests at other locations in the Soviet Union require special verification techniques, and (2) that the detailed procedures of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty's Protocol took two years to negotiate, whereas
President Nixon, in the midst of the Watergate crisis, wanted a treaty with
the Soviet Union which could be negotiated quickly. The procedures of
the PNE Treaty were never used because the Threshold Test Ban Treaty,
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Los Alamos National Laboratory refined this device into a
system called CORRTEX. 124 National technical means of
verification were initially considered adequate with regard to
both the TTB Treaty and explosions under 150 kt carried
out within the PNE Treaty. The Reagan Administration,
however, decided in 1982 that the TTB and PNE Protocols
were inadequate, and that the two treaties should not be ratified unless the Soviets agreed to modify them to provide for
"direct, accurate" measurements of the yields of tests even at
nuclear test sites. 125 The Soviets, however, showed no interest in renegotiating the treaties they had signed in the
1970's.
In 1984, President Reagan attempted to edge the Soviets closer to accepting a modification of the treaties to allow
CORRTEX measurements by proposing that the United
States and the Soviet Union observe a nuclear test at each
other's test site. 126 When the Soviets did not respond to this
overture, the President in 1985 offered the Soviets a unilatnot having been ratified, has not entered into force. Even if the Treaty
had entered into force, these verification procedures might never be used
because the Soviets might not conduct any explosions with aggregate
yields in excess of 150 kt away from designated test sites.
124. The acronym stands for Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiments. These experiments consist of an electronic unit, a
small computer, and one or more coaxial cables. The cables are lowered
into a hole drilled into the earth relatively near the hole through which the
explosive device was placed. The device sends a rapid series of electronic
pulses through the cable. As the shock wave produced by the explosion
travels the length of the cable, it short circuits the cable at distances progressively closer to the electronic device. These distances are measured
by the speed with which the pulses are reflected by the short-circuit and
return to the electronic device. The faster the cable is destroyed, the
greater the yield of the explosion. The computer quickly shows the rate of
disintegration of the cable and the approximate yield of the blast. U.S.
DEPT. oF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATioNs OFFICE & Los AuMos NATIONAL
LABORATORY, CORRTEX (1986) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE] (brochure). The brochure adds that "[a]ll
equipment for power, recording, and data reduction can easily fit into a
small trailer." For a more technical description, see Deupree, Eilers, McKown & Storey, CORRTEX: A Compact and l'ersatile System for Time Domain
Rejlectomelry, in INSTRUMENTATION IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY & ADVANCES
IN TEST MEASUREMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION SYMPOSIUM (1981).
125. REPORT, supra note 54, at 6, 8.
126. SPECIAL REPORT No. 150, supra note 62.
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eral VISit to the U.S. test site in Nevada to observe a
CORRTEX demonstration. 127 Still the Soviets did not respond. In early 1986, however, the Soviets did agree to a
series of meetings in Geneva to discuss test ban issues.
These meetings gave the United States another forum in
which to try to interest the Soviets in CORRTEX, "but it was
clear the two sides had conflicting purposes-the United
States wanted to deal with verification proposals and the Soviets wanted to talk about a complete ban."l28
This frustrating effort by the United States to persuade
the Soviets to modify the TTB Treaty suggests a CORRTEXrelated theory of why the United States quickly granted the
NRDC its requested export licenses but conditioned the
visas of the Soviet scientists. The U.S. Government may
have wanted the NRDC project to fail (because the costs in
terms of optimistic interpretations of data and revelation of
U.S. testing outweighed the benefits of seismic data collection), but the value of moving the Soviets a step closer to
accepting CORRTEX would have been very great-great
enough, at least, to make attractive to the United States a
package that included both the NRDC project and Soviet
participation in a CORRTEX demonstration. 129
But this explanation, too, has its gaps. If the United
States really wanted to use Soviet interest in the NRDC project to impose pressure to observe a nuclear test and
CORRTEX demonstration, it could have focused the pressure more clearly by stating as a policy that the entire NRDC
127. !d. Technically, the President did not insist that the Soviets observe CORRTEX. He offered to let them watch a CORRTEX demonstra·
tion or to use a non-seismic method of their own choosing to make direct
yield measurements of a U.S. nuclear test. !d.
128. REPORT, supra note 54, at 6.
129. This participation might not only lead, eventually, to better verification of the TTB Treaty, but it might tarnish the image the Soviets had
tried to create during their self-proclaimed moratorium, an image of not
wanting to dirty their hands by having anything to do with nuclear tests.
Observing a U.S. test might not appear to third world countries to be as
negative an act as ending their moratorium, but to countries that perceived the world in terms of a North-South struggle, superpower cooperation in nuclear weapons testing might tend to discredit the observer along
with the observed. This problem of public relations could, of course, be
one of the reasons why the Soviets showed so little interest in President
Reagan's repeated offers to observe a U.S. nuclear weapon test.
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project would only be allowed to go forward in the context
of Soviet acceptance of President Reagan's standing offer.
To have conditioned all three necessary ingredients-the export license, the visas, and the station permits-on Soviet acceptance of the package would have been more logical. In
that case, the United States would neither have expedited the
export licenses unconditionally nor offered the Soviets the
option of working with NRDC on the project in states other
than Nevada. 130
This explanation is hard pressed to account for the
speed with which the export license was granted, and like all
130. Furthermore, a policy of using the NRDC project to force the Soviets to observe a U.S. test created a significant public relations risk. The
Soviets might accept the offer to view a test in a way that made the United
States appear to be interested in creating nuclear explosions and the Soviet government interested in ending them. For example, the Soviets
might announce that they were visiting the test site most reluctantly, because they opposed continued nuclear testing and were only doing so because the United States had forced them to observe a weapons test as a
condition of being allowed to participate in a scientific exchange designed
to demonstrate the feasibility of banning all nuclear tests. From a U.S.
point of view, any such short-term propaganda victory for the Soviets
might be outweighed by the verification gains if the Soviets, having seen
CORRTEX in operation, embraced it. But that a demonstration would
make a significant difference in the Soviet attitude toward CORRTEX
seems unlikely; after all, Soviet scientists had already had ample opportunity to learn about it by reading the open literature on the device.
The reason the Soviets were so negative regarding this device is unclear, but two possible explanations exist. First, they may have felt insulted that the United States demanded additional verification measures
(particularly in a climate of U.S. accusations about "likely" violations) after
both countries had long ago signed a treaty which did not provide for such
measures. Second, the use of CORRTEX to measure the yields of Soviet
nuclear tests would require a team of fifteen Americans drilling holes and
operating electronic equipment on the Soviet nuclear test site ("a few tens
of feet from the emplacement hole") before, during, and immediately after
Soviet tests. In many ways, "onsite" CORRTEX inspections would be far
more intrusive than onsite inspections under a CTB, because under a CTB
regime, no testing would be legitimate, and an inspecting country would
only look at a wilderness area where a suspicious event had occurred, not
at a nuclear weapons test itself. The Soviets may not have had confidence
that their counter-intelligence equipment and procedures could insure
that CORRTEX observers and equipment monitored only yields and not
radioactive by-products or other indications of the purpose or nature of
nuclear tests. Hearings/Exec N/100, supra note 106, at 20 (testimony of
Robert B. Barker, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy));
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE, supra note 124, at 2.
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of the other Model I explanations, it cannot begin to account
for the' granting of the station permits.l 31 If governments
are rational actors, the Soviets had some reasons for wanting
to establish seismic stations in Nevada. If it were also in the
U.S. interest to let the Soviets do so, unconditional grants of
visas would have seemed in order. If, on the other hand, letting the Soviets have stations in Nevada were not in the U.S.
interest, or were in the U.S. interest only if the Soviets also
observed a CORRTEX demonstration, denying or conditioning the station permits would have made more sense
than denying or conditioning the visas. With NRDC help,
the Soviets would be able to select sites and obtain data without physically setting foot in Nevada, but if permission to
construct the stations had been denied, neither NRDC nor
the Soviets could have continued to pursue the Nevada end
of the seismic verification project.
IV.

MODEL

II

To the analyst using Model II, the "U.S. Government"
barely exists. A "government consists of a conglomerate of
semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own." 132 Each of these organizations
works, to a large extent, independently of the others,
although their outputs are "partially coordinated by government leaders." 133 The behavior of each organization is determined primarily by pre-established routines, and explanation of governmental behavior "starts from this base line,
noting incremental deviations." 134 Thus, national governments are not in fact "national," and their conduct cannot be
well understood without penetrating the veneer of governmental unity and looking at the conduct of particular agen131. Other observers of the Government's reaction to the NRDC project, applying Model I reasoning, have concluded that the United States
was inconsistent because of its "unease," Garelik, The Grounds for a Test Ban
Treaty, DISCOVER, June 1987, at 50, 58, or because it was "ambivalent,"
Goldman, Gallis & Voas, Verifying Arms Control Agreements: The Soviet
View 122 n.25 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-316F, at
73-74, prepared for the Subcomm. on Arms Control of the Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, April 10, 1987).
132. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 67.
133. !d.
134. Id. at 68.
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cie~ or departments. Consideration of more than one such
agency is usually necessary. The various aspects of a problem must be delegated to particular offices which were previously given primary responsibility for, and "primary power"
over, an area oflife (such as diplomacy, or military readiness,
or intelligence) .1ss
Governmental behavior is not necessarily "rational,"
either. The organizations that are the true decision-makers
do not look at all aspects of a problem and then carefully
canvass all available options in order to maximize utility according to a long-range pfan for achieving considered and
agreed goals. Instead, these organizations tend to focus primarily on only those aspects of the problem for which they
have responsibility, and even when an agency considers
more than one piece of a problem, it looks at the pieces one
by one. Agencies also tend to attempt solutions that are
"good enough" rather than those that are necessarily the
best. These solutions may be directed not to the "national
interest" or even to the goals of the highest leaders of government. An agency's central concerns may be oriented
around maintaining "organizational health" by avoiding decreases in budgets, limitations on personnel, or encroachments by other agencies on the agency's mission.136 Perhaps
most importandy, the organizations operate almost exclusively by "standard operating procedures" (SOPs) rather
than by tailoring action to the needs of each situation, because SOPs "permit concerted action by large numbers of
individuals, each responding to basic cues." 137
To the Model II analyst, leaders appear to play only specialized, severely bounded roles. Leadership decisions are
confined by the bureaucratic outputs of various organizations, which are themselves limited by those organizations'
own constraints, capabilities, and SOPs. In Model II, "existing organizational routines for employing present physical
capabilities constitute the range of effective choice open to

135. /d. at 80.
136. /d. at 71-72, 82.
137. /d. at 83. Although Allison does not make the point, a positive feature of governmental use of SOPs is that in situations affecting individuals
or corporations, standard responses are consistent with the notion of
"equal protection under law"; that is, oflike cases receiving similar treatment.
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government leaders confronted with any problem." 1 ~1 s
Given this system, the "organizational outputs structure the
situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must
make their 'decisions' ... the formal choice of the leaders is
frequently anti-climactic." 139
In Allison's characterization of Model II, law plays only
a minor role. Allison mentions the law only once in his paradigm for Model II, when he says that the "set of constraints
[affecting an organization's goals] emerges from a mix of the
expectations and demands of other organizations in the government, statutory authority, demands from citizens and special interest groups, and bargaining within the organization." 140 That the law must, at least some of the time, significantly affect SOPs and, as a result, significantly influence
decisional outcomes, seems evident.
Allison's evidence for the validity of Model II analysis,
based on his study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, is striking, for
Model II resolves some riddles of that event that Model I
cannot begin to answer. For example, given the fact that the
Soviets were trying to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba
secretly, before the United States could discover their presence, Model I has a difficult time explaining why, after the
missiles were delivered to Cuba in a clandestine manner,
their sites were set up in a way that virtually advertised their
presence. The surface-to-air missiles defending each site
were positioned in the same trapezoidal pattern in which surface-to-air missiles were arrayed around strategic missiles in
the Soviet Union. Each site had four rocket launchers, as in
the Soviet Union. The sites were not camouflaged until after
the United States announced it had discovered the missiles.
The Russian troops wore civilian clothing when they arrived
at Cuban docks, but they formed in ranks of four to go to
their truck convoys and decorated their barrack areas with
insignia including the Red Army Star.t 41
Model II can account for this "irrational" behavior. The
equipment was transported to Cuban shores by a Soviet mili138. !d. at 79.
139. !d. This statement is a somewhat oversimplified summary of Allison's paradigm. For the complete statement, see id. at 78-96.
140. !d. at 82 (emphasis added).
141. /d. at 106-09.
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tary intelligence agency which was accustomed to secretive
procedures. Upon delivery, however, the equipment became
the responsibility of the Soviet Air Defense Command and
the Strategic Rocket Forces, which had no SOPs for secret
operations. The Air Defense Command constructed surfaceto-air missile emplacements just as it had always done-in a
trapezoidal pattern. The Strategic Rocket Forces put four
launchers on a site because "literally according to the book"
a strategic rocket site is supposed to have four launchers.
Missile sites were not camouflaged because they were not
camouflaged in the Soviet Union. The regiments of soldiers
behaved exactly as they had been trained.l 42
U.S. Governmental conduct is also clarified by Model II
analysis. On October 4, 1962, after the Kennedy Administration learned that a CIA agent had seen what looked like a
strategic missile in Cuba, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, which had responsibility for U-2 overflights,
decided to send a plane over the island. But the flight did
not take place for ten more days. The delay cannot be explained in terms of maximizing national utility. The delay
can be understood, however, in terms of a battle between the
Air Force and the CIA over whose pilots would fly the mission. For the Air Force to win the fight (arguing that if a
plane were shot down, the pilot would be safer in uniform)
took five days. A second five days were lost apparently because the Air Force pilot had to be trained to fly the CIA's
modified version of the U-2 plane.t43
Applying this model of organizational processes to the
U.S. Government's response to the NRDC seismic verification project, the first step is to note that there was no unified
142. !d. at 110-12.
143. !d. at 122-23. Allison offers many other examples showing the influence of turf battles and standard operating procedures having more influence than leadership decisions on governmental behavior during the
crisis. A few months earlier, for instance, Secretary of Defense McNamara
had stated that in a nuclear war, the United States would launch its weapons at Soviet military sites, rather than cities, to encourage the Soviet
Union to do likewise. Yet at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, following that organization's SOPs, the head of the Strategic Air Command dispersed his B-47 bombers with nuclear weapons to civilian airports across
the country, even to southeastern cities within the range of Soviet missiles
in Cuba that had already become operational. !d. at 138-39.
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"U.S. Government response," but only responses of particular agencies or groups of agencies, linked loosely by liaison
mechanisms. Furthermore, the responses that occurred
were not reactions to "the NRDC project," but only to particular aspects of that project--export, visas, or construction
of the stations. Although NRDC initially described the overall nature of its project to a senior government official, 144 the
"government" never planned a unified, coherent policy approach to all aspects of the NRDC project. The Government's "response" was easily split, partly because, depending on the stage of the project, different agencies had primary responsibility for dealing with the NRDC, and partly
because the NRDC's project calendar required it to apply for
the various government licenses at separate times, months
apart. Looking at each aspect of the project as an isolated
part then becomes necessary.

The Export License
In june, 1986, expected waiting time for a license to export controlled goods to the Soviet Union was sixty days 145
even when the level of technology was relatively low. The
NRDC application was granted on June 24, a mere four
working days after it was filed. Several questions arise regarding this license. Why was it granted at all? Why did it
A.

144. NRDC project co-director Dr. Thomas Cochran met with Deputy
Secretary of State John Whitehead on February 20, 1986, and again on
June 3, 1986 (immediately upon returning from Moscow), to brief him on
the project. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran in Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 5, 1987).
145. Estimate of Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Trade Administration, quoted in Sfiligoj, Government Export License Proposal to Reduce Response Time by Half, AMERICAN METAL MARKET/METALWORKING NEws, June 23, 1986, at 5, 38. Secretary Freedenberg's estimate may
have been low; a 1986law review note puts the average West-East processing time at 192 working days. Note, Trade Regulation-Export Controls, 16
GA.]. INT'L & CoMP. L. 197, 202 (1986). But the Note cites a 1983 monograph as its authority, and Commerce probably improved its performance
between 1983 and 1986. The Freedenberg estimate is supported by a
Commerce Department official who works in the lower ranks of the Office
of Export Administration. Interview with Donald Hammond, Office of
Technology and Policy Analysis, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (April 27, 1987) (estimating
60 days as normal processing time for the level of technology involved in
the first NRDC export).
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take as much as four working days? Why did it take only four
working days?
Exports ofU.S. equipment to foreign countries are governed by the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended. 146 The Act has multiple, sometimes contradictory
purposes-to facilitate exports by U.S. businesses, to further
U.S. foreign policy, and to protect national security.147 The
Act assigns to the Department of Commerce principal responsibility for achieving these objectives, and it provides for
a licensing scheme as the primary device for regulating the
export of sensitive technology. 148 The Department maintains a "control list" of types of goods and information
which cannot be exported to other countries without a license.149 If an item appears on the list, no person in the
United States may take the item to another country without a
license from the Department--either a "general license"
(permission under regulations to send the item to certain
countries but not others) or a "validated license" (a piece of
paper authorizing a particular export). 150 As a practical matter, with only a "few minor exceptions," all exports of U.S.
goods and technology require one type of license or the
other.l5l
Certain types of equipment could be of some military or
intelligence value to a potential enemy of the United States.
These items, selected jointly by the Defense and Commerce
Departments, are designated on the control list as subject to
national security controls. 152 In addition, the Act permits
the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation of any
146. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401 et seq. {West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
147. Id. §§ 2401, 2402, 2404, 2405.
148. /d. §§ 2403, 2409{a){1), 2415{8).
149. Id. § 2403{b).
150. /d. § 2403{a). For an overview of the statutory plan, sec Evrard,
The Export Administration Act of 1979: Anal)·sis of its Major Provisions and Potmlial Impact on United States Exporters, 12 CAL. W. lNT'L LJ. 1 (1982}.
151. Flowe, Export Licensing of Computer Equipment and Technology-A Practitioner's Perspective, 10 N.CJ. lNT'L L. & CoM. REG. 633, 635 (1985). Thus,
even the baggage that a tourist takes on a Western European vacation
must be licensed, although in this case, the "exporter" need not apply for
a particular "validated license" because ordinary baggage is covered
under a General License called, appropriately enough, "BAGGAGE." 15
C.F.R. § 371.6 (1988).
152. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404 {West Supp. 1985).
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goods ... to the extent necessary to further significantly the
foreign policy of the United States," 153 subject to certain
procedural constraints. These "foreign policy controls" can
only be imposed if the President (or an appropriate official
exercising delegated power) consults "at the earliest possible
opportunity" with other countries "with which the United
States maintains export controls cooperatively," and with
two statutorily designated Congressional committees. Further, foreign policy controls may not be imposed until after
Congress has been sent a written report indicating, among
other things, how they will further U.S. foreign policy. The
written report must be followed, within a year, by oral testimony about those controls to the two committees which had
to be consulted in advance. 154 In addition, foreign policy
controls must be indicated on the control list. 155
Numerous government offices deal with the export license process. In the Department of Commerce, the Office
of Export Administration (OEA) includes twenty-four offices
staffed by "230 licensing officers and other professionals."156 The Department receives about 140,000 applications a year, 157 requiring a high degree of standardization in
processing. The applications are screened to determine
whether they must be referred to other agencies. If an application pertains to an item and destination controlled for purposes of national security, OEA refers it to the Department
of Defense. 158 Similarly, if an item is subject to foreign policy controls, it is reviewed by the Department of State, and
the State Department additionally has a statutory right to review "any" application. 159 If other agencies are entitled to
or ask to review an application, the referrals must take place
within twenty days, and the other agencies have twenty days
after receipt in which to respond, although they may, at the
end of that time, routinely request a further twenty-day ex/d. § 2405(a)(1).
/d. § 2405(d), (f).
!d. § 2405(1).
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OVERVIEW
ISTRATION PROGRAM at iv, 1 (1985).
157. !d. at 15.
158. Flowe, supra note 151, at 638.
159. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(a)(l), (a)(5).

153.
154.
155.
156.

OF THE EXPORT ADMIN-
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tension. 160 Then, within sixty days after receiving the recommendations of other agencies, OEA must grant or deny
the license, subject to appeal. 161 Thus, under the statutory
plan, OEA must grant or deny licenses within five months
after application is made.
Although, in practice, these "time limits are often not
adhered to," 162 OEA does manage to process most cases
within five months. In fact, by 1986 the processing time for
West-East transfers had been reduced to sixty days.I63 Typically much of the delay in processing time is due to the internal procedures of the agencies to which the OEA refers applications for comment. For example, at the Department of
Defense, applications referred by OEA are received at the
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), an
agency with seven "directorates" of its own. 164 Upon receipt, the application is logged into a computer system and
then
assigned to a technical expert who assesses the impact of the proposed export on national security.
The export regulations[,] . . . technical data, personal knowledge, recommendations on previous
cases, intelligence reports, and consultations with
the military services and/or the applicant are all
used in this assessment. . . . The case then undergoes a policy review which considers the technical
assessment as well as other pertinent information
on which a final DOD position is based.I65
If DTSA, speaking for the Department of Defense, disagrees
with the conclusions of the OEA staff, an interagency meeting must be held to resolve the differences. According to the
Department of Defense, in such meetings it "frequently finds
itself advocating its position ... in isolation. Often the other
participating agencies will challenge DoD's national securitybased objections with arguments of foreign policy or com160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. § 2409(e).
Id. § 2409(£).
Flowe, supra note 151, at 658.
See supra note 146.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY SECUR-

A
165. Id. at 34.

ITY PROGRAM,

REPORT TO THE

99TH

CoNGRESs,

2o

SESs.

4 (1986).
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mercia! competitiveness." 166
When the NRDC applied for its export license in June
1986, OEA had primary responsibility for evaluating therequest. In addition, if any of the items to be exported to the
Soviet Union were listed on the control list for national security reasons, DTSA would also contribute to this review.
The NRDC's license application listed eleven models of
equipment that it wanted to install in Kazakhstan. 167 Eight
of the eleven models consisted of seismometers, a drum recorder, an oscilloscope, a frequency counter, and a sweep
function generator. The control list included a listing for
"electronic and precision instruments specially designed or
modified for geophysicial or mineral prospecting, 168 but this
listing did not apply to the seismometers the NRDC proposed to export. These particular instruments were "off the
shelf items designed for multiple purposes (including earthquake monitoring)" and had not been "specially designed"
for prospecting. 169 This category did not fit the seismometers, and no listing covered drum recorders, oscilloscopes,
frequency counters, or sweep function generators. 170 Therefore, these eight models of equipment were all swept up in a
catch-all category, numbered "6599G," entitled "other electronic and precision instruments, including photographic
equipment and film." For items in this category, individually
validated licenses are necessary only for exports to country
groups "S" and "Z"; Libya, Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea,
and Viet Nam, and for exports to military or police entities in
166. !d. at 38.
167. Rider A to NRDC Export License Application 001 Qune 16, 1986).
The application covered 33 pieces of equipment, but there were several
multiples of the same model.
168. International Trade Admin. Commodity Control List, 15 C.F.R.
§ 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6598F (1986) [hereinafter ITA Control List]
(amended by 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6598F (1988), which removes
such electronic equipment from control). Exports to the Soviet Union of
goods fitting within this listing were subject to "foreign policy" controls.
/d. If the seismometers had fit this description, the State Department
would have had to pass on the application, and the government might
have had discretion to deny it.
169. Telephone interview withjohn Vema, Office of Export Licensing,
Department of Commerce Qune 15, 1987). Mr. Vema processed the
NRDC application.
170. See ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1.
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South Africa and Namibia. 171 For these eight types of equipment, therefore, the NRDC was not required to apply for explicit permission at all.
The three other types of items were a "DCS-302 Event
Recorder," an "SMR-104 lab playback system," and an
"SMR-102 field playback system," all manufactured by Terra
Technology Corporation. 172 These items use cassette tapes
to receive and record information from seismometers and to
plot the data on special paper; the information can also be
played from the tapes into a computer for further analysis.173
They are therefore "recording or reproducing equipment,"
within the meaning of Section 1572A of the Control List.17-t
A digital tape recorder is exempt from export licensing if it
uses a "tape width not exceeding 1/4 inch" and packs its
data at a "density not exceeding 800 [bits per inch]." 175 But
the DCS-302 event recorder the NRDC wanted to employ,
while using quarter-inch tape, was able to record 1200 bits
per inch, and was therefore subject to controls. 17G On the
other hand, the regulations also provide that for exports to
"Country Group Y" (which includes the Soviet Union),
"[l]icenses are likely to be approved for export to satisfactory
end-users . . . [of d]igital magnetic recorders specially
designed for seismic/geophysical applications and operating
in the frequency range of 5 to 800 Hz." 177 The DCS-302
records at 50 to 600 Hz, so while a license was required, it
would be granted for exports to the Soviet Union as long as
171. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6599G.
172. NRDC Export Application 001, Rider A, supra note 164.
173. Brochures of Terra Technology Corp., Seattle, Wa.
174. ITA Contol List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A. The
Control List defines this category to include all such equipment, subject to
a few specific exceptions such as non digital tape recorders designed for
voice or music. /d. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A{a)(i).
175. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A,
Note 2{c){6).
176. Handwritten, undated notes of Donald Hammond, OEA, supplied
to the author by NRDC attorney David Wirth.
177. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A, Advisory Note 5(e) (1986). The most recent C.F.R. revision renames Group
Y countries as Group Q,W.Y. While Group Q,W.Y. contains more countries, both groups include the Soviet Union, id. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec.
1572A, Advisory Note 5(c) (1988).
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the end-user was acceptable. 178 In this case, the end-user
was the NRDC itself, and the license application specified
that "this equipment will remain under the ownership and
control of U.S. citizens at all times [and] will not be consigned or sold."
In light of Model II two questions can be anwered about
the NRDC license: why it was granted, and why it took as
long as six days. The license application was filed with OEA
in the Department of Commerce, and there it underwent a
point-by-point comparison with the control list. OEA
learned from this review that most of the items on the application were ones for which no approval was needed, and that
with respect to the items for which a license was needed
under Section 1572A, the regulations mandated that for an
American end-user who proposed to bring the equipment
back to the United States when the work was done, an export
license should be granted. NRDC got its license because, for
this equipment, a license would have been granted to any
American proposing to use it in the Soviet Union. The control list established the standard routines of OEA and of the
other agencies that advised it, routines that were used
thousands of times a year. These regulations and routines
did not distinguish between exports that advanced verification of nuclear test ban treaties and those that did not, or
between those that encouraged investigation of CORRTEX
and those that did not. Indeed, to the standard procedures
of OEA and the other relevant agencies, the fact that this
exporter's purpose was to demonstrate seismic verification
of restraints on nuclear testing was profoundly irrelevant.
While the Secretary of State can review any export license application, 179 the law apparently provides that foreign policy control may only be exercised if it is made part of
the regulations. The ITA Control List describes the controls
on the recording equipment NRDC wanted to use as for national security rather than foreign policy purposes, rendering the Secretary of State powerless to block an export. 180
178. Unacceptable Soviet end-users include, for example, plants producing military goods. See Interview with Norman D. Kass, Defense Technology Sec. Admin., in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 10, 1987).
179. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
180. "The Secretary shall clearly identify on the control list which goods
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The granting of the license was fairly routine, and the
reason why six days (four working days) were needed is apparent. Under the national security controls of Section
1572, DTSA must review the application and Commerce
could not have granted the license instantly. Six days is
barely time to get the application from the Commerce Department's headquarters over to the Defense Department in
Virginia, have it logged in and reviewed by the proper people and return it to the OEA.
The more interesting question, is not why the licensing
took as many as six days, but why it was achieved in such a
short time, when OEA is given by statute five months to
make a determination and usually takes sixty days, even for a
relatively simple West-to-East export. 1SI
The statutes do not explain the result, but the regulations are helpful, and the actual operating practices of OEA
or technology, and which countries or destinations, are subject to which
types of controls under this section." 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(1) (West
Supp. 1988). In the case of listing 1572A, "national security" controls,
and not "foreign policy" controls, are imposed. ITA Control List, s11pra
note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A. Therefore, while the application
could have been received by the Department of State, such re,iew is irrelevant because the Department's foreign policy control could not have been
imposed. Foreign policy controls are imposed under listing 6599, for the
seismometers, oscilloscope, etc., but only with respect to country groups S
and Z and not for the Soviet Union. Thus the State Department can advise
OEA-and perhaps thereby determine-whether a proposed export of a
seismometer to Cuba should be permitted, but is not given the same discretion with respect to exports to the Soviet Union of goods described in
6599. As indicated supra notes 167-171, the State Department could ha,•e
exercised considerably more discretion if the seismometers had happened
to be of a type designed specially for mineral prospecting, for then the
equipment would have fallen in a different category. In this case, the application was not sent to the State Department. Telephone interview l\ith
Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Division, Office of E.xport Licensing,
Dept. of Commerce, May 26, 1987 (based on Ms. Vigness' computer
search of the processing record for License B 130273).
181. See mpra notes 145, 160-161 and accompanying text. The likelihood of substantial delay is so great that for exports to the Soviet Union,
the Commerce Department's regulations direct exporters not to request
information about an application, in the absence of emergency circumstances, until six weeks after they mailed the application to the Department. International Trade Administration, Export Licensing General Policy, 15 C.F.R. § 370.ll(a)(2)(iii)(B) and note following (1988).
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are of great significance. 182 Over the years, American exporters have complained bitterly about the slow treatment
that their applications have received from the Department of
Commerce.IB3 In response, OEA has quietly adopted a twotrack processing system, in which approximately 98% of applications are handled through the usual routines, and the
other 2% are expedited on a special fast track, known as
"special processing" or "emergency clearance." 184
Formal authority for the fast track derives from a federal
regulation 1 B5 which is extremely vague. According to the
regulation, an exporter may apply for emergency clearance,
and if emergency handling is warranted (the regulation specifies no standards), the exporter will be notified by telephone
when a license is granted. The regulation further provides
182. These operating practices have been committed to writing in an
informal operating manual of the Exporters Assistance Division of OEA.
but the manual is not shown to the public. Part of the reason that the
manual is not public is that it is still, after more than a year, in a process of
development, but in addition, the Division prefers to keep it private because "if you put everything out on the table, everyone will try to use it to
push his case through." Interview with James Truske, Exporters Assist·
ance Division, OEA (May 28, I 987).
183. See, e.g., Export of Alaskan Crude Oil-Foreign Policy Implications: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 361-65 (1983) (testimony of
C.N. Winningstad, Chairman of Floating Point Systems, Inc.) (complaining that the government often takes a year to process license applications, despite a (then) six-month deadline); Aerospace Industry, Machine Tools
Industry, and Electronics Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommillee on National
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 145-47 (1982) (testimony of Victor Ragosine, representing the
American Electronics Association); id. at 175-78 (testimony of Robert S.
Lovett, representing the Scientific Apparatus Makers Association); Second
Annual judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 104 F.R.D. 207, 298-99 (1984) (statement ofHylan B. Lyon, Texas
Instruments, Inc.); Schatz, A Moving Modem Story, DATAMATION, July 15,
1984, at 64; Flowe, supra note 151, at 658.
184. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182. The 2% figure applies to cases handled from their inception on the fast track; another 3%
are placed on the fast track after they are the subject of such delay within
the Department that the statutory deadlines for action will soon be triggered. /d.
185. International Trade Administration Individual Validated Licenses
and Amendments, 15 C.F.R. § 372.4(h)(i) (1988) [hereinafter ITA Individual Licenses].
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that a such license will expire in one to two months rather
than the customary one year period.
In practice, cases get onto the fast track if, as a result of
an event beyond the exporter's control, quick licensing is
needed. For example, if a production line in another country breaks down and an American part is needed to repair it,
emergency clearance is warranted. However, if an exporter
contracts to deliver merchandise at an early date, sooner
than export licensing on the normal track would occur,
emergency handling is not considered warranted. The
agency takes the position that the exporter "got himself into
it." 186 The decision to put a case on the fast track is made or
implemented by an "emergency handling officer of the
day," 187 one of fifteen rotating entry-level civil servants who
form part of the staff of the Exporters Assistance Division of
OEA. If the officer of the day believes the case to be among
the 2% qualifying for emergency handling (a decision which
can be overriden by the head of the Division), he or she gives
the file a special cover page, called a Special Processing Control Record. 188 This record alerts those who handle the file,
both in the Department of Commerce and in any agencies to
which the matter is referred, to take the case out of the usual
order and to expedite it as much as possible. Normally, export license cases are sent from office to office in OEA in
batches of three to four hundred cases, every few days, and
186. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182. Getting export license cases expedited requires mastery of intricate regulations, but understanding the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy is important as well. Exporters who need quick treatment may hire as a consultant a Washington
attorney or other specialist who knows the OEA bureaucrats by name and
is deeply familiar with their regulations and written and unwritten operating procedures. The D.C. bar includes a specialized group of la\\1'ers
whose work is to try to expedite the export license applications of firms
from all over the United States. They make telephone calls and personal
visits to focus the attention of OEA personnel on the cases for their clients
and to argue the substantive case in favor of granting the license, where
necessary. Telephone interview with Martin Kalin, one such specialist
(Mar. 30, 1987).
187. Telephone interview with Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Division, OEA (May 26, 1987).
188. Interview with james Truske, supra note 182. See also Berlack, Practical Tips on Obtaining Export Licenses, in 2 I. MARGUUES, THE COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND E.XPORT ADMINISTRATION 1984, at 253, 277 (1984).
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are reviewed within each office on a first-come, first-served
basis. If a case has the Special Processing cover page, however, it is individually hand-carried to the licensing officer,
and that officer reviews it within a day, rather than letting it
work up through the pile of applications awaiting consideration. The Exporters Assistance Staff checks with the office of
the licensing officer two to three times a day so that as soon
as that officer has approved the application, it can be taken to
the next office (often the Review and Referral Unit, which
sends copies to any other agencies that must be consulted).
The application is, again, hand carried to this Unit if it is covered by a Special Processing form.ts9
The NRDC application moved as quickly as it did because it was assigned to the fast track. On June 16, it was
given Emergency Control Number 4001, and the file was
covered by a Special Processing Control Record. 190 The file
was moved quickly among offices. The file originated in the
Exporters Assistance Division, where the Special Processing
Control record was assigned, and it was immediately sent to
the Electronic Components Division of OEA for review.
Then the file was transmitted to the Review and Referral
Unit which within two days of the original filing, sent it for
concurrent review to the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. 191 These offices also expedited consideration. For example, the Defense Technology Security Administration marked its own file "Urgent," 192 and, after completing its review in two working days, DTSA received the
application from the Review and Referral Unit of the Department of Commerce on june 20, a Friday, and notified Commerce of its approval on Tuesday,June 24. 193 DTSA used its
own "fast track" procedure for notifying the Department of
189. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182.
190. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Special Processing Control Record 400 I, covering Export License Application
B 130273 (hand dated june 16, 1986, machine dated june 18, 1986).
191. Telephone interview with Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Division, OEA (May 26, 1987).
192. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense Technology Security Administra·
tion, Export Control Case Work Sheet for Case Number B 130273 Qune
20, 1986).
193. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of Strategic Trade Policy, Case
Processing Work Sheet for Case No. B 130273 Qune 20, 1986).
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Commerce of its favorable recommendation. Usually, DTSA
collects its recommendations on export license cases in
"batches," and transmits these batches to OEA periodically.
This application fell into batch number 705, 194 the recommendations for which went in writing to the Department of
Commerce onJuly 2, after the date by which the Soviets had
told the NRDC it needed to have the shipments undenvay.
But a DTSA official followed the standard procedure for
emergency cases, telephoning OEA of DTSA's decision on
June 24. 195 That very day, OEA notified the NRDC by telephone that its application had been granted. 196 Similarly,
the Department of Energy received its copy of the application on June 23 and notified OEA of its approval on June
24.197

Although an examination of the U.S. Government's procedures for processing export license applications reveals
that NRDC's application moved quickly because it was
scooped up into the "fast track" procedures of the Department of Commerce and other agencies, the documents raise
four questions that Model II, with its focus on organizational
routines, can not answer. First, the Special Processing Control Record is hand-dated June 16, two days before NRDC
filed its application for a license. How can even "special"
processing begin to deal with an application that had not yet
been filed?
Second, although attachment of a Special
Processing Control Record can predictably lead to expedited
consideration, we do not yet know how the NRDC project
qualified for the fast track rather than routine treatment. Indeed, the NRDC-SAS agreement seems to be a contractual
arrangement of the very sort that OEA does not usually regard as a legitimate case warranting expedition. 198 Third,
the regulations specify that if emergency treatment is given
to an application, the validity period of the license "will end
no later than the last day of the calendar month following the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran Uune 24, 1986) (entry for
2:32p.m.).
197. Telephone conversation between Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC,
and Kathleen Vial, Department of Commerce, reflected in Daily Journal of
Dr. Thomas Cochran Uune 24, 1986).
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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month in which the license is issued unless a longer validity
period can bejustified." 199 In this case, although NRDC did
not request nor desire a "longer validity period" the license
that was granted was valid for a full thirteen months.2oo
Fourth, even if we consider the Department of Commerce's
special processing to be normal, it does not satisfactorily explain why the case moved so swiftly through DTSA in the
Defense Department as well, since " 'other agencies will pay
no attention to the EC [Emergency Clearance] status of the
application, whatsoever.' "201
The Department of Commerce Special Processing Record itself contains a clue to at least the first three of these
oddities; in the "remarks" column are two handwritten notations: "RUSH STATE DEPT. REQUEST NEED BY JUNE
2.4" and "Expedite per [Secretary of Commerce] Baldrige
Request. " 202 But an explanation of these notations, and of
what happened when the application arrived at the Defense
Department, must await consideration of Model III, in which
the discretion of individual policy makers is seen to affect the
decisions of their government.
B.

The Visas

As in the case of the export licensing, our question
about the Soviet scientists' visa applications may be broken
down into three parts. First, why was there an issue about
the entry of the Soviet scientists? That is, was the issuance of
visas more complicated than ministerially stamping their
passports and, if so, how? Second, assuming that their admission was not automatic, and given the fact that their mission would tend to advance the cause of a nuclear test ban
which the U.S. Administration did not support, why were
they admitted at all? Finally, why was their admission subject
to their having to choose one of two sets of conditions-observation of a CORRTEX demonstration or exclusion from
199. ITA Individual Licenses, supra note 185, at (h)(5).
200. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export License B 130273 (orally granted
June 24, 1986, written license machine datedjune 27, 1986).
201. Berlack, supra note 188, at 278.
202. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, supra
note 190 (emphasis in original).
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the areas to which they needed to go for on-site selection of
seismic station locations?
Like export licensing, visa issuance is heavily regulated
by federal statutes and regulations; these statutes and regulations strongly influence the day-to-day operating procedures of the State Department and the Justice Depanment,
the agencies with primary responsibilities for admitting foreign nationals to the United States. People (other than Canadian or certain Mexican nationals) 203 who desire to enter
the United States must have valid visas. The law distinguishes between immigrant visas (for those desiring to take
up permanent residence in the United States) and nonimmigrant visas (for temporary visitors). 204 Since the Soviet
scientists who proposed to visit Nevada in connection with
the NRDC-SAS project were to be temporary visitors, they
applied for nonimmigrant visas.
The State Department controls visas 205 and therefore
has primary regulatory authority. By statute, the State Department includes a Visa Office within the Bureau of Consular Affairs. 206 Consular officers of the U.S. Embassies abroad
perform the day-to-day work of reviewing applications for
nonimmigrant visas.2o1
A nonimmigrant seeking to enter the United States must
apply for one of thirteen categories ofvisa.208 Many of these
categories were unsuitable for the NRDC project, 209 but
three categories might have been considered: the A-2 visa,
the J-1 visa and the B-1 visa. An "A-2" visa 210 can be
granted to employees of a foreign government (other than
diplomatic officers, who come within the scope of the "A-1"
visa category) "who are accepted by the Secretary of
State."2 11 Had the Soviets applied in this visa category, the
203. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Documentary Requirement, 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.1(a), (c) (1988).
204. 8 U.S.C.A. § 120l(a) (1977).
205. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (1976).
206. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1104(c) (1982).
207. Jd. § 1201(a)(2).
208. Jd. §§ II01(a)(15), 1201(1)(2).
209. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a)(l5)(D) (alien crew members);
(a)(15)(K) (alien fiances entering to marry U.S. citizens).
210. Jd. § II01(a)(15)(A)(ii).
211. Jd.
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Department of State, exercising the power of the Secretary,
would have had unlimited discretion to "accept" them; that
is, to accept or refuse the application. But if the Soviet scientists, who were employed by the Institute of the Physics of
the Earth, had elected this option, they would have had to
say that they were employees of the Soviet government.
Although the Institute, like other Soviet scientific establishments, obtains its budget from the Soviet state, its scientists
do not regard themselves as government employees. 21 2 To
apply for A-2 visas, they would have had to characterize
themselves in a disagreeable way.
The Soviets might have considered applying for a ':J -1"
visa, the type of visa often used for scientific exchanges. This
type of visa is given to scholars with specialized skills coming
to the United States "for the purpose of ... studying; observing, [or] conducting research." 213 But a visa can be
granted under this section only if the program under which
the scholar is coming to the United States has been "designated" by the Director of the United States Information
Agency. The NRDC-SAS program had not been so designated, and no application for designation had been made.
The Soviet scientists therefore applied for "B-1" visas.
B-1 visas are granted to aliens having permanent residences
in foreign countries who are visiting the United States temporarily.214 An alien in this category is entitled to a visa,
however, only if he is not rendered ineligible by the McCarran-Walter Act. 21 5 This controversial 216 law, passed over
212. Cf Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 5, 1987). Cochran's knowledge of how Institute scientists regarded themselves was based on conversations with Soviet scientists over
the course of a year.
213. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (1970).
214. !d.§ 1101(a)(15)(B).
215. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163,
184-185 (1952) (ineligibility provision codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(28)(c),
(d) (1982)).
216. For recent criticism of the provisions pertaining to the exclusion of
prospective visitors who believe in or advocate Communism, see, e.g.,
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of New York, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON
HALL LEGIS.j. 249 (1985); Kalven, U.S. Visa Policy: The Machinery of Exclusion, BuLLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SciENTISTS, May 1987, at 21; Kemper, Do
Not Enter, Boston Globe, Feb. 17, 1985, Magazine at 12.
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President Truman's veto in 1952, makes prospective visitors
ineligible to receive nonimmigrant visas if they:
are members of or affiliated with ... the Communist
or any other totalitarian party of any . . . foreign
state [or if they] advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism ... or [if they] are members of or [are] affiliated with any organization that advocates the economic, international, and governmental doctrines
ofworld communism .... 217
A consular officer in the State Department post (embassy or
consulate) at which the application is presented218 makes the
determination of whether an applicant for a visa fits this or
any other category of excludable alien. 219 In the case of a
person applying for a B-1 visa, the consular officer's determination is based on the information disclosed in required
State Department Form 156, any information that U.S. Government agencies happen to have about the applicant, and
such information as may be obtained in a personal interview
with the applicant. 22o
In principle, the consular officer's decision as to the
alien's admissibility is final, and not subject to review by the
Secretary ofState. 221 In practice, however, the State Department has circumscribed its consular officers' discretion by issuing an extensive body of regulations 222 and supplementing
217. 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(28)(C) and (D) (1982).
218. 8 u.s.c. § 1201(g) (1982).
219. The law lists 33 grounds for excluding an alien. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(l)-(32) (1982). However, 24 grounds were repealed in 1986. 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. 1986).
220. Although interviews are required of almost every applicant for a
nonimmigrant visa, 22 C.F.R. § 41.114(a) (1986), they play only a small
role in the process. In the routine case, the interview lasts only five to ten
minutes even for those applying to immigrate rather than to visit. Note,
Consular Discretion in the Immigrant rrua-Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
87, 100 n.63 (1978).
221. The Secretary of State is charged with administering the immigration laws "relating to ... consular officers of the United States, except
those powers ... relating to the granting or refusal of visas." 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1104(a)(1) (1977). See Note,justicefor the Alien: The AdequaC)' of the Gansufar JTua Issuance System, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 461, 464 (1982).
222. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.50 (1988) (including 14 pages of regulations
governing issuance of nonimmigrant visas).
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the discretion with an even longer volume of formal administrative requirements, embodied in the Department's Foreign
Affairs Manual. 223 The regulations make the issuance of
most nonimmigrant visas a matter of law rather than discretion.
Some of these provisions are relevant to the applications
of the Soviet scientists. The regulations require a consular
officer to issue a visa to an applicant unless there is a statutory or regulatory basis for denial. 224 In the case of an applicant from a communist country, a person who has served
voluntarily "in a political capacity" with the "organization in
power" is deemed to be affiliated with a proscribed organization, rendering the applicant ineligible for admission under
the communist-exclusion provision of the McCarran-Walter
Act. 225 The Foreign Affairs Manual adds that "an alien who
is or was employed in a responsible position in an agency of
the government of a Communist or Communist-controlled
country is presumed to be ineligible" for a visa. 226 Even
though a State-funded scientific organization like the Institute of the Physics of the Earth may not technically be an
"agency of the government" of the Soviet Union, as a matter
of practice the State Department regards working as a scientist in such an organization as the equivalent of working for a
Soviet Government agency. 227 In addition, Form OF 156
asks applicants whether they are or have been members of
223. The sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual applicable to nonimmigrants are reprinted in 6 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE 32-1 to 32-349 (1988). The text is considerably longer than
349 pages, however, because many inserted pages are numbered with
decimals.
224. 22 C.F.R. § 41.90 (1986).
225. I d. § 41.91 (a)(28)(iii).
226. u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, PART II, 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.9l(a)(28) Note 2.2, reprinted in 6 GoRDON & RosENFIELD, supra note
223, at 32-216.
227. "Life in the Soviet Union is such that if you are involved at all in
society, as opposed to being a babushka wanting to visit a relative, you
can't help being affiliated in some way with the Communist Party. If you
have a job, you're going to belong to some organization. All those organizations are Communist-dominated or affiliated. So unless you're what
they call a parasite or a hooligan, you'll come under [subsection] 28 [of the
Immigration Act)." Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of
Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, Visa Office, U.S. Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 16, 1987).

Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1988]

POLICY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE

57

"Communist organizations and those affiliated therewith."228 If an applicant refuses to answer this question, the
refusal "may be considered an admission of affiliation in a
proscribed organization. "229 Although the operative word
in the Manual is "may," the Department routinely treats failures to answer this question by Soviet applicants as admissions of affiliation. 230 In these. cases, too, the consular officer
may refuse the visa.231
As a matter of standard practice, applicants from communist countries who seek nonimmigrant visas for non-official travel232 to the United States are routinely regarded by
consular officers as ineligible to receive such visas if: they
hold responsible positions in any sector of the Soviet establishment; admit their membership in a Communist-affiliated
organization; or refuse to answer the standard questions
about such membership. While it is not known for certain
how the Soviet scientists who sought to visit Nevada dealt
with the questions on their Form OF 156,233 the Soviet
scientists would have been regarded, at least by senior offi228. See A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL REY, & S. BELL, 1987 IMMIGRATION PRoCEDURES HANDBOOK 1-36 (1987).
229. u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, PART II. 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.9l(a)(28) Note 2.41, reprinted in GoRDON & RosENFIELD, supra note
223, at 32-216.1.
230. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227.
231. If these guidelines do not sufficiently constrain the discretion of a
consular officer, a further set of procedures may suffice to ensure that,
despite the statutory bar on Secretarial intervention, the discretion exercised is really that of senior department officials, rather than the consular
officer, if they have an interest in the particular application. A refusal must
be reviewed by the principal consular officer at the post. 22 C.F.R.
§ 4l.l30(b). The principal officer may ask the Visa Office in Washington
for an advisory opinion, or the Department may ask for a report and may
issue such an opinion on its own initiative. 22 C.F.R. § 4l.l30(c). If the
consular officer declines to follow the advisory opinion issued in Washington, he must explain the refusal to the Visa Office. !d. Furthermore, an
"interpretation of law, as distinguished from an application of the law" is
binding on the consular officer. !d.
232. Official governmental travel is accomplished on "A" visas, including diplomatic and official visas, rather than "B-1" and other types of visas.
See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text.
233. Since NRDC, an environmental organization, is not accustomed to
obtaining visas for foreign scientists, it left the visa application process to
the Soviet scientists. NRDC did not request or receive copies of the Soviets' application forms, nor did it do any research or advise the Soviet
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cials in the Visa Office, as Communist-affiliated by virtue of
their connection with the Institute of the Physics of the
Earth. At least equally important, is the fact that Soviet
scientists, following their standard operating procedure, do
not file U.S. applications with the U.S. Embassy personally,
but have them submitted by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.2 34 The Ministry, following its standard operating
procedure, never fills out the part of the form requesting information about Communist affiliations. 235 Under these circumstances, the consular officer handling the applications
would have been required, under the procedures of the Foreign Affairs Manual, to regard the applicants as ineligible for
entry into the United States.
But a determination of ineligibility is only the first step
of a two-step process. A statute provides that the consular
officer or the Secretary of State may apply to the Attorney
General of the United States for a waiver of ineligibility, and
that the Attorney General has discretion to grant the
waiver. 236 While "waiver" by the Attorney General of statutory ineligibility to enter the country might at first blush
seem to be an extraordinary procedure, the volume of applications from otherwise ineligible applicants has swelled considerably over the years, 237 and the granting of waivers now
has its own standard operating procedure, one that has be~n
influenced by a further legislative enactment, known as the
McGovern Amendment. In 1975, the United States, Canada,
and most European countries (including the Soviet Union)
Academy with respect to U.S. visa law. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr in
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1987).
234. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227.
235. /d.
236. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(3) (1985) provides that an ineligible alien applicant for a nonimmigrant visa "may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be
granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General. ... "
237. In 1985, 47,574 waivers were sought by persons classified as ineligible because of their belief in or advocacy of Communism. The Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 99th Gong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986) [hereinafter Helsi111li
Hearings] (testimony of Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs).
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signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,238 in which the signatory countries undertook, among other obligations, t9 reduce restrictions on
the free travel of foreign nationals in their countries. 239
As part of its response, Congress (at the urging of Senator McGovern) provided by law in 1977 that the Secretary of
State "should, within 30 days of receiving an application for
a nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludable from the
United States by reason of membership or affiliation with a
proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to
the United States, recommend that the Attorney General
grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa. "240
The Secretary may refuse to make such a recommendation
only by determining that the admission of the alien would
jeopardize "the security interests of the United States" and
so certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairperson
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.24I The McGovern Amendment established a strong Congressional policy
against the exclusion of aliens on the basis of their political
beliefs. The Amendment also imposed on the State Department personnel the considerable bureaucratic burden of
having to justify to Congress a refusal to recommend a
waiver.
As a result, 242 the State Department routinely recommends waivers. In 1985, 98.3% of the 47,574 alien applicants who had been rendered ineligible for admission because of their Communist affiliations were actually admitted.243 Two collateral practices demonstrate the tenacity
238. See Historical Note following 22 U.S.C.A. § 3002 (1979).
239. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (August 1, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1314 (1975).
240. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982).
" 241. /d.
242. "But because of the McGovern amendment that we have mentioned earlier, in most cases automatic waivers ofinadmissibilit)' were submitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service [of the Justice Department] . . . ." Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 28 (testimony of
Michael Newlin).
243. /d. In 1979, the McGovern Amendment had been amended to permit the Secretary to refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from "signatory counties which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions
of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian
affairs provisions." Pub. L. No. 96-60, § 109(2)(d), 93 Stat. 395, 398
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with which the State Department holds to its practice of recommending waivers. The law is silent with respect to
whether the ineligible alien must file a form in order to trigger the waiver process, but the Department does not require
this further application. Once the State Department determines that the applicant is excludable, it processes the
waiver application on his or her behalf without even informing the applicant that it is doing so. 244 In addition, in at least
a substantial fraction of the two percent of cases in which
waivers are denied, the Department resorts to a subterfuge
so that it can avoid taking responsibility for the refusal and
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 269l(d) (1982)). This provision pointedly referred to the Soviet Union, among oher countries. See 125 GoNG. REc.
8345-47 (April 24, 1979) (statement by its sponsor, Representative Solarz). The Solarz Amendment does not prohibit the Secretary from suggesting waivers routinely; it only removes the requirement that the Secretary recommend a waiver. In actuality, the Solarz Amendment did not
change the State Department practice of recommending waivers in nearly
every case. Although the practice could have changed with respect to Soviet-bloc applicants after 1979, "[o]ld habits die hard. They [State Depart·
ment bureaucrats] [still] act as if they had [sic] to justify a tum-down."
Telephone interview with Hon. Michael Heilman, Judge, Board of Immigration Appeals and former Associate General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Qune 30, 1987). The Department's rationale for not having changed its practice is that the United States has never
made a formal determination that the Soviet Union or any other country is
not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Making such a
determination "could affect other policies and interests going beyond the
area of visas, so it hasn't been done." Telephone interview with Cornelius
D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, Visa Office, U.S. Department of State Quly 6, 1987). The standard
practice of recommending waivers for Soviet applicants based on an interpretation of the Solarz amendment as requiring a formal determination is
consistent with the State Department's liberal administration of the McGovern Amendment itself. The statutory language directs that the Secretary "should" recommend waivers. Solarz stresses that the language was
deliberately "not mandatory." 125 GoNG. REc. 8347 (April 24, 1979)
(statement of Representative Solarz). "[T]he conferees went to a good
deal of trouble to use the word 'would' [sic] not 'shall,' but the fact of the
matter is that the Department of State has treated it as though it were
mandatory." !d. According to one Representative, in one year "well over
I 000 recommendations for exclusion had been made by our intelligence
agencies. Not one of them had been acceded to by the State Department.
In effect, every single recommendation against the admission of an excludable alien was overturned." 125 GoNG. REc. 8346 (April24, 1979) (state·
ment of Representative Ashbrook).
244. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227.
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can avoid notifying Congress that it is recommending against
a waiver. Under even the most liberal reading, the McGovern Amendment only requires that State recommend a
waiver, not that the Attorney General grant one. In cases in
which the State Department wants to exclude the applicant
but wants to avoid public responsibility, it sends a formal
recommendation for a waiver to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Then, in oral communications or
meetings, INS informs the Service that the State Department
really wants the waiver request to be denied. "They may
want the Attorney General to be the 'hard nose' while State
plays the innocent party, recommending entry."245 The result is a "collusive rejection."24 6
Based on standard procedures two of the three questions posed at the outset of this subsection become answerable. The admission of the Soviet scientists into the United
States was not a simple rubberstamping operation because,
under the routines originating in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and embedded in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual, visa applicants who hold responsible positions in the Soviet economy, or who decline to
answer the question about Communist affiliation on Form
OF 156, are deemed to be affiliated with a Communist organization and therefore ineligible to enter the United
States. On the other hand, the Soviets scientists were ultimately admitted because under practices originating in the
McGovern Amendment of 1977, the State Department has
developed a very strong presumption of not excluding applicants on the basis of their Communist affiliations.
These scientists, however, were not merely tourists or
even business persons who just happened to be connected in
Soviet society. They intended to carry out a project that
would prove that U.S. nuclear test-ban policy was based on
false premises about seismic verification. Could they not
have been excluded simply on the ground that their presence
in the United States was inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy? The answer to this question appears to be negative, in
terms of operating procedure if not law. The State Depart245. Interview with Hon. Michael Heilman, supra note 243.
246. Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 17 (statement of Reprcscntati\'e
Barney Frank).
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ment's consistent practice, under the McGovern Amendment, has been to treat it as though it eliminated any discretion to deny visas to Communist-affiliated aliens based on
generalized foreign policy concerns. 247 The Department
takes the position that although the text of the McGovern
Amendment does not preclude it from taking foreign policy
interests into account, the intent of the Amendment was to
effect just such a preclusion. "The result has been that the
Secretary of State is effectively precluded from acting in such
cases on the basis of legitimate foreign policy factors and
considerations .... Accordingly, for all practical purposes,

247. This is the practice under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982), dealing
with those affiliated with Communist organizations. A parallel provision, 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(27) (1982), bars entry of any alien who (in the opinion
of the consular officer) seeks to enter the United States "to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the
welfare, safety, or security of the United States." Conceivably, this other
provision could be used to deny admission to an alien applicant seeking to
enter the United States to engage in a project that was at odds with U.S.
foreign policy. However, such a usage of (a)(27) would not have been
consistent with the Department's ordinary practices. In a typical year, only
33 people are denied admission under this provision, compared with
47,574 people denied, initially, on the basis of Communist affiliations, and
most of them are individuals thought to be planning activies "harmful to
national security ... [such as] engaging in certain kinds of study in this
country at the behest of or with the support of Libya [for the purpose of
advancing terrorism]." Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 28-30 (testimony of Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs, and Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations, and Advisory Assistance, U.S. Department of State). In addition,
invoking subsection (a)(27) affords the State Department considerably less
flexibility than subsection (a)(28) because neither the provision of the law
allowing a waiver, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982), nor the provision allowing the imposition of conditions on an alien's visit applies to exclusions
under (a)(27). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982). Thus, if (a)(27) had been
invoked in the case of the Soviet scientists, they could not have been admitted at all. Of course, to find that an alien's visit was consistent with
"the public interest" might be theoretically possible only if the alien
agreed voluntarily to certain restrictions, and therefore to use (a)(27) to
exact self-imposed restrictions (e.g., geographical limitations) on a proposed visit, but the State Department never uses (a)(27) to impose conditions. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227. For a construction of (a)(27) and its relationship to the McGovern Amendment, see
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
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foreign policy factors are no longer considered m such
cases. " 248
Although a close look at the laws, regulations and procedures of the State Department helps to clarify why the Soviets were neither routinely admitted nor altogether excluded
from entry to the United States, it does not explain why their
entry was conditioned on their observation of a CORRTEX
demonstration or, alternatively, on their refraining from visiting the potential sites for seismic stations. The regulatory
scheme can shed some light regarding how their visas were so
conditioned, but not about why the conditions were imposed.
The authority for imposing conditions on the visit of a
nonimmigrant stems from a section of the 1917 Immigration
Act and, curiously, predates both the Communist exclusion
provisions and the authority of government officials to waive
excludability and admit otherwise ineligible aliens. Prior to
1917, Congress had already barred certain categories of
nonimmigrants from visiting the United States. These categories included "idiots," epileptics, paupers, polygamists,
anarchists, and prostitutes. 249 In 1917, Congress imposed
further limitations on the granting of nonimmigrant visas;
these included prohibitions on the entry of applicants who
were illiterate, psychopathic, or chronically alcoholic.250
But to some members of Congress, the statutory exclusion of visitors in all of these categories (particularly the barring of illiterates, which generated considerable controversy)251 seemed excessively Draconian. A clause, which be248. Letter to Vice President George Bush from Acting Assistant Secretary of State Alvin Paul Drischler (October 18, 1983), repri11/td i11 129
CoNG. REc. 515128 (1983). In the few cases in which State Department
Officials informally request the Department of justice to reject their own
formal recommendation for a waiver, see supra note 246 and accompanying
text, foreign policy considerations are taken into account, notwithstanding
the contrary implication in Mr. Drischler's assertion that "the Attorney
General, whose discretionary authority has not been affected by the 'McGovern Amendment' is not in a position to evaluate or act upon foreign
policy factors." /d.
249. Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898 (1907).
250. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 875
(1917).
251. Congress had three times previously passed such a literacy pro\ision, only to have it vetoed by Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson.
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., repri11ted i11 1952 U.S. CooE

Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

64

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 21:1

came known as the "Ninth Proviso," was included in the
1917 legislation to permit the Commissioner General of Immigration with the further approval of the Secretary of Labor
to "prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as
may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and
return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for temporary admission." 252 In the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, when
those with Communist affiliations were added to the list of
excluded aliens, a provision was added to the law which
made explicit the power of the Attorney General25 3 to waive
altogether most of the statutory prohibitions on the entry of
nonimmigrants (as opposed to the power to "prescribe conditions" on their entry).254 This waiver section was much
used, and by the 1980s was invoked tens of thousands of
times a year. 255 The "conditioning" aspects of the Ninth
Proviso were, however, relegated to what became an extremely obscure section of the Immigration Law, 256 one so
obscure, in fact, that it is invoked only in a minute number of
cases per year. 257 In those few cases in which conditions are
imposed, the only types of restrictions that are used are geographical limitations, and the reason for these restrictions is
almost always that the State Department has learned that the
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 1653, 1665. In passing the 1917legislation, Congress overrode a second Wilson veto. /d.
252. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 878 (1917).
253. The Attorney General had meanwhile succeeded to the powers
over immigration of the Secretary of Labor. REORG. PLAN No. V OF 1940,
reprinted in 54 Stat. 1238 (1941).
254. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(3) (1964). The occasion for dividing the
Ninth Proviso (which implicitly authorized complete as well as conditioned
waivers) into separate sections providing for waivers and for the imposition of conditions may have been the fact that Congress for the first time
in 1952 created certain categories of aliens (e.g., suspected saboteurs)
whose excludability could not be waived. !d. Since the language had to be
changed for this purpose, and since the entire Immigration Act was being
reworded at this time, a general overhaul of the section may have been
opportune.
255. See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
256. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(6) (1964).
257. Telephone interview with Harvey Adler, Inspections Program, U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Uuly 14, 1987). Mr. Adler
directs the INS unit which passes on requests for (d)(3) waivers and occasionally (but always at the request of the State Department or an intelligence agency) imposes conditions under (d)(3). /d.
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applicant is someone believed to have connections with an
Eastern bloc intelligence service, who proposes to come to
the United States for a legitimate scientific conference but
who, if allowed to travel freely, might obtain technological
information whose export is restricted. 258 The invocation of
the "conditions" section of the law is, indeed, so unusual
that none of the articles critical of the McCarran Act's exclusions of Communists mention this practice. 259 The subject
of conditions on entry never came up in Congressional hearings exploring the Government's exclusion of aliens and its
use of the waiver power26° and the leading treatise on immigration law cites the section once in passing but gives neither
explanation nor examples of its use. 261 The "conditioning"
of nonimmigrant visas is so infrequent that the State and justice Departments have no "standard operating procedure"
for this practice; accordingly, Model II is of little help in elucidating the application of geographical restrictions to the
Soviet scientists. Further understanding, if it is to come at
all, must devolve from Model !11.262

258. !d.
259. See, e.g., supra note 216.
260. See, e.g., Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237; Implementation ofthe Helsinki
Accords: Hearing on Basket Three Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
261. 1 GoRDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 223, § 2.53(b), at 2-365
(1986).
262. Indeed, the documentary record tends to suggest that such casesor at least this one--are handled in ways inconsistent with even the most
fundamental standard bureaucratic procedures. In run-of-the-mill waiver
cases, the State Department either sends a wire to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) requesting the waiver, in which case the
waiver is kept on file by the Service, or makes a telephone request for the
waiver, in which case the request is noted in a telephone log maintained by
the Service. In principle, requests for conditioned waivers also should be
recorded in one of these two ways, because the imposition of conditions
does not change the fact that a waiver must be granted before the alien is
admitted. However, with respect to the Soviet scientists who came to the
United States in connection with the NRDC project, the INS files include
neither a wire from the Department of State requesting a waiver nor a
telephone log entry. INS officials do not know why the usual documentation is missing in this case. Telephone interview with Daniel Collins, Assistant Chief Inspector, Inspections Branch, Immigration and NalUralization Service (Aug. 20, 1987).

Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

66

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

C.

[Vol. 21:1

The Seismic Station Permits

Even more essential to the NRDC's ability to fulfill its
agreement with the SAS was obtaining government permission to install the seismic stations, since all of the suitable
land was owned by the U.S. Government. 263 The Nevada
stations could be established without a Soviet physical presence, since the data could be sent by radio or mail to Moscow. But without government permission to set up the stations (including permission to drill a 300-foot deep borehole
at each site), 264 there could be no monitoring of tests in Nevada.
In San Diego during their restricted visit, the Soviet
scientists selected three sites, each about 100 miles from National Test Site. One, at Troy Canyon, Nevada, was in Humboldt National Forest. The other two, at Deep Springs, California, and Nelson, Nevada, were on federal lands managed
by the Department of the Interior.
Establishment of a station in a national forest required a
permit from the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture. The permitting standards and process had been
established by law and regulation long before the NRDCSAS agreement was signed. The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), among other statutes, 26 5
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to permit the public
to obtain various kinds of permits, licenses or leases to use
National Forest land for a variety of purposes, most ofwhich
are called "special uses." 266 The Secretary has delegated the
263. See supra note 88.
264. Construction of each station would require cutting into a hillside to
expose an area of granite rock about 12-15 feet square. On top of the
rock, a vault 8' x 6.7' x 4.5' would be built, resting on a four-inch thick
concrete pad. The surface seismometers and electronic equipment would
be placed in the vault, and additional seismometers would be installed in a
hole drilled 100 meters into the rock. Then the vault would be buried
beneath two feet of earth. In addition, two of the stations which were located away from power lines would need solar panel assemblies and shelters, and all of the stations would require telemetry equipment to transmit
their seismic data to a satellite or a satellite relay station. See, e.g., U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Special Use Application and Report, filed by University of Nevada-Reno (Feb. 24, 1987).
265. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472, 551 (1982); 30 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1982).
266. All uses of national forests except the disposal of timber, 36 C.F.R.
pt. 223 (1987), and minerals, 36 C.F.R. pt. 228 (1987), the grazing of live-
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permitting authority to the Forest Service, a unit of the Department of Agriculture.267
Although no sections of the FLPMA specifically regulates seismic research stations, the law does authorize the
Secretary to grant a "right-of-way" 268 to use forest land for
"systems for transmission or reception of ... electronic signals."269 In the case of a "resource monitoring site" incorporating radiotelemetry equipment, a Forest Service officer
must also be satisfied that the site will not be "suited for general communication use. " 270 An applicant for a special use
right-of-way files a written proposal which includes a description of the project, information showing that the applicant is
technically and financially capable of constructing and operating the project, a description of any public benefits, and a
statement of environmental impact and of how the environment will be protected. 271 When an application has been
filed, a Forest Service officer assesses the applicant's qualifications, completes an environmental analysis, determines
compliance with other law, and consults any other interested
parties. 272 In the case of simple uses having no environmental impact, comments from others are not solicited. In the
stock, 36 C.F.R. pt. 222 (1987}, and ordinary recreation such as camping
(which requires no permit}, 36 C.F.R. § 250.50(c}, are special uses requiring authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 250.50(a} (1987}.
267. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551 (1982}; 36 C.F.R. § 200.1 (1987).
268. The use of the term "right-of-way" for construction of a research
station (as opposed to a road or railway line} may seem odd. The terminology, however, apparently dates back to the days in which communications systems consisted only of linear networks such as telegraph \\ires.
Although communications became wireless, government officials (apparently making only incremental changes in their standard procedures} continued to categorize licensing for all communications facilities under the
heading of "rights of way." See Pub. L. No. 82-367, 66 Stat. 95 (1952}
(inclusion of radio and television transmitting facilities}, amending Pub. L
No. 61-478, 36 Stat. 1253 (19ll} (rights-of-way issuable for poles and
lines for electricity and communications}.
269. 43 U.S.C.A. § I76l(a}(5} (1982}. In terms of effect on the land, the
drilling of a hundred meter borehole might seem like the most significant
~ctivity requi??g federal al?p~o~~· b~t. the. routines o~ the Fores.~ Se~ce
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case of a more significant disruption of the environment, the
officer typically contacts interested state and local agencies
such as State recreation and road departments, environmental groups, and specially affected private parties. Contact
with other federal agencies is less common. 273 Finally, the
District Ranger or Forest Supervisor for the affected forest
makes a decision to grant or deny the application. 274 The
special use right-of-way may be denied only on the basis of
five grounds: (1) incompatibility with the "purpose(s) for
which the lands are managed, or with other uses"; (2) incompatibility with "the public interest"; 275 (3) lack of qualifications of the applicant; (4) illegality; and (5) lack of financial
capacity to undertake the project.276
Similarly, establishment of the stations at the other two
sites required rights of way to be issued by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior. 277 Because seismic research stations use communica273. Telephone interview with Reuben Williams, Lands Specialist
(Group Leader in Charge of Special Uses), U.S. Forest Service, by FrederickS. Young (Aug. 3, 1987).
274. FSM, supra note 269, at § 2704. One way a District Ranger (typically a GS-12 employee with 8-15 years of experience) can grant a right-ofway application is if the use has already been approved at a higher level,
for instance, if the Forest Supervisor makes the decision. Forest Supervisors are usually career officials at the GS-14 level with degrees in forestry
or engineering and about 15 years of experience. A Forest Supervisor is
five bureaucratic rungs below the Secretary of Agriculture (after the Assistant Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment, the Chief of
the Forest Service, and the nine Regional Foresters). Telephone interview
with Reuben Williams, supra note 273.
275. The public interest category is used to deny an application if the
Forest Service wants to deny it but "nothing else fits." This category may
be employed where the proposed use was consistent with state law and not
environmentally unsound, but which Forest Service officials determined
was not in the public interest to be built in a national forest, such as a
casino (in a state which permitted gambling) or an abortion clinic. Telephone interview with Reuben Williams, supra note 273.
276. 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h) (1986).
277. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,90 Stat. 2743 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 961, 1761 (1982)). The Bureau also issues
"permits" under 43 U.S.C.A. § 1732(b) (1982), but when it has discretion,
it prefers to issue "rights of way" because a permit cannot be revoked
without a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1732(c) (1982), and the permittee may appeal locally, whereas revocation of a right-of-way does not require a hearing, and appeals are heard in
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tion links, the BLM, like the Forest Service, grants rights of
way for their use under the authority given it to authorize the
use of public lands for systems for "transmission or reception of ... electronic signals ... or such other ... systems or
facilities which are in the public interest and which require
rights-of-way over, upon, under or through" those lands. 278
The procedures and standards for granting these rights of
way are governed by codified regulations. 279 The applicant
must file a form indicating its name and address, a description of the project, a map, a statement of financial and technical capacity, and certification that the applicant is authorized to do business in the state. 280 This application is then
evaluated by a "realty specialist," ajunior BLM official who
heads a small interdisciplinary team charged with writing an
environmental analysis in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act. 281 The analysis must take into account
a list of specified considerations which includes among
others: air quality; noise; general hazards; flood plains; paleontological resources; soil resources, vegetation resources,
wildlife resources; threatened and endangered species; cultural resources; visual resources; recreation and wilderness
resources; and socioeconomic concerns. 282 The realty specialist also determines compliance with federal and state
laws, consults with "Federal, State, and local agencies having
an interest, as appropriate," and proposes any "appropriate"
modifications in the proposal. 283
Arlington, Va. Interview with Annette jameson, Natural Resource Specialist, Lands Division, BLM, Department of the Interior, by Fred Young ijuly
9, 1987). In 12 years at BLM, Ms. Jameson has worked on more than 300
right-of-way applications. Telephone interview with Ms. Jameson, supra
note 88.
278. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1761(a)(5), {a){7) (1982).
279. 43 C.F.R. § 2800 (1986).
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The proposal then goes to an "authorized officer" who
makes the actual decision to grant or deny the request. 284
This official is usually a Resource Area Manager, a GS-12 or
GS-13 career officer, seven rungs on the hierarchy below the
Secretary of the Interior. In some BLM Districts, the "authorized officer" is a District Manager, one level above the
Resource Area Manager.2ss The officer begins the decision
process with a presumption in favor of granting a right-ofway, because "[i]t is the objective of the Secretary of the Interior to grant rights-of-way . . . to any qualified individual."286 Further, the regulations specify only five grounds
for denial: (1) inconsistency with the purpose for which the
lands are managed; 287 (2) inconsistency with the public interest;288 (3) lack of qualifications of the applicant;2B9 (4) illegalilty; or (5) lack of technical or financial ability.290
The Model II framework provides the means to understand why the Government granted the permits necessary to
build the nuclear test monitoring stations on federal land.
Concerning the site in Humboldt National Forest, the appliconsistent with BLM's Master Plan submitted to the public in 1975-78,
public hearings can be avoided. Telephone interview with Annette Jameson, supra note 277.
284. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4 (1986).
285. Below the Secretary are several Assistant Secretaries, one of whom
is responsible for BLM and several other agencies. One of the Assistants
to this Assistant Secretary is the BLM Director. Below the BLM Director
are several Deputy Directors, one of whom is in charge of resources. The
fifty State Directors report to this Deputy Director. District Managers
(California has four districts) report to the State Director, and Managers of
the Resource Areas (the Riverside, Cal., district has five Resource Areas)
report to the District Manager but are delegated the authority to decide
right-of-way applications within their Resource Areas. Telephone interview with Annette Jameson, supra note 88.
286. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2800.0-2 (1986) (emphasis added).
287. The purpose for which the lands are managed is, however, "multiple use," so BLM attempts to allow the widest possible variety of uses.
Telephone interview with Annette Jameson, supra note 88.
288. BLM officials interpret this standard to preclude them from granting rights-of-way for purely private convenience (e.g., if a homeowner
wanted to build a road on BLM land solely for the purpose of shortening
the drive to his house by a quarter of a mile) or for uses that would cause
undue and unnecessary environmental degradation. /d.
289. U.S. citizenship was formerly, but is no longer, required. !d.
290. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4(a) (1986).
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cant filed all of the necessary standard papers. 291 The application contained nothing that would trigger any of the five
grounds listed in the Forest Service regulation as bases for
permit denials. A covering letter even stated the willingness
of the applicant to adjust the site location "somewhat" provided that "line of sight communications, granite structure
and low quiescent noise must be maintained. "29 2 The application adverted to one of the principal criteria that the Forest Service was required to keep in mind--environmental
disruption. 293
Similarly, the two applications filed with the Department
of the Interior met all of that department's criteria. The applications contained the required back-up materials, including maps and diagrams of the proposed station construction,
and provided no grounds on which the applications could be
denied. 294 BLM assigned the required analysis to staff members who, drawing on other experts as needed, wrote a land
suitability report and an environmental assessment. Since
the seismic stations would not interfere with other proposed
uses of the land (because they were small and, for the most
part, underground), they were granted by the Resource Area
Manager or District Manager as a routine matter.
The U.S. Government granted permits to build the seismic stations on federal land because, under the standard operating procedures of the two relevant Departments, permits
to build seismic stations are always granted to applicants
who show themselves financially capable of constructing and
operating the stations and who are solicitous of the environment, provided that the stations did not conflict with other
public uses of the land. Decisions of this kind are so unremarkable that they are routinely made by junior or midlevel officers, without any high-level policy review or referral
291. See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, supra note 264 and accompanying
text.
292. /d.
293. "Slight visual impact, stations are small and hidden from view to
minimize visual impact, disturbance and vandalism. A small road will be
needed for the drill rig to access the site." /d.
294. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, APPUCATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION AND UTILITY SYSTEMS AND FACIUTIES ON FEDERAL LANDs, filed b)' University of Nevada-Reno with the Las Vegas, Nev., and Ridgecrest, Cal.,
offices of the Bureau of Land Management Uan. 30, 1987).
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to any official in Washington. Once appropriate applications
were filed, the Government's decision to authorize the use of
public land for seismic research stations was virtually inevitable.

v.

MODEL III

The analyst who makes use of Model III focuses more
on the actions of individuals, and the interpersonal bargaining among them, than on either the rational justifications for
decisions or the structure and standard procedures of the
bureaucracies that make or implement them. In Allison's
terms, governmental decisions are the result of moves in a
"competitive game" made by players who act "according to
various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal
goals ... not by a single rational choice but by the pulling
and hauling that is politics. " 295 The outcome may be due to
the triumph of one individual or group over the other, or
may result from "compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests" 296 and is not what any person
or group wanted. In either event, however, that outcome is
determined more by the "power and skill" of the players
than by rationality or routines. Bureaucratic structures are
not irrelevant. Bureaucratic loyalty, for example, might affect how a particular player conceives of what outcome will
best serve the national interest. Nonbureaucratic concerns
are relevant as well, including personal beliefs or ideology,
domestic political concerns, and personal interests. 297
Bureaucratic routines are significant, though not determinative, because they establish the "action channels" that
structure the game. The action channels pre-select the major players and allocate power among them (e.g., by determining which agency has principal responsibility for implementing a decision, thereby giving that agency's head some
additional influence over its outcome).29S
Formal (including legal) and informal rules of the game
also affect the outcome by making some moves (such as certain kinds of bluffs or deceit) legitimate and others im295.
296.
297.
298.

G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 144.
/d. at 145, 162.
/d. at 167.
ld. at 169-70.
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proper. 299 Even after the formal decision is made, the game
continues, characteristically expanding. More players, who
will have to implement the decision, enter the field. The
players in conflict over a decision will often try to "maneuver
to get the action into the channel that they believe offers the
best prospect for getting their desired results," but often
they will have no choice in the matter of implementation. As
a result, the implementing players may go "beyond the spirit
if not the letter" of the decision or, if they disagree with it,
may delay or disobey it.3oo
Model III analysts are not shocked that the outcome of
what passes as decisional process301 is often incoherent. Due
to the number of simultaneous games and players, the resulting actions "rarely follow from an agreed doctrine in
which all players concur" and "rarely reflect a coordinated
government strategy and thus [should not be read as] conscious 'signals.' " 302 Indeed, misperception is essential to
the process of government, for it is "the grease that allows
cooperation among people whose differences othenvise
would hardly allow them to co-exist. "303
Applying Model III to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison
addresses the question of why the United States responded
with a blockade by recounting the opening positions of each
of the members of President Kennedy's Executive Commit299. /d. at 170-71.
300. !d. at 173.
301. In the words of former National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, "[i]n the making of national security policy, we have, in effect,
a chaotic nonsystem." D. CLARKE, PUBLIC PoLICY AND PoLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (epigraph) (1985).
302. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 175.
303. Id. at 178. Model III seemed considerably more esoteric when Allison described it in 1971 than it is today, after the American public has
now been exposed for years to spectacular conflicts within the national
security policy apparatus. The public spectacles have included frequent,
major clashes between Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors
to the President, such as those between Secretary William Rogers and Advisor Henry Kissenger, Secretary Cyrus Vance and Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Secretary Alexander Haig and Advisor Richard Allen, and Secretary George Shultz and Advisor John Poindexter, the last of which became the "battle royal" through which Secretary Shultz was e.xcluded even
from knowledge of the Government's repeated sales of arms to Iran. Stt
Pear, Those to Whom "Battle Royal" is Nothing New, N.Y. Times, July 28,
1987, at A14, col. 1.

Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

74

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 21:1

tee, and, drawing particularly on Robert Kennedy's posthu~
mously published memoir, 304 he describes the argument and
bargaining among them. 305 Allison highlights, for example,
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to use the crisis to force
the President to undertake a massive air strike and invasion
of Cuba in order to overthrow Fidel Castro. 30 6 But the De~
fense Department's misrepresentation that a "surgical" air
strike (limited to the Soviet missiles) was impossible was a
key factor leading to the President's decision in favor of a
blockade rather than an air strike. 307 Similarly, he explains
that President Kennedy summoned U.N. Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson to a meeting of the inner circle and allowed Ste~
venson to argue for exchanging U.S. missiles in Turkey or
the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay for Soviet withdrawal. The
President rejected Stevensen's advice in front of the inner
circle, thereby "sacrific[ing] the Ambassador to the hawks in
order to allow himself to choose the moderate, golden
mean." 308
Model III analysis has considerable inherent appeal.
Every close reader of a good daily newspaper is constantly
bombarded by details of at least some of the political give~
and-take of governmental policy-making, including the formation of national security policy. The media frequently reports on disagreements between the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, or between one or both of those
Secretaries and the National Security Advisor, as well as efforts of Congressional leaders to influence foreign and defense policy. In an academic setting, however, Model III
must overcome two obstacles. First, the model is suspect
precisely because it is so familiar. "[A]ccording to prevailing
doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual substance. It constitutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious
investigation. " 309 Second, the Model relies heavily on information-particularly interview information-that is unusually difficult to obtain. 310 Despite these problems, Model III
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

R.
G.

KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS (1968).
ALLISON, supra note I, at 193-210.

/d. at 198.
/d. at 204-05, 209-210.
/d. at 209.
/d. at 146.
"What is required is access ... to a large number of the participants
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can at least contribute considerable information to the other
forms of analysis, and perhaps it possesses substantial persuasive power of its own.
A Model III analysis of the governmental response to
the NRDC initiative centers around Richard Perle, for no individual was better poised than he to influence U.S. reaction.
In the Spring of 1986, Perle was completing his fifth year as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, including arms control. As a result of his extensive
Washington experience, his support from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, his charm, and his skill at bureaucratic infighting, Perle's influence in national security decisions was far greater than his rank would suggest.
Perle had served on the staff of Senator Henry M. Jackson from 1972 until President Reagan had appointed him to
his Pentagon post. 3 ll He and Senator Jackson both viewed
the Soviet Union as a nation that wants "a world in which no
decision can be taken anywhere that isn't consistent with
in a decision before their memories fade or become too badly discolored.
Such access is uncommon. But without this information, how can the analyst proceed?" !d. at 181. Allison quotes Prof. Richard Neustadt: "If I
were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand and late,
limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the
other, I would be forced to discard the documents." !d. Because gaps arc
-inevitably created by lack of access to officials or lapses in memory, Model
III analysis must occasionally speculate as to events rather than rely on
interview or other information. See, e.g., id. at 190-91 (speculation that
CIA Director John McCone learned of Soviet plans to install missiles in
Cuba from French intelligence}, 229-30 (speculation that the ultimate settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the President's sending ofRoben
Kennedy to assure Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that U.S. missiles in Turkey would be removed-without the knowledge of any other members of
the Cabinet}.
Conducting this study on the NRDC project required approximate!)•
three dozen interviews, primarily with federal officials, over an eight
month period. Even so the record is incomplete, because a few officials
refused to be interviewed, a few declined to answer particular questions,
and in a few cases, the interviewees' memories had faded. Another problem in studying recent national security decisions is that some of the documents may remain classified for decades. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47
Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982}.
311. Nomination of Richard N. Perle to be AssistaTZl Secretary• of Deferue: HtariTZgs Before the Smale Committee on Armed Services, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1981}.
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Moscow's interests." 312 Together, they succeeded in restricting arms control agreements with the Soviets by challenging, from the right, the arms control measures negotiated by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. 313 He had arrived in office thinking that the only good arms control
agreement was the 1963 atmospheric test ban treaty.3I4
From his Defense Department post, he had pressed for U.S.
negotiating positions so stringent that the Reagan Administration's first Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
called them "absurd" 315 because they were so unlikely to
lead to any strategic agreement with the Soviets. 316 Yet his
bureaucratic skill and political support was such that he was
regarded as "the major player on arms control in this town
for many years," 317 the person "having more impact on policy in arms control than any other official in the U.S. government,"318 and even "the single most effective bureaucrat in
the government."3I9
Perle was no stranger to the issues of nuclear test ban
proposals or export licensing. He was the Pentagon's principal policy-maker on nuclear testing constraints, and just days
before the NRDC and the SAS had reached their agreement
in Moscow, he told Congress that even if the United States
could verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban at this
point, "a comprehensive test ban would [not be] in our interest" or the interest of the world 320 because of the need to
develop ever-improved safety devices. He had appeared on
a San Francisco television show to say that "there is signifi312. Gerstenzang, Soviets' Mortal Foe Lurks at Pentagon, L.A. Times, Nov.
11, 1985, at 1, 12, col. 2 (interview with Richard Perle).
313. /d. at 12 col. 4.
314. Miller, Sometimes I Say Things Differently, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1987,
at A16, col. 4.
315. Hiatt, Perle's Distrust Shapes U.S. Policy, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at
A1, col. 1.
316. See generally S. TALBOIT, DEADLY GAMBITS (1984).
317. Gordon, Perle is Bowing Out, His Goals and Acerbity Intact, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 13, 1987, at A16, col. 2 (statement of House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin).
318. S. TALBOIT, supra note 316, at 17.
319. Hiatt, supra note 315, at col. 3 (statement of Senator Larry
Pressler).
320. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1986).
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cant evidence the Soviets have violated the 150 kiloton
threshold [of the "'TB Treaty]"; confronted by statements to
the contrary by prominent seismologists who had been Defense Department consultants, he replied that "they're a
bunch of seismologists feathering their own nests."32l
Perle's view that the U.S. Government was too lax in
dealing with the Soviets extended not only to arms control
but also to U.S. exports. Upon assuming office, he entered
into an extended feud with the Commerce Department,
claiming that by supporting U.S. exporters, Commerce was
allowing militarily significant technology to leak to the East.
On Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci's last day in
the Pentagon, Perle persuaded Carlucci to transfer the Defense Department's functions in export controls (including
reviewing applications filed ·with the Commerce Department)
from the Undersecretary for Research and Development to
himself.322
Perle believed that the Commerce Department's attitude
toward U.S./U.S.S.R. relations permeated the State Department as well. The people at State, he believed, were too eager to obtain agreements with the Soviets, regardless of the
content of these agreements. 323 As a result, Perle was sure
that State Department officials in conflict with him often attempted to conceal at least some of their actions. 324
At the Natural Resources Defense Council, Thomas
Cochran realized that NRDC would need a certain degree of
government cooperation for the seismic monitoring project
to succeed. Cochran was well aware of Perle's reputation
321. Perle and the Scientists (KRON-TV, Channel4, San Francisco, California, broadcast, May 9, 1986) {6:00PM News) [hereinafter "Perle and the
Scientists"]. The same program revealed that when Air Force Intelligence
had asked seismologists to advise on Soviet Nuclear Tests, Perle had written a letter complaining that the "intelligence community is undermining
the Administration's position. My department will control this area." /d.
at 5.
322. Hiatt, supra note 315, at A20, col. 2.
323. Hiatt, A Richard Perle Sampler, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at A20, Col.
2. Perle's regard for academics was no higher: "We have a tendency to
turn over negotiating responsibility to mid-level officials who may or rna)'
not be competent negotiators and sometimes to academics who couldn't
negotiate a sabbatical." Interview with judith Miller, supra note 314, at
col. 2.
324. Perle and the Scientists, supra note 321.
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and his view on nuclear weapons issues. Therefore, he
sought a more receptive audience within the U.S. Administration. NRDC had no links with Secretary George Shultz,
but the Chairman of NRDC's Board of Directors, Adrian W.
(Bill) DeWind, was a senior partner at the New York law firm
of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison. Through decades oflaw practice, DeWind had come to know many, perhaps most, of the members of the nation's legal and financial
establishments. Among his many contacts was john C.
Whitehead, who had been appointed, a few months earlier,
as Deputy Secretary of State.
Whitehead, sixty-four years old, had assumed office
without prior government experience after thirty-eight years
as an investment banker. Early in 1985, Secretary Shultz had
tapped him for the Number Two job at State, and Whitehead
fulfilled Shultz's expectations. After a few months on the
job, those who had worked with him were praising him for
"acting decisively when options are put to him rather than
looking for others to choose. "325
In policy matters, Whitehead was a moderate conservative. He wrote in 1984, before his appointment, that the Soviet Union "has lost its appeal to third world nations and
may now be slipping backward. Over time, these developments may permit some moderation in the increase of defense expenditures . . . . " 326 Significantly, he came to the
Government with the "strong conviction that now is the time
for private-sector companies to step up and play a larger role
in solving the country's social problems."327
At Cochran's request, DeWind asked Whitehead for a
meeting when the NRDC project was still at the conceptual
stage. This first meeting took place on February 20, 1986,
three months before NRDC representatives went to Moscow
325. Gwertzman, Parting the Fog at Foggy Bottom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1986, at B6, col. 3.
326. Whitehead, Markets Would Flourish With Reagan, N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1984, at 2, col. 3.
327. Vise, Interview with john C. Whitehead, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1985, at
G2, col. 5, G3, col. 3. Whitehead was referring to domestic problems, but
his belief that government is not able to solve many domestic problems
may have predisposed him at least to be intrigued by the possibility that a
private initiative might make a contribution to arms control.
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to work out an agreement with the Soviets.328 DeWind flew
to Washington for the meeting, and took with him Cochran
and another NRDC staff member. Whitehead brought Paul
Nitze, one of the Reagan Administration's principal anns
control negotiators, andjames Timbie, an experienced anns
control analyst who was serving on Whitehead's staff.
The concept of an agreement between NRDC and a Soviet insititution had not, as of this meeting, arisen. Cochran
disclosed the NRDC's proposal to suggest, in separate letters
to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, that
each nation permit seismic monitoring near its test site by
non-governmental scientists of the other country. NRDC
hoped that the State Department representatives would be
enthusiastic, not because the Reagan State Department
would want to edge the world a little closer to a comprehensive test ban, but because the NRDC proposal might obtain
for the United- States some unique seismic data that could
reduce uncertainty about ITB Treaty compliance.329
The State Department representatives were skeptical,sso
however, and Whitehead wrote to DeWind a few days later
to express "certain concerns." First, he worried that "private citizens" 331 could "draw conclusions about Soviet compliance with testing constraints that differ from the judgments of U.S. officials with access to more sources of information." Second, "the Soviets could try to turn your
proposal to their advantage in their campaign for a CTB."
Finally, a CTB in the near future was a bad idea because continued nuclear testing was required to maintain confidence
in U.S. nuclear forces.ss2
When the Soviets proved less receptive to the idea of
sending letters to the superpower leaders,333 this idea was
328. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC (entry for Feb. 20,
1986).
329. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington, D.C.
(Mar. 5, 1987).
330. Interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary Whitehead, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 10, 1987).
331. Whether DeWind meant the NRDC or the American public is unclear.
332. Letter to Adrian DeWind, Chairman, Board of Trustees, NRDC,
from Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead (March 4, 1986).
333. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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abandoned in favor of the direct agreement between NRDC
and the Soviets that was signed in Moscow on May 28, 1986.
News of the agreement was reported from Moscow in The
New York Times, 334 and it was from such press accounts that
Perle and other Pentagon officials first learned of the project.335
Immediately upon returning from Moscow, DeWind and
Cochran met again with Whitehead. In this june 3rd session,
DeWind and Cochran described the agreement they had
reached and made two alternative requests of Whitehead.
First, they proposed that the U.S. Government assume responsibility for the project. This change would have spared
the NRDC from the enormous administrative burden of running a scientific mission in the Soviet Union, but the U.S.
officials did not want to encourage the seismic exchange to
this extent. Alternatively, DeWind and Cochran sought the
help of the State Department with the export licenses and
Soviet visas that they knew would be necessary.
Whitehead liked the idea that NRDC scientists would be
able to collect unique data from within the Soviet Union,
and, while he did not support a governmental take-over of
the project, he believed that the Government should not discourage NRDC in any way.3 36 He told the NRDC representatives that he was personally supportive of the concept of assisting the organization to obtain the necessary governmental approvals, but he could not promise much because the
decision was not up to the State Department alone. Whitehead did, however, promise to appoint a State Department
official to act as a liaison between the Department and
NRDC. The next day, his office called Cochran to inform
him that Bismark Myrick, in the Office of Strategic Nuclear
Policy, a part of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
would act as liaison. 337
Representatives of Whitehead and other interested government players convened three days later, as part of the In334. Taubman, New Yorkers Sign Soviet Test Pact, N.Y. Times, May 29,
1986, at A3.
335. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Policy (Aug. 18, 1987).
336. Telephone interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to
Deputy Secretary Whitehead (Aug. II, 1987).
337. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, supra note 72.
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teragency Working Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations.338 This Working Group had been set up years earlier,
338. This working group was one of dozens of interagency committees
established under the authority of the National Security Council as fora in
which representatives of different agencies could meet to reach consensus
or explore differences regarding national security policy. "Working
groups" are the lowest level in a hierarchy of such bodies. The membership of working groups generally consists of civil servants not holding
political appointments, although they sometimes include politically appointed deputy assistant secretaries. In either event, working group members attend the meetings with instructions from their superiors to negotiate for particular outcomes deemed desirable by senior agency officials. If
the working group reaches consensus on an issue, it writes a descriptive
memorandum which is circulated at higher levels. If an issue is very controversial, however, the working group may not achieve agreement, and it
will instead prepare an "options paper" describing the problem and the
results favored by various agency representatives. The problem is then
passed along to the next level on the hierarchy, the "interagency group,"
known in the national security community as an "IG." At this level, assistant secretaries of the various departments explore the issues on which the
working groups divided, and they either agree or write options papers for
the next level, the "senior interagency group" or "SIG," which is attended
by undersecretaries or deputy secretaries. Next, disagreements may be
taken to the National Security Council itself, whose divisions can be resolved only by the President. Bamford, Carlucci a11d the N.S.C., N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), 16, 26; U.S. TOWER COI\II\IISSION, REPORT
oF THE PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REVIEW BoARD II-14 to II-15 (1987).
This description is idealized. Because of bureaucratic or personal disagreements or rivalries, there are many occasions on which working
groups or interagency groups are unable to reach consensus, but for
which it makes little sense to convene the very busy highest officials of
several agencies (in SICs or the NSC, or even in IGs). During the Reagan
administration, "generally the SICs and many of their subsidiary groups
... fell into disuse." !d. at Il-l. The membership of IGs (in terms of
agencies, rather than particular incumbents of offices) is determined by a
formal order issued by the President's National Security Advisor, and the
membership of working groups is determined by the IGs to which they
report. Interview with William Clay, a State Department official involved
in developing the Government's response to the NRDC project (April
1987). William Clay is not the real name of this official. Four of the author's interviewees agreed to speak only on the condition that they not be
identified by name, and accordingly, the names, precise titles, and exact
interview places and dates of these informants have been withheld. All of
them specified the accurate but not fully informative descriptions to which
the author was limited in identifying them. These four officials are Leonard Appleby, a foreign service officer who participated in State Department policy making at the working level, interviewed in March 1987;
Steven Blair, an official actively involved in the NRDC's project, inter-
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and it had been meeting periodically to discuss the U.S. response to General Secretary Gorbachev's testing moratorium. The main activity of this Group was developing ways
to put pressure on the Soviet Union to accept President Reagan's alternative to a mutual halt on testing-a Soviet visit to
the Nevada Test Site to observe an American test and to
measure its yield with CORRTEX or some similar instrumentation. The NRDC project was discussed at the june 6th
and subsequent meetings, but it was always "a kind of
sidebar. " 339
The membership of the Group included junior officials,
none of them presidentially appointed but all experienced in
nuclear policy, from the Soviet desk of the State Department,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the staff of the
National Security Council, the Department of Energy, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The representative of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was retired Colonel Ed
Nawrocki, who reported to Richard Perle and to his Deputy,
Frank Gaffney. The Group was led by State Department official Bismark Myrick.34o
At this point, NRDC had not yet formally applied for any
form of government permission, so there was no paper on
which anyone could act. But from Myrick's report on the
meeting with Whitehead, members of the Group knew that
the NRDC would soon be asking for an expedited export license, and at this meeting the Working Group began to discuss the NRDC project in general terms. They quickly realized that because of the nexus between the particular equipment the NRDC sought to export and the existing export
regulations, the government would eventually have no
choice but to grant the export license. 341 Because the Soviviewed in March 1987; William Clay, a State Department official, interviewed in April 1987; and Charles East, a member of the staff of the National Security Council, interviewed in August 1987.
339. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338.
340. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. Certain meetings of
the Group, including the june 6 meeting, were also attended by Dr. Ralph
Alewine Ill, Director of the Geophysical Sciences Group, Office of Strategic Technology, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Interview
with Dr. Ralph Alewine in Roslyn, Va. (May 5, 1987).
341. One of the Pentagon officials present at the meeting was aware that
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ets had insisted, however, on a clause in the NRDC-SAS
agreement providing that seismic monitoring in Kazakhstan
would begin by the end ofjune, slow or routine processing
of the expected application might derail the project. The issue for the Group, therefore, was whether to try to accelerate
the processing, to decelerate it, or to let it take its normal
course, whatever that might be. 342
Deliberate delay was, in practice, a genuine possibility.
Had the State Department recommended rejecting the application:
it wouldn't have been approved. We all appreciate
the law, but if a high official wants to stop something it can be stopped. There are thousands of bureaucratic reasons why you can stall. Delay is sometimes worse than denial. On a denial, you can go to
court. But delay is the government's most potent
tool. You have to back up a decision to deny, but
not a decision to delay.343
The government does in fact stall from time to time:
We even stall a company out of business. I don't
want to tell you about specific cases, so I have to be
round about. Suppose a company had done a lot of
sales of something that has dual civilian and military
uses, such as radios. Now say that a country's status
has changed because of a change of government, as
in Iran. And let's say that the new government still
wants the product, but the U.S. doesn't want them
to have it. And let's say that we haven't formally
pronounced an embargo, for political reasons. But
whenever we become aware of an export by the
American supplier of radios, we can have the Customs office hold up the goods and inquire whether
they need a license, even though we know they
don't. Then we can require them to document that
the government had already licensed the export of a far more sophisticated seismic system-one just like the borehole system that the NRDC
planned to export a few months later to replace the early surface systemto Bulgaria, to enable that Soviet ally to build an earthquake warning network. /d.
342. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
343. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145.
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every component of the radio is decontrolled, and
when they finally submit the documentation, we can
pass the papers around from office to office. I know
that kind of thing has happened.3 44
The State Department members of the Working Group were
aware that (despite his letter to Cochran three months earlier), Whitehead had a "fairly relaxed attitude" about the
project. 345 However, they expected resistance from other
agencies, particularly Perle's office. One State Department
member argued for expediting consideration of the license
application when it arrived, but the representative of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (reflecting the attitude of Director Kenneth Adelman) suggested that the
group explore means to slow down the procedure.346 When
Perle's representative Ed Nawrocki took a middle course, arguing that the project was "just a routine scientific exchange" and that the Government should follow the normal
procedures for such exchanges, 347 Myrick supported him.
Those inclined to try to obstruct the process could not realistically expect to budge the group away from a compromise
on which the two leading players-the State Department
chairman and the man representing Perle-agreed. Moreover, the leaders "realized that there had to be grounds for
holding up an export license and even if you had grounds to
refuse one ... [i]t would look bad to hold them up on procedural grounds." 348
On this issue, then, the critical bargaining took place at
the lowest possible level, the Working Group. On approximately June 11, 1986, the Group reached a consensus in
favor of handling the license application, when it arrived, according to standard procedures. 349
Working Group consensus can be challenged at higher
344. !d.
345. Interview with William Clay, supra note 338.
346. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
347. Interview with Col. Ed Nawrocki, Office of Verification Policy,
UASD/ISD Department of Defense, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 16, 1987).
348. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
349. /d. According to Blair, the group's consensus is reflected in part of
a still-classified document entitled Memorandum from Bismark Myrick to
the Members of the Working Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations Uune
11, 1986).
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levels,350 however, and when the Interagency Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations convened at the Pentagon on june
17, 1986 with Perle the chairman,351 Perle questioned the
Working Group's consensus.
In the eyes of Perle and his deputy and successor Frank
Gaffney, the project was very dangerous. Gaffney saw the
project as "a calculated effort by the Soviet government to
undermine U.S. security policy." Gaffney maintained that
the U.S. Government should do "everything it legally could
do to discourage it as we would discourage any subversion."352 Perle's opinion was equally negative. If Perle
could have had his way, he would have prevented the project
from going forward because he thought "it could give the
public the misleading impression that seismic verification
alone would be sufficient to verify a test ban" treaty. 35 3 In
the June 17 meeting, he said that the NRDC program would
350. This procedure, like many other practices in the system of national
security decision-making, has no basis in regulations or other WiiUen
guidelines. "Executive orders delegate some of the President's authority
to specific Cabinet officers. More frequently, however, the operating rules
[determining which bureaus have responsibility for 'moving' an issue
through the government, which ones must 'clear' communications to people outside of the government, or even to senior government officials, and
how high in the government an issue must go] are not written down any
place but are understood intuitively by those involved." M. HALPERIN
wrrn: P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, BuREAUCRATIC PoUTics AND FoREIGN PouCY
107 (1974).
351. The role of presiding over the IG rotated between Allen Holmes,
Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of
State (in practice, his deputy John Hawes usually attended for him), and
Perle, and between the State Department and the Pentagon, reflecting the
perennial rivalry between the two Departments for control of nuclear arms
control policy. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. "Much of the
story of the Reagan Administration's arms·control policy is the story of the
struggle" between Perle and Richard Burt, a predecessor of Holmes. S.
TALBOIT, DEADLY GAMBITS 15 (1984).
352. Interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, in Washington, D.C.
(July 2, 1987). In August, 1986, Gaffuey wrote that "Soviet authorities
hope the NRDC experiment will serve ... to confuse the domestic debate
about the need for American nuclear testing and the reasons why we oppose the effort of the Soviet Union and others to promote an inequitable
and unverifiable ban on nuclear testing." Gaffuey, Test Ban: The "Quick
Fix" Won't Work, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1986, at Al5, col. 1.
353. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335.
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not advance U.S. policy, and therefore the Government
should not make it easy, but should slow or stop the progress. 354 The IG members from other departments, particularly the Department of Energy to which Cochran had circulated a draft list of the equipment he proposed to use, replied that the seismic equipment that NRDC wanted to
export did not seem to present any problems, and that
Cochran had expressed his willingness to substitute other
equipment if the proposed items were problematic.355
Checked by the regulations, Perle retreated.356 He rejected
any extra-legal opportunities for delay because he did not
want to expose himself or the Defense Department to
charges of arbitrariness. 357
Within a few days, Perle met in the Pentagon withjohn
Konfala, Director of the Pentagon's Office of Strategic
Trade. That Office acts for the Department of Defense when
the Department of Commerce receives a license application
that requires concurrent Defense approval. 358 Perle alerted
Konfala to the imminently expected application and told him
that the Department would not object to the export license.359
Perle's decision not to fight the export license did not,
however, solve NRDC's problem. Under normal procedures, the Government would take approximately sixty days
to process the papers, 360 and when the IG met on June 17,
354. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
355. !d.
356. !d.
357. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335. "We
couldn't do anything about it because they were within the technical limits
set by the export regulations," Perle says. "It would have been different if
they had needed an exception from us; then I would have been very comfortable denying it, just because I didn't like the project." !d.
358. "There's nothing in writing about it so don't bother to file a [sic]
FOIA [Freedom oflnformation Act] request. I don't know exactly when it
was. I won't tell you who attended." Telephone interview with John
Konfala, Director, Office of Strategic Trade, Defense Technology Security
Agency (April 14, 1987).
359. !d.
360. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. In addition, Donald
Hammond, a Commerce Department official who helped NRDC to complete its application, told NRDC attorney David Wirth that under standard
Department procedures, the application would not be approved for
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1986 NRDC had not yet filed its application. The Working
Group consensus had resolved only to handle the application through normal channels, and had specifically decided
not to expedite consideration of the NRDC application.
At this juncture, Bill DeWind intervened to assist the
project. One of his law partners, Bayless Manning, was an
old friend of Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and
had served with him on the Board of Directors of the Aetna
Corporation. At DeWind's request, Manning telephoned
Baldrige and cleared the way for DeWind to speak with him.
At Baldrige's direction, DeWind then spoke with Laverne
Smith, Director of the Department's Exporter Assistance Division.361
At about the same time, Cochran moved on another
front. He contacted Bismark Myrick, his contact at the State
Department, to request State's help in expediting the license
application. Myrick told him that although State would not
publicly support the NRDC project, it would "give whatever
support it could to expedite the export license within the
Government." 362 Myrick also advised Cochran (probably
following whatever general directions Whitehead had given
Myrick) that normal Commerce Department processing
would take sixty to 120 days, and that NRDC should therefore ask the licensing officials in the Department of Commerce to call Myrick to confirm that the "application should
be handled on an emergency basis. " 363 This conversation
encouraged Cochran and others at the NRDC to inform the
Commerce Department officials that the State Department
wanted the license application expedited. On june 18, 1986,
however, Myrick remonstrated with Cochran, telling him that
NRDC's statements that State wanted the license expedited
were "putting us [at State] in a bad position" with colleagues
months. Telephone interview with David Wirth, NRDC attorney (April 2,
1987).
361. Interview with Adrian W. DeWind, NRDC Board Chair, in Las
Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 15, 1988).
362. Memorandum to David Wirth, NRDC, from Thomas Cochran,
NRDC (June 10, 1986) (reporting conversation of June 9, 1986 between
Cochran and Bismark Myrick). This conversation took place afler the
Working Group meeting of June 6 and two days before Myrick's memorandum reporting the "hands-off" consensus of the Working Group.
363. /d.
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in other agencies, and he asked Cochran not to say that State
was being helpful. 364
Meanwhile, Cochran and David Wirth had been meeting
frequently with Commerce Department officials for guidance
on completion of the application forms, no easy task for a
first-time exporter because of the need to include the numbers of the sections of the regulations governing each piece
of equipment. Every contact was a problem. "First we
needed to find out what we needed to do to apply. There's a
phone number for export licenses in the Department of
Commerce, but it's busy all the time. People with automatic
redialers call it a hundred times to get through, so there's no
chance of getting them on the phone. We went down there
personally, since we were in Washington .... "365 After several false starts, and unfruitful meetings, Cochran and Wirth
were referred to Don Hammond, an official in the Office of
Export Administration of the Commerce Department who
took an interest in their project. Hammond could sympathize with their problems:
They'd bucked up against the bureaucracy in a way
that isn't that unusual. The office of Export Administration is a big organization with one phone
number. The people who work in it have evolved a
scheme to cope with the large numbers of exporters
who want attention. Whomever you get passes you
on to someone else. They have lists of ten referral
numbers. If 75% of the individuals take that tack,
people will be referred fifteen times before they
give up. I've had a woman crying on the phone with
me, begging me not to hang up, because no one
else would talk with her. 366
Hammond had another reason for taking some extra time to
help the NRDC. Before coming to the Department of Commerce, he had worked for twenty years at the Naval Research
Laboratory. At the Laboratory, "all I'd heard about the verification of nuclear test restrictions was just talk: 'it can be
done, it can't be done.' Just a lot of arm waving.'' Now, at
364. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of june 18, 1986); interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, supra note 72.
365. Telephone interview with David Wirth, supra note 360.
366. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145.
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last, "[s]omebody was doing something other than just talking about verification. "367
Hammond spent several hours helping the NRDC to
prepare its application. He found out which items of equipment required a license. With respect to the items about
which he was unsure, he informally consulted colleagues
who would know the relevant export control regulations.
Though his job was to be a technical advisor on the formulation of certain types of regulations and he was not in the Office of Export Licenses which actually processed applications, he considered what he could do to speed the application once it was filed. 368
The application was filed with the Commerce Department on June 18, 1986,369 but the key people at the Department had anticipated its arrival. Two days earlier, the
"emergency handling officer of the day, " 370 Dale N. Tasharski, had prepared a Special Processing Control Record 371 to
cover the application when it arrived. 372 Without any further
notations, this form would have caused other Commerce officials to give the application priority over others and to hand
carry it among offices. 373 But on this form, two further notations had been added. In the "Remarks" box on the form,
Tasharski had printed, in block letters, "RUSH STATE
DEPT. REQUEST NEED BY JUNE 24." Under his notation,
in a different hand, someone else had written, "Expedite per
Baldrige Request. "374
The irregularity of the entries can be explained only by
speculation. Mr. Tasharski (who handled dozens of special
processing requests each time he rotated through the duties
of "emergency processing officer of the day") no longer recalls precisely who asked him to make the "rush" notation.
However, he thinks it unlikely that a State Department offi367. !d.
368. !d.
369. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of june 18, 1986).
370. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
372. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Special Processing Control Record 4001, covering Export License Application
B 130273 (hand-datedjune 16, 1986, machine-datedjune 18, 1986).
373. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
374. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 372.
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cial would have called him directly. More likely, some higher
official in Commerce relayed the State request to him.375
What was the chain of information? Myrick had asked
Cochran to have the Commerce Department call Myrick's office.376 Probably, when a middle-level Commerce Department official phoned Myrick's office on Cochran's urging,
Myrick or a subordinate made the "State Department request."377 Since Laverne Smith, with whom DeWind spoke
at Secretary Baldrige's request, was Tasharski's immediate
superior,s 7s it seems highly likely3 79 that she was the source
or author of the second notation.
The Office of Export Licensing was alerted to the exigency three times, which might have been enough to ensure
expedition of the processing. Nevertheless, Hammond
made sure that nothing went wrong. "I don't work in that
office and couldn't order anyone to do anything," he says.
But you get to know the individuals in the office and
who has to sign off at each step of the way. You get
to know them on a personal basis, and you talk to
them about something other than business, and to
develop a relationship other than a professional
one. And then people will do things for you, almost
as a personal favor, if you don't ask too often and if
it doesn't get them in trouble. I can ask favors of
people a few times a year. And I was able to get
faster action on this one.3so
NRDC had every advantage in Commerce: the Department's
Special Processing routine reserved for two percent of applications; an expedition request from another agency; inter375. Cf Letter from Dale N. Tasharski, Trade Specialist, Nashville District Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Philip G. Schrag Uune 11, 1987).
376. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
377. The circumstantial evidence suggesting that the call to Commerce
originated with Myrick or his office includes (1) Myrick's statement to
Cochran, (2) the fact that Myrick's office was handling the NRDC project
for the State Department on a day-to-day basis, and (3) Richard Perle's
statement that if Myrick did help to expedite the processing of the export
license, "that would have been consistent with the position that he took [in
interagency meetings] all along." Telephone interview with Richard
Perle, supra note 335.
378. Interview with james Truske, supra note 182.
379. Ms. Smith declined to be interviewed.
380. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145.
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vention from, or attributed to the Secretary himself; 381 and a
sympathetic employee with direct, personal access to the licensing officials. As a result of this four-pronged pressure,
Commerce acted in record time, and within two days of being filed, the application had completed its Commerce Department review and was on its way to the Department of
Defense.382
Review at Defense was another matter. No one at State
could intervene there because the principle ofleaving NRDC
to the standard routines had been settled by the IG. NRDC
had no connections with the Secretary of Defense, and no
sympathetic employee was likely to emerge.
Nevertheless, when the application reached the Office of
Strategic Trade Policy (OSTP) in the Defense Department,383 NRDC benefitted fortuitously both from the notation on the cover sheet reflecting Baldrige's personal interest
and from Perle's prior consideration of the matter. "The
fact that Baldrige was interested carried some weight . . .
Commerce would be on the phone with our office every day
[if we didn't make a prompt decision on this case]."384 This
fact might alone have been enough to speed up the first half
ofOSTP review, the technical assessment ofwhether the export was consistent with the export control regulations. All
applications evaluated at OSTP also undergo a second, "policy" review, however.sss This additional review could have
slowed the application considerably. Fortunately for the
NRDC, in this instance, "Perle and the other policy people
had [already] met, so we didn't have to go back to the policy
381. Appealing to the Secretary through an outside channel was not
without its risks. A Commerce Department official later told the NRDC's
David Wirth that such tactics "would help us in the short run but would
hurt us in the long run, because by disrupting the routine of the Depanment of Commerce workers, we would make enemies who would retaliate
against us when we filed our subsequent applications." Telephone interview with David Wirth, supra note 359.
382. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
383. The application was hand carried across the Potomac as pan of its
"special processing." Telephone interview with john Konfala, Director,
Office of Strategic Trade Policy, Defense Technology Security Adl\linistration (April 14, 1987}.
384. /d.
385. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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people"; 386 as a result, the policy review within OSTP was
fast and virtually pro forma. 387
If the application had simply arrived in OSTP in the normal course of business, it would have taken ten to fifteen
days to process and could legally have remained in defense
for forty days. 388 In fact, because of pressure from OSTP's
Commerce Department counterparts and because Konfala
had already discussed the project with Perle and knew that
there was "high-level focus" on this project at State, Defense
and Commerce, 389 the Department of Defense approved the
application within two working days. 390 Defense then expedited communication of its decision to the Department of
Commerce, which immediately thereafter granted the license.391 Indeed, Commerce not only speedily granted the
license, but gave NRDC one year to complete the export,
rather than the month which is the standard expiration period for licenses granted through special processing. Granting a one-year license for an application handled through the
Department's expedited procedures is extremely rare. It
happens only once every four or five months, and it happened in this case because the papers showed the personal
386. Interview with Norman D. Kass, Office of Strategic Trade Policy,
Defense Technology Security Administration, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 10,
1987).
387. According to Mr. Kass, prior political review was one of six reasons
why the application cleared the Defense Department's reviewers so
quickly. The others were (1) the fact that the equipment was going to
remain under the control of American scientists, so OSTP did not have to
investigate a Soviet end-user; (2) the fact that the NRDC had done its
"missionary work" by explaining the project to senior officials at State
before filing its application, so "even though it was embarrassing that a
private group had done something that the US government hadn't been
able to achieve, we knew what we were dealing with"; (3) the fact that
Commerce officials had called ahead to say that the application would
soon be arriving; (4) calls from the NRDC to alert OSTP officials that the
application was arriving from Commerce; and (5) the evident urgency that
the applicants from the NRDC felt. /d.
388. Id.; 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409(e) (1985).
389. Telephone interview with John Konfala, supra note 383.
390. See supra note 193. Perle did not know until the author's interview
with him more than a year later that the application had moved through
his Department so quickly. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra
note 335.
391. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
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concern of Secretary Baldrige.392 Reflecting on the speed
with which this application was processed, one Defense Department official noted, in a colloquial paraphrase of Allison,
"This shows how the government works. From an administrative standpoint, there are established procedures. But
also there's a lot of ad-hoc-ism."393
NRDC's next problem was obtaining the visas for Soviet
scientists. During the deliberations on how to respond to
the expected export license application, the Working Group
had known that the NRDC-SAS agreement called for reciprocal visits to the United States. The Working Group had
never discussed the proper response to Soviet visa applications, however, because its members believed that the Soviets would never actually implement this part of the arrangement. The Group reasoned that since the U.S. Geological
Survey openly published seismic data from Nevada, including data showing most, if not all, of the U.S. nuclear tests,
the Soviets would not want to go to the expense of sending a
team to Nevada. The Soviets insisted on negotiating reciprocal rights into the agreement, the Group assumed, only so
that the deal ·with NRDC did not look to the world like a unilateral U.S. inspection of the Soviet Union. As a result,
Working Group consideration of these two phases of the
project were "two very distinct operations."39-t
Mter the license was granted, some officials began to focus on the next stage. At an IG meeting onjune 27, 1089,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth
Adelman said that if the Soviets did propose to come, his
agency would oppose the visit. In july, when U.S. scientists
were already placing their seismic equipment in Kazakhstan,
American newspapers reported the NRDC's announcement
that the Soviets were indeed planning to come to the United
States to select sites for their stations. The Soviets wanted to
have these sites operational by October.39s
Reacting quickly, the State Department sent a telegram
392. Interview with james Truske, Division of Exporters Assistance, Department of Commerce (May 28, 1987). When the Secretary is interested,
"people hop to be accommodating." /d.
393. Telephone interview with john Konfala, supra note 383.
394. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
395. See, e.g., Gerstenzang, Soviet Scientists Plan to Monitor Nroada A-Tests,
L.A. Times,July 15, 1986, at 16, col. 1.
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to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, alerting the Embassy to the
U.S. newspaper reports. "Given the media attention from
both sides which the travel of such a team of Soviet scientists
would attract, and the need to consider the question of visa
issuance for these purposes, post should alert the Department ASAP when these Soviet scientists apply," the cable ordered. "Please advise via Visas Donkey Chipmunk . . . for
appropriate adjudication. "396
Several aspects of this telegram are worth noting. First,
it is clear from the text that media attention was among
State's early concerns regarding the visa problem, and the
public relations factor would continue to mold U.S. policy.
Second, although the law gives consular officers theoretically
unreviewable discretion with respect to decisions on the excludability of nonimmigrant visitors, 397 the officials at the
Soviet desk who drafted and approved the telegram 398 were
instructing the visa officers in the Embassy to request from
them an "appropriate adjudication" which, in effect, would
guide the decision of the Embassy personnel. Finally, the
Government would take advantage of the controls on Communists in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act to exert leverage
over the visit. Under State Department codes, 399 "Donkey"
means a request for an advisory opinion from headquarters
in Washington, and "Chipmunk" refers to a request for a
determination as to eligibility under the Communist-exclusion sections of the Act, with the further recommendation of
the consular officer that if the applicant is thought to be ineligible only on the basis of Communist affiliations, the ineligibility should be waived by the Justice Department.400
At about the same time that the State Department sent
its telegram to Moscow, State officials sent a visa proposal to
396. U.S. Dep't of State, Outgoing Telegram No. 222084 from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow Quly 16, 1987).
·
397. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
398. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 395 (drafters located in "SOV,"
the Department's Soviet desk).
399. The codes are not secret; they are shorthands that date back to the
days when telegraphic communication was so expensive that single words
were used to express pre-agreed longer messages. Telephone interview
with Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations, and
Advisory Opinions, Visa Office, U.S. Dep't of State Uuly 6, 1987).
400. Id.
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the three people on the National Security Council (NSC)
staff who dealt with arms control issues.401 These officials
refused, however, to allow State to decide the issue unilaterally or in consultation only with NSC staff. In mid-:July, NSC
asked State to run the decision through the interagency process, starting with the Working Group.-1o2
Early in August 1986, therefore, the Working Group began to discuss the proper U.S. response when the Embassy
reported the filing of a visa application. Because of the McCarran-Walter Act, the government had more options with
respect to the visas than it did with respect to the export
licenses. As a result, the Working Group did not, in this
case, reach an easy consensus. The State Department representatives argued that the Soviet applications, once filed,
should be handled in accordance with normal visa regulations. This position had the cosmetic advantage of parallelling the "normal processing" outcome of the Working
Group's debate about the export license. In practice, however, since the Department consistently recommends waivers
for Soviet nationals without applying foreign policy criteria,403 the outcome for which State argued would have
granted the Soviets the visas they sought. The State members of the Group and a few others who agreed with them
reasoned that as U.S. officials "[we] were going to have to
take our lumps for giving them [the Soviets] the seismic data,
but we shouldn't also have to take lumps by being seen as
trying to spoil the process. We shouldn't look as though the
U.S. wasn't as open as the Soviets were being."404
The representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed
·with the State Department,405 but Perle's representative, Ed
40 L The three NSC staff members were Sven Kraemer, Robert Linhard,
and Linton Brooks. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. Of the
three, Kraemer was the most influential on this issue, because he was
deeply familiar with the NRDC case by virtue of his membership on the
Working Group. Cf interview with Dr. James Timbie, supra note 336.
402. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
403. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
404. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338.
405. In foreign policy matters, the uniformed services do not always
agree with the Pentagon civilians. Richard Perle has observed that "most
of these fellows [Pentagon generals he works with] are not paid to have
ideas, when you come right down to it. Asking them to advise on arms
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Nawrocki, strongly disagreed. Nawrocki believed that:
the NRDC's goals were totally the opposite of our
own. They went into this project to prove that a
CTB is verifiable. [And we'd made verification into
the main public objection to a CTB because] verification is such a 'show stopper,' as Richard Perle is
fond of saying. So the government didn't go much
beyond verification as a reason why we shouldn't
have a CTB. And NRDC was out to undermine the
verification argument against a CTB.406
Perle and Nawrocki had another reason to try to block the
NRDC project, if possible. On August 8, 1986, in the midst
of the Working Group's debate as to how the United States
should respond, the House of Representatives was debating
an amendment to the following year's military authorization
bill. The amendment would have prohibited the United
States from testing nuclear weapons of more than one kt unless the Soviets ended their moratorium and tested at yields
higher than this level. Several members were pointing to the
NRDC project as key evidence to show that the Soviets
would indeed cooperate in CTB verification. The chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee noted that the
NRDC project "could be expanded to incorporate a wider
network of monitoring stations on their territory which
would provide even greater monitoring confidence."407
In the Working Group, Perle's representatives did not
take the hardest possible line, which would have been to
deny the Soviet scientists any possibility of visiting the
United States. Perhaps Perle saw the public relations price
control is a little bit unfair. It doesn't come naturally to them." Hiatt, A
Richard Perle Sampler, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at A20, col. 2.
406. Interview with Col. Ed Nawrocki, supra note 347.
407. 132 CoNG. REc. H5738 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep.
Fascell). One member displayed, in the well of the House, "the first seismogram from an in-country monitoring system to come back from the Soviet Union." Holding the seismogram up to the television cameras in the
House, he added, "This, my friends, is the Soviet moratorium in action, a
graphic description of what happens when a nuclear explosion doesn't go
off. It should have been a U.S. official agency installing this equipment,
not a private American environmental organization. The signatures that
are on this seismogram should read: Adelman, Perle, Weinberger, Gaffney, not the names of independent scientists." !d. at H5744 (statement of
Rep. Hartley).
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of a fiat denial as too costly. Instead, Nawrocki argued that
the Soviets should be told that they could come, but only as
official representatives of the Soviet Government, on an official visit to the United States. In that context, they should be
invited only to the Nevada Test Site, and only for the purpose
of observing an American test and measuring its yield with
CORRTEX or some similar mechanism.408 In other words,
the Government should counter the NRDC project by inviting the Soviets to accept the offer that President Reagan had
extended to them a year earlier, an offer they had already
rejected. In proposing this policy, Perle was indifferent to
the Soviet reaction. If the Soviets accepted, the NRDC project would be revealed as one that was really sponsored, on
the Soviet side, by the Soviet Government.409 If Soviets
turned the program down, "no damage would be done. "410
The other members of the Working Group took positions between those of the two most directly affected agencies, State and Defense, but somewhat closer to the stand of
State. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representative argued that the visas should be granted but that the
Government should insist that that the Soviet visit was limited to scientific purposes. This formulation might allow the
Soviets to come, but, by characterizing the visit as a scientific
exchange, could make the visit less newsworthy and could
also reserve for the Government the option of discontinuing
cooperation if it wanted to stop the Soviets from monitoring
actual nuclear tests. The Department of Energy's member
said that the visas should be granted, and that the Government should avoid official involvement in the visit.4 1 1
Unable to reach consensus among the four different
proposals, the Working Group wrote an options paper
408. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338, confirmed in part in
interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, supra note 338.
409. Interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335.
410. Interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, supra note 338. The U.S. Government might still have appeared obstructive, but the obstruction would
have been less apparent than the clear blockade represented by a visa denial with no counter-offer.
411. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 352. The NSC member took
no formal position, since the NSC is, in principle, a coordinating rather
than an operating agency.
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describing the agencies' positions,412 which was intended to
be circulated to more senior officials for resolution at an IG
meeting. Just after the paper had been completed, however,
the Soviets filed their application, with a proposed itinerary
that included areas in California and Nevada I 00 miles from
the Test Site, and a proposed arrival date of September 14,
1986.413 NRDC was already making arrangements for the
Soviet delegation to meet reporters at several stops in the
United States, and to attend various scientific meetings.
With the clock running, the Labor Day holiday intervening,
and little prospect for any greater agreement in the IG than
in the Working Group, the IG members did not meet. Instead, they forwarded the options paper directly to the staff
of the National Security Council.414 The reference of such a
matter to the NSC staff had become a standard procedure for
resolving State-Defense standoffs, "in fact it was as a consequence of virtual paralysis in the development of arms control policy in 1983 that that subject was moved to the White
House." 415
Meanwhile, the NRDC staff members attempted to work
with the Department of State officials to smooth the visa process, as they had with Commerce Department officials in the
case of the export license. Cochran asked Myrick for assistance, and Myrick's office told him to deal with Gladys
Boluda, at the State Department's Soviet desk, who worked
on visa matters.416 Cochran made no mention of interagency disputes, working groups, Communist exclusions, or
waivers. To the NRDC, impliedly, the decision was being
handled through routine bureaucratic processes. Cochran
412. Memorandum for Members of the Interagency Group on Nuclear
Testing Limitations From the Nuclear Testing Working Group (Aug. 28,
1986). The memorandum is still classified and the author has not seen it.
413. Letter to Gladys Boluda, Department of State, from Dr. Thomas
Cochran, NRDC (Sept. 2, 1986); Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran
(entry of Aug. 26, 1986).
414. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. The NSC staff had a
copy of the Working Group paper in late August by virtue of Sven Kraemer's membership in the Group. This paper was not formally transmitted
by the State Department to the NSC, however, until September 13. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
415. McFarlane, Letter to the Editor, Wash. Post, June 28, 1987, at C6, col.
3.
416. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of Aug. 26, 1986).
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called Boluda, informing her of the scientists' proposed itinerary and their proposed September 14 arrival date, and followed his call with a letter appealing for her help in expediting the visa process.417 Two days later, Boluda told Ann
Schonfield, an NRDC research associate, that although the
U.S. Embassy in Moscow had not actually received the visa
applications, everyone knew that they would be filed imminently, and the Embassy staff was ready to process them.
She told Schonfield that the approval process usually took
two to three days, and, in response to a concern expressed
by Schonfield, reasssured her that NRDC need not worry
about the Soviets being restricted to certain geographic areas-that was a problem only for diplomats.418
Two days after the Working Group completed its options paper and sent it to the NSC staff, Nicholas Daniloff, a
journalist for U.S. News & World Report, was arrested and
jailed in Moscow, apparently in retaliation for the August 23,
1986 arrest in New York of Gennadi Zakharov, a Soviet scientific officer assigned to the United Nations.419 The President and the nation were outraged. After writing two letters
to General Secretary Gorbachev, 420 President Reagan told
the United Nations General Assembly that the Daniloff arrest
had cast a pall over U.S.-Soviet relations, 421 and the United
States ordered the expulsion of twenty-five Soviet diplomats.422 The NSC staff members who received the NRDC
options paper could not have failed to notice the potential
political fallout if they granted, in the midst of the Daniloff
4I7. Letter to Gladys Boluda, supra note 4I3.
4I8. Handwritten notes of Ann Schonfield, NRDC (dated Sept. 4, 1986).
Travel of Soviet diplomats to certain areas (usually designated by county) of
the United States is prohibited, in retaliation for restrictions on travel by
Americans in the Soviet Union. See Note from the United States Secretary
of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Nov. 1, 1983), rt:}ltcted in
DEP'T OF STATE, MAP OF AREAS AND MUNICIPALlTlES IN THE
OPEN
OR CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL (undated).
4I9. Bohlen, KGB Says U.S. Reporter Engaged in Espionage, Wash. Post,
Sept. I, I986, at AI, col. 1.
420. Hoffman, Reagan Feeling Pressure From Daniloff Detention, Wash. Post,
Sept. 22, I986, at AI, col. 4.
421. Hoffman, Reagan U.N. Speech Cites Anns Progress, Hits Daniloff Arrest,
Wash. Post, Sept. 23, I986, at AI, col. 5.
422. Ottaway & Cannon, U.S. Firm on Ousting 25 Soviets, Wash. Post,
Sept. 22, I986 at AI, col. 3.

u.s.

u.s.
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crisis, unrestricted visas to a highly visible group of Soviet
scientists who were coming to monitor American nuclear
tests. With Daniloff a prisoner, the visit of the Soviet scientists "had a domestic political dimension" which "had a psychological bearing" on the outcome of the NRDC application.423
Unbeknownst to Cochran and Schonfield, who continued to write to Boluda,424 the matter was now in the hands of
NSC staff members. Behind the scenes, each of the major
players lobbied the NSC staff in attempts to persuade that
arbiter to take its side. Frank Gaffney, Perle's deputy, was
the Defense Department's "point man" 425 in "some off-line
discussions." 426 While at Foggy Bottom, "everybody was
talking to everybody at many levels."427 Both Whitehead
and Secretary of State George Shultz called Admiral John
Poindexter, the President's National Security Advisor, to
press for a decision in State's favor. 428
The delay in processing the visas was caused in part by
preoccupation throughout the national security community
with other matters, including the Daniloff affair, 42 9 partly because of the awkwardness of dealing with the issue with
Daniloff unresolved, and partly by the continuing informal
discussions with and among the NSC staff members and the
President's National Security Advisor. During the first three
weeks of September there were many such discussions. In423. Interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to the Deputy
Secretary of State (Mar. 10, 1987).
424. Letter to Gladys Boluda, Department of State, from Ann Schonfield
(Sept. 5, 1986).
425. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
426. Interview with Frank]. Gaffney, supra note 352.
427. Telephone interview with john Hawes, Deputy Chief of Mission,
U.S. Embassy to Morocco Uuly 20, 1987). Mr. Hawes served in 1986 as
the principal deputy for purposes of the NRDC project to Allen Holmes,
Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Sitting in for Mr.
Holmes, he co-chaired (with Perle) the IG meetings dealing with nuclear
testing restraints. According to Richard Perle, although interagency conflicts are a "fact oflife, ... under this Administration the National Security
Council has been weaker than in prior administrations. Its ability to reconcile differences is less. So the differences persist longer and are fought
out with greater determination." Pear, Those to Whom the "Bailie Royal" is
Nothing New, N.Y. Times, july 28, 1987, at Al4, col. I.
428. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
429. Interview with Frank]. Gaffney, supra note 352.
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deed, "[t]he role of [Working Group and IG] papers is to
trigger the informal discussions. The papers cause the discussions, but the decisions are really made as a result of a
series of informal dialogues. "4So
After Daniloff had been released from prison into the
custody of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,431 the NSC staff
members reached a decision which Admiral Poindexter ratified.432 The NSC considered both the Perle option of restricting the Soviets to an official visit to the Test Site under
government auspices and the Whitehead option of letting
them make the trip that they wanted to make. In the end, the
NSC staff members selected some aspects of each approach
and gave the Soviets a choice. They could come as an official
delegation, measure a test in Nevada, and then do as they
pleased, or they could come as guests ofNRDC but not go to
the prospective sites that they wanted to examine:tss
In part, this choice grew out of the previous proposals.
Toward the end of the informal bargaining process, when it
became clear to the State Department that the NSC would
not support their preferred approach, State Department
members stopped asking for unrestricted visas and argued in
favor of a conditioned visa, so as to avoid a blanket denial. 434
But the idea of giving the Soviets two options took all of the
agencies by surprise. The reason for this outcome was that
the NSC staff "split the difference. The decision embodied a
430. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
431. See Cannon, Daniloff Freed by Soviets; U.S. to Return Zaklzarov, Wash.
Post, Sept. 30, 1986, at AI, col. 4.
432. "The decision was formally looked at by Poindexter. I wouldn't say
he 'rubberstamped' our decision; 'ratify' is the non-pejorative term. On
issues other than very major ones, we staff members tend to debate and
decide them, and the National Security Advisor signs off. In this case, he
had no questions about our recommended course of action." Interview
with Charles East, supra note 338.
433. Outgoing Telegram No. 305164 from the Secretary of State to
Europoean Embassies et aL (Sept. 27, 1986) (press guidance).
434. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338. The concept of a
conditioned license was originally suggested in an interagency meeting by
someone from an agency other than the State Department, but after
Myrick checked with the Visa Office to make sure that this device would be
lawful, the State Department officials decided that they could live with it
for the sake of compromise. Interview with William Clay, supra note 338,
supplemented by telephone interview with William Clay (Aug. 17, 1987).
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compromise between imposing no conditions [State's preferred approach] and permitting the Soviets to come only as
government officials [favored by Defense]." The compromise resulted because compromise is "the typical decisionmaking mode in the U.S. government."435 As a NSC staff
member explained, "Sometimes we have to be tie-breakers.
But there is a very strong split-the-difference ethic that works
over here. The NSC staff tries to find a solution that's acceptable for the country and to avoid complete winners and
losers in the bureaucracy. This administration has some resemblance to a feudal system and there is no sense in pissing
off the barons if you don't have to do so. We try to keep the
process as a whole functioning."436
On September 24, 1986, Myrick informed Cochran of
the two options,437 and shortly thereafter the State Department issued press guidance attempting to make the Government's decision appear to have been an utterly routine
one. 43S The Soviet visit was rescheduled based on a truncated itinerary, and the Soviet scientists selected sites for
seismic stations in California and Nevada based on maps and
rock samples shown to them while they were in San Diego. 43 !J
When the Soviets asked to return a few months later, to participate in the establishment of the stations, they were again
offered two unpalatable choices. They could measure the
yield of a U.S. test and then enjoy an unrestricted threemonth visit, or if they refused to monitor a test, they would
be limited to a seven day U.S. visit and barred from visiting
the areas in which they wanted to set up stations.440
On this round of governmental consideration, some of
435. Interview with FrankJ. Gaffney, supra note 338.
436. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
437. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC (entry of Sept. 24,
1986). According to the NRDC staff member who had primary responsibility for trying to get an answer to the visa request from federal officials,
"[w]e never got a formal tum-down. We never heard anything from
Boluda though we'd been calling her five times a day." Interview with
Ann Schonfield, NRDC Research Associate, in Washington, D.C. Uan. 7,
1987).
438. "Regarding the issuance of visas, visa requests submitted by Soviet
officials routinely require waivers. Such waivers may involve certain conditions or restrictions." Outgoing Telegram No. 305164, supra note 433.
439. Moe, Soviets' N-test Plan Blocked, San Diego Union, Nov. 11, 1986.
440. Telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr (Mar. 13, 1987).
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the factors had changed. Daniloff had long since returned to
the United States and the diplomatic relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union was slightly less
chilly. Nevertheless, the decision on this second visa application was virtually identical to the decision on the first one
because, through the interagency fracas, a new standard operating procedure had been implicitly established-a procedure for dealing with NRDC visa requests. As one State Department participant in the process explained:
the second time around, there was no Daniloff affair, but by then we had a policy. It was easier just
to follow the policy because it seemed to work.
Also, by just following our previous policy, we
could keep Defense out of our knickers. If you just
say, 'now we've got a policy that everyone agreed
to, and we'll carry it out,' they can't tell you what to
do. Also it's easier to continue a policy than to revisit it. And you waste as little time as possible:H 1
This time, however, the Soviets rejected both options,
choosing not to visit. They preferred to allow the NRDC to
perform the site preparation work and, if necessary, to accept electronic data reports without ever visiting the sites.
Although data collection in Nevada would not actually be
hampered by the fact that the Soviets never set foot there,
the inability to provide reciprocal access to the sites in the
United States opened the project to attack from the Soviet
Government bureaucracy. The lack of reciprocity may have
contributed to the Soviet decisions in the summer of 1987 to
require NRDC scientists to move the Kazakhstan stations to
locations further from Semipalatinsk, and to leave all of the
Soviet stations under the day-to-day control only of Soviet
nationals.442
Because application for permission to install the seismic
stations on government land had to await Soviet selection of
particular sites, the interaction between the NRDC and the
Government on this issue lagged behind the resolutions of
the export license and visa issues. By the time the sites had
441. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338.
442. Telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr ijuly 9, 1987);su Natural
Resources Defense Council and Soviet Academy of Sciences, USA-USSR
Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Agreement ijune 25, 1987).
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been selected, NRDC had contract~d to the University of Nevada at Reno the responsibility for setting up the U.S. stations.
lnjanuary and February 1987, the University of Nevada
applied for rights-of-way to erect the three stations.'143The
University subcontractor suggested that the applications be
filed by the University, rather than by the NRDC, and that
they not mention the NRDC-SAS agreement.444 The NRDC
agreed to this proposal. At both institutions, those who were
working on the project made decisions about the application
forms based on their understanding of bureaucratic decision-making. The technicians at the University Laboratory
had long-standing relationships with the government agencies that would process the applications. The University had
been installing seismograph stations on public lands in Nevada for more than twenty years. Their experience predated the Government's enforcement, beginning in the
1970's, of laws requiring permits even for minor installations
on federal lands. Walter Nicks, the engineer who actually
signed the applications on behalf of the University, had, over
a period of five to seven years, participated in obtaining permits for about thirty such stations. All of the University's applications had been granted without difficulty, and no one
had ever objected to seismic monitoring near the Nevada
Test Site. 445
443. Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for Transportation
and Utility Systems and Facilities on Federal Lands to the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management Uan. 30, 1987) (re:
Deep Springs Valley); Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for a
Special Use Application to the U.S. Department of the Agriculture-Forest
Service (Feb. 24 1987) (re: Troy Canyon); Application of the University of
Nevada-Reno for Transportation and Utility Systems and Facilities on
Federal Lands, to the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management (undated) with covering letter from Walter Nicks to Ben Collins, District Manager Uan. 30, 1987) (re: Nelson).
444. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design Engineer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (April 21,
1987). NRDC'sjacob Scherr recalls agreeing with the suggestion that the
applications be filed by the University, but does not recall being aware that
the University was not even mentioning the agreement in its application.
Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 25,
1987).
445. Interview with Nicks, supra note 444.
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Nicks and his colleagues "thought it best not to mention"446 the agreement with the Soviets. The NRDC's officials acquiesced in Nicks' judgment because of past adversarial relationships between the NRDC and the Bureau of
Land Management. "We have sued BLM and the Forest Service countless times," reasoned Jacob Scherr, the principal
NRDC attorney working on the project.44 7
Accordingly, the applications were indistinguishable
from those previously filed by the University and granted by
the federal agencies. The applicant was the University, enabling it to check a box on the form categorizing the applicant as "State Government." Where the application required the applicant to "describe in detail the land use," the
University stated that the right-of-way was needed "to establish an earthquake monitoring station to obtain seismic data
used in the laboratory's research." 448 In the University's explanation of why federal land had to be used, the University
noted that "station location needed to obtain earthquake data
from this location." In its statement of need, the University
said that "sites are needed to provide essential seismic data.
Science, education, public awareness and public safety all
benefit from the collection of this data. "449
Despite the the lack of mention of the NRDC, the Soviet
Union or nuclear test monitoring on the applications, federal
officials at all three offices responsible for processing the applications knew that the real purpose of the applications was
to monitor testing at the Nevada Test Site as part of a cooperative project with the Soviets. At the U.S. Forest Service
headquarters for Humboldt National Forest, the Troy Can446. /d.
447. "It could have been counterproductive to have named NRDC as
the applicant. The papers might have gone, eventually, to someone who
knew about NRDC lawsuits and who might have let them remain for a
while at the bottom of his stack. We didn't want to take a chance by calling
special attention to these applications. We wanted them to be handled
routinely." Telephone interview with S. Jacob Scherr, NRDC attorney
(April 22, 1987).
448. NRDC Application, supra note 443.
449. Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for a Special Use Application to U.S. Dep't of Agriculture-Forest Service, supra note 442 (emphasis added). Regarding the reference to earthquakes, Nicks reasoned
that "it will measure earthquakes as well." Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, supra note 444.
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yon application was assigned for investigation to Steve Wyatt, a range conservation and mineral specialist and Gary
Shafran, a recreation and lands staff officer. The first step in
processing the application was to view the proposed site. In
order to resolve expeditiously any problems that might arise,
the federal officials invited Walter Nicks, who had signed the
application, to walk the site with them. Nicks agreed, and he
brought one ofhis students with him. The student had been
to Kazakhstan, where he had helped to install a station similar to the one that would be installed at Troy Canyon.
During the site walk, Nicks and his student discussed
some of the technical aspects of the Soviet stations, and the
federal officials joined the conversation. As a result, the federal officials learned about the NRDC-SAS agreement and
the purpose of the Nevada station.4so
This disclosure may have subtly improved the already
good prospects for approval. "It probably influenced my decision in a positive way," says Shafran, the senior of the three
officials, and the one who had responsibility for making a
positive or negative recommendation to BJ. Graves, the Forest Supervisor. "It was a very positive factor in my mind because it was part of a larger effort to determine whether nuclear tests can be differentiated from earthquakes, and that is
very worthwhile research." 45I
After the site visit, Larry Gillham, a recreational forester, was assigned to draft the environmental assessment
which would then be sent to Shafran for review. Gillham was
aware of the agreement with the Soviets because he had seen
the project on the television news and was already excited
about the project. But Gillham was conscious of not allowing his interest to affect his professional judgments. Nevertheless, that the purpose of the project did not negatively
impress him influenced him, at least in part. Gillham also
confirms the validity of the concerns previously expressed by
Jacob Scherr:
I have pretty much full say about how this project
goes. If I'd had a bias, I could have slowed it down
450. Telephone interview with Steve Wyatt, U.S. Forest Service, Humboldt Nat'l Forest Uuly 23, 1987); telephone interview with Gary Shafran,
U.S. Forest Service, Humboldt Nat'l Forest Uuly 23, 1987).
451. Telephone interview with Gary Shafran, supra note 450.
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or speeded it up. That's how the government
works. It all depends on individuals. But I'm new
here, and I haven't built up biases yet. I just try to
get a project done whatever it is.452
The function of Forest Service officials involved in making a recommendation to the Forest Supervisor was not to
judge the nuclear test monitoring purposes of the seismograph station but to evaluate the environmental effect. "The
purpose of a project has no bearing on our approval," Gillham says. "We treated this application like we treat all special use applications. Our only job is to mitigate environmental impacts. Our only concern is with the disturbance of
the surface and the protection of natural resources. We
never get into what the project is specifically for. " 453 The
fact that the application had come from the University of Nevada reinforced the officials' tendency to treat the project
routinely. "That added a lot of credibility to the stated need
for the site," Shafran remarks, "[i]t's a reputable school, so
we would feel good about any proposal we received from
them."454
Concerned only with environmental aspects, Gillham
did not consider soliciting comment from the State or Defense Departments. He did, however, confer with the Department of Wildlife of the State of Nevada. The Wildlife
Department was satisfied by the University's posting of a
$5,000 bond to guarantee that the land would be restored.455 With these issues resolved, Shafran recommended approval to the Forest Supervisor. Because the testban verification potential of the station was a positive factor
in his mind, Shafran edited Gillham's environmental assessment to include a description of the international ramifications of the permit:
The seismic data is needed as part of a larger research project. It involves both the United States
and [the Soviet Union]. Seismic instruments are being located around both countries [sic] nuclear test
452. Telephone interview with Larry Gillham, U.S. Forest Service, Humboldt Nat'l. Forest Uuly 23, 1987).
453. /d.
454. Telephone interview with Gary Shafran, supra note 450.
455. Telephone interview with Steve Wyatt, supra note 450.
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sites. The objective being to be able to distinguish
nuclear explosions from natural earthquakes. This
could then be used to verify a nuclear test ban
treaty. 456
The Forest Supervisor, however, was not favorably or
negatively influenced by this statement. Focusing only on
the environmental concerns, Mr. Graves granted the permit:457
"I granted the right-of-way because the project
would have minimal ground-disturbing activity....
Even though it may have positive world-wide political and social implications, I didn't take account of
them. We do sometimes take political and social effects into account, but only when they are local
ones, not global ones. My job is to assess how well
the land can handle the use it's going to be put
to."45s
The application for a station site near Deep Springs,
California, was assigned for initial processing to Eric Watson, a natural resources specialist with the Ridgecrest, California, office of the Bureau of Land Management. Because
of a local policy of requiring that rights-of-way involving
communications sites be approved at the District level, Watson's evaluation could not be approved by the Resource
Area Manager in the Ridgecrest office. Although the application only mentioned earthquakes, Nicks told Watson on
the telephone that the purpose of the station was to monitor
U.S. nuclear tests as part of an exchange with the Soviet
Academy of Sciences. Watson was troubled that "the written
application wasn't really the same as the oral description we
got [over the phone]. That isn't good." 459
An environmental assessment typically begins with a de456. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Service, Environmental Assessment Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact, University of
Nevada-Reno Troy Canyon Seismic Site Uune 18, 1987).
457. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Service, Special Use Permit,
granted to the University of Nevada Uune 18, 1987).
458. Telephone interview with BJ. Graves, Forest Supervisor, Humboldt National Forest (Aug. 3, 1987).
459. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, Bureau of Land Management Uuly 23, 1987).
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scription of the project. Watson began to write a description
which included the real purpose of the effort stating that the
project would help with weapons control and the prevention
of nuclear war. On second thought he discarded his draft
and began a new one which did not mention nuclear testing.
"I decided to follow the written application," he said. "It
was better that way, for the sake of the papenvork."4 Go
The entire staff of Watson's Ridgecrest office knew that
the purpose of the seismograph station would be nuclear test
monitoring. 461 Nevertheless, all of the officials of that office
who worked on the papers confined their focus to environmental concerns. "We worked it up from a natural resources
perspective: the botanical impacts, geology, wildlife, that
sort of thing. We don't look at the politics or purposes of a
project."462
As a result, the District Manager receiving the papers for
final decision was unaware that the application was for an
NRDC-sponsored project or that it involved nuclear test
monitoring as well as earthquake detection. Had the papers
disclosed more, said Watson:
the District Manager might have knocked it up to
the State Director, and the State Director might
have sent a copy of the papers to the Defense Department. There probably would have been more
inquiries, but the result would probably have been
the same. The purpose certainly wouldn't have
been a negative factor. From the point of view of
most people, setting up mutual monitoring stations
to verify limits on nuclear testing can only be a
good thing. 463
As at Troy Canyon, the fact that the University of Nevada
had applied for the Deep Springs right-of-way might have
affected the processing of the application:
460. /d.
461. /d.
462. /d. Mr. Watson's statement is entirely consistent with BLM regulations. See supra notes 286-290 and accompanying texL
463. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, supra note 459. At the time
of the interview, Mr. Watson was probably not aware that some senior
Defense Department officials viewed this particular monitoring project as
a "subversion" of U.S. foreign policy. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
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That made it a more routine case. The NRDC
probably would have seemed more political,
although I don't know because I know a lot of the
environmental organizations, but I'm not familiar
with the NRDC. If the applicant had been the
NRDC, that probably would have at least led us to
require a more complete written description of the
project. 464
Nevertheless, the description was deemed adequate, and the
application was routinely approved.465
The application to build a station on BLM-managed
land near Nelson, Nevada, followed a similar procedural
path, though it included a twist which advanced its consideration to a higher bureaucratic level. Initially, the application
was assigned to a realty specialist, Dennis Samuelson, for review. At Samuelson's level, the application was entirely routine. He needed only to insure that no archaeological artifacts would be disturbed, and that the grazing area of the
local rancher would not be impaired.466
The environmental analysis prepared by the staff was
sent to Ben Collins, the District Manager in BLM's Las Vegas
office. Collins would have granted routine approval to what
appeared to be an application for a small earthquake monitoring station, with no significant environmental impact. But
as Collins was about to sign the permit, he remembered that
months earlier, he had been called by Bob Stewart, the public relations director in BLM's State Office in Reno, and had
been told to watch for an application for a right-of-way for a
seismic station that would monitor nuclear tests at the National Test Site. Although the University's application for
the Nelson site did not mention nuclear test monitoring,
Collins realized this application was the one Stewart had
mentioned. As directed, Collins telephoned Ed Spang,
BLM's Nevada State Director.467
464. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, supra note 459.
465. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Special
Use Permit No. CA 19121 (a "right-of-way"), granted to the University of
Nevada-Reno (March 8, 1987).
466. Telephone interview with Dennis Samuelson, BLM Realty Specialist, Las Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 10, 1987).
467. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, BLM District Manager, L,s
Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 11, 1987).
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When Collins spoke to Spang, the State Director told of
two concerns. First, Spang noticed that the University of Nevada was applying for several rights-of-way in the State, including not only the seismic research stations at Troy Canyon and Nelson, but numerous other facilities unrelated to
the NRDC project. This series of requests reminded him of
another setting in which an applicant for the use of Nevada
land-the United States Air Force-had over the years acquired the right to use several small parcels. Each one individually was innocuous but, combined, constituted such a
large withdrawal of public land for bombing ranges and
other military uses that BLM's acquiescence had become a
public issue. Spang thought that the University's numerous
pending and expected applications should be reviewed together, rather than piecemeal. The State Director did not
want the Nelson application to become the "camel's nose
under the tent. "468
Second, Spang feared that if BLM granted the requested
right-of-way, the Bureau might appear to be acting inconsistently. In recent months, BLM had generated controversy in
Nevada by granting rights-of-way in connection with two significant local activities-a proposed nuclear waste repository
at Yucca Mountain and the Air Force's emplacement of electronic devices in order to conduct tests involving tactical aircraft. As a result of local concern, BLM had recently placed
a moratorium on the granting of any further rights-of-way
for these activi_ties. Spang wanted to know how BLM could
justify granting a right-of-way for a nuclear test monitoring
project while it was denying rights-of-way for these other nuclear or military projects.469
Spang surveyed all of the University's applications, and
was satisfied that they were not cumulatively excessive. Collins found two answers to Spang's concern about consistency. First, Collins noted that BLM's office in Ridgecrest,
California, and the Forest Service in Humboldt, had already
granted permits for the very same activity. The Government
would certainly appear to lack consistency if it granted two of
-the requested permits but denied the third. Second, Collins
468. Telephone interview with Bob Stewart, Public Relations Director,
BLM Nevada State Office, Reno, Nev. (Aug. 17, 1987).
469. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, supra note 467.
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determined, through a telephone call, that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which manages the Nevada Test Site,
had no objection to granting the right-of-way.47o
To make the inquiry into DOE opinion, Collins called
DOE's Nevada operations office and spoke with Pete Fitzsimmons, the Director of Health, Physics, and Environment
there. Fitzsimmons regarded Collin's request as an informal
inquiry regarding the granting of rights-of-way, not as an official request for DOE approval. Consequently, Fitzsimmons
did not check with more senior DOE officials and told Collins that DOE had no objection to granting another right-ofway.471
Spang was persuaded by the precedential cases that Collins cited, and by the fact that DOE had no objection.
Neither Spang nor Collins ever questioned the State or Defense Departments regarding opinions on the application. 47 2
Spang authorized Collins to issue the right-of-way, and Collins granted it immediately.473
No one will know whether, had the rights-of-way applications been known about, the senior Defense Department
officials who opposed the Soviet scientists' visit to the sites4 74
470. Id.
471. Telephone interview with Pete Fitzsimmons, Director of the
Health, Physics, and Environment Division, Nevada Operations Office,
U.S. Dep't of Energy (Aug. II, I987).
472. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, supra note 467; telephone
interview with Ed Spang, Nevada State Director, BLM (Aug. I8, I987).
473. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Special
Use Permit No. N 46068 (Aug. 2, I987).
474. The senior officials of the Defense Department did not know. Interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335; Frank J. Gaffney, supra note
352. The author assured the NRDC, in connection with soliciting that organization's cooperation in the writing of this study, that he would not ask
questions that would cause officials who might be unsupportive of the project to reopen matters that were just being settled. Accordingly, the precise question he asked Messrs. Perle and Gaffney was not "[a]re you aware
that NRDC needs federal permission to install seismic equipment on federal property in order to carry out its project?" He asked, instead, "Besides the export licenses and visas, are you aware of any other forms of
government cooperation that NRDC wanted for its project?" To this
question (posed after the Troy Canyon and Deep Springs rights-of-way
were granted and, in one case, while the Nelson application was pending
and, in the other,just after it had been granted), Messrs. Perle and Gaffney
responded in the negative. Id.
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would have tried to intervene or whether they would have
succeeded.475 By chance, Defense was not part of the rightof-way action channel. The lower level officials in the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior did not seek comments from Defense, and Cochran's statements, reported in
the national press,476 were apparently not noticed in the
Pentagon. In addition, neither the Department of Agriculture nor the Department of the Interior were connected to
the National Security Council's action channel for nuclear
testing issues. Consequently, the NSC staff had no knowledge of the permits that those agencies were processing.477
Fortuitously, a Department of Energy official (Fitzsimmons) was consulted regarding one station permit. His
agency was represented on the Interagency Group and the
Working Group on nuclear test limitations. The stations issue might have been brought before the Interagency Group
through this channel and, utimately, sent to the NSC staff.
The official, however, was an environmental officer, not a
policy-maker, and since he had only been consulted in an informal manner, he saw no need to seek policy guidance from
senior officials in Washington. For the above reasons, in the
spring and summer of 1987, the national security policymakers who had fought vigorously over the issue of visa
awards for the NRDC project, remained unaware that federal
officials in other departments were in the course of routinely
granting permits to install nuclear test monitoring stations
on government property.
The description of the Government's response to the
NRDC initiative, as constructed by a Model III analyst, implies explanations that can be phrased in terms of interpersonal interactions rather than policies of a nation or its standard responses. As seen by the Model III analyst, the central
4 75. Given the regulatory plan, Perle and Gaffuey might have been able
to slow down the processing for a while, but they probably could not have
prevented the rights-of-way from being granted. See supra notes 286-290
and accompanying text.
476. Blakeslee, Russian Team Arrives to Mo11itor Atom Test.s, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 11, 1986, at C8, col. 3 ("[T]he American scientists said they did not
think it would be difficult to get permission to place instruments at the
monitoring sites to be selected. All of the potential sites are on Government land.").
477. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338.
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determinants of the Government's response were: (I) the attitudes of key senior officials of bureaucratic organizations,
particularly Perle and Whitehead; (2) an action channel-in
this case the Working Group reporting to an interagency
group and ultimately to the President's National Security Advisor and his staff-through which policy decisions could be
negotiated; (3) bargaining and eventual compromise among
the participants with power to affect the outcome; (4) rules of
the game affecting the bargaining process; (5) maneuvers to
affect the action channel for decisions and their implementation; (6) the introduction of new players at the implementation stage; and (7) misperception, misunderstanding, and
luck. The relevance of each of these factors to the NRDC
project may now be summarized briefly.
A.

The Attitudes

of Key Officials

If Whitehead and Perle had agreed that the government
should do everything it could to undermine the NRDC effort, or had they agreed that the project could contribute to
knowledge about verification of a test ban, the government's
response would probably have been quite different. In the
former case, the export licenses might have been delayed for
months, perhaps long enough to cause the Soviets to lose
patience with the NRDC. The Soviets would have been denied a visa or invited to visit only if they would witness a
CORRTEX demonstration. In the latter case, the Government might have taken over the project as the NRDC invited
it to do, or the Soviets would have received unrestricted
visas. 478
A more challenging question is why the leaders held the
views that they did. An analysis of the attitudes of Perle or
Whitehead in terms of their individual histories is beyond
the scope of this work. At least one factor might have been
the agencies in which they found themselves or, as Allison
4 78. If the leaders had strongly believed in the NRDC project but had
felt constrained by the domestic political consequences of granting unrestricted visas to monitor tests in Nevada, the government might have
conditioned Soviet access to seismic monitoring sites on Soviet willingness
to permit the stations in Kazakhstan to remain operating even if Soviet
testing resumed-a condition that would have been readily understandable in terms of the principle of reciprocity.
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reminds us, ''[W]here you stand depends on where you
sit."479 Government logistics and self preservation explain
why the person more willing to tolerate this Soviet-American
joint project was the Deputy Secretary of State, an official of
the Department primarily responsible for negotiating agreements and maintaining good relations with other governments.480 On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, an official of the Department responsible for deterring
Soviet aggression (in part by maintaining a nuclear arsenal
that some believed would be threatened by a treaty banning
all nuclear weapon tests), 481 most wanted the project to fail.
To conclude that these individuals' bureaucratic base
could constitute a complete explanation for their stances
would be a mistake. Perle had formed his general stance toward the Soviet Union long before his appointment to a policy job in the Pentagon. Indeed, he was appointed to that
job largely because he held those views, views consonant
with those of the Secretary of Defense and of the President.
Senior public officials are rarely ciphers whose outlooks are
shaped (in Model II terms) by their agencies' missions. They
frequently seek, and are appointed to office (an essential
479. G. ALLisoN, supra note 1, at 176 (quoting Prof. Don K. Price).
480. Indeed, Perle believes that "[i]n its heart of hearts, State would
have wanted to embrace this project, as a stepping stone to a CTB
Treaty," but that it couldn't do so because the government's general policy toward a CTB had long been set in concrete. A more fundamental
conflict about test ban policy was therefore, in his view, deflected to the
second-level issue of how to react to the NRDC project, and particularly
whether to grant the visas. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra
note 335.
481. See Current Negotiatwns on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearings
Before the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcomm. of the
Hovse Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). In these hearings, held during the Carter Administration while the U.S. was actively
negotiating for a comprehensive test ban treaty, a Defense Department
witness testified that "CTB would have an adverse affect [sic] upon U.S.
stockpile reliability and upon our ability to develop new nuclear weapons.... In my view, such a CTB would be asymmetrical in favor of the
Soviets." Id. at 59 {statement of Adm. R.R. Monroe, Director, Defense
Nuclear Agency). Similarly, a witness from the Department of Energy (the
agency responsible for developing new nuclear weapons and for maintaining the Nevada Test Site) testified that "in the long run without testing, we
could not maintain the same confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile
that we have today...." !d. at 22 (testimony of Dr. Donald Kerr, Acting
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Dep't of Energy).
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move in the Model III game) because they and their appointing officials seek to affect national politics in a particular way.
B.

The Action Channel

The existence of a decision-making mechanism for nuclear test ban issues also affected the outcome of the various
applications. Most export licensing decisions are made in a
particular action channel. Depending on the commodity being exported, either the Commerce bureaucracy licenses unilaterally, or Commerce and Defense engage in bureaucratic
bargaining. The Department of State, unilaterally, determines most visa applications. Occasionally it consults with
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice.
In this instance, however, the Government had, years
earlier, established a special action channel especially for issues relating to constraints on nuclear testing. This action
channel's jurisdiction was broad enough to encompass the
NRDC problem when it presented itself. As a result, the relevant players included not only officials from Commerce and
Defense (for exports), and State (for visas), but also the President's National Security Advisor and the NSC staff, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of
Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite the
statute482 assigning to the Attorney General the duty to impose conditions on nonimmigrant visas, 483 the Justice Department's role in this case was virtually irrelevant. 484 The
482. Aliens and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(6) (1982).
483. In another context (asylum), the staff of a Congressional Commission has severely criticized the Department of Justice for permitting the
State Department to exercise, de facto, the discretion in immigration matters assigned by law to the Attorney General. "Congress has given the
Attorney General the primary responsibility for deciding on the admission
or exclusion of aliens in accordance with the INA [Immigration Act] ....
The Attorney General, or his designated agent, may not fail to exercise the
discretion which has been granted to him by Congress through statutes .... The Department of State is not at liberty to control or coordinate
an alien's request for admission .... " CoMMISSION ON SECURITY AND CoOPERATION IN EuROPE, THE MIROSLAV MEovm INCIDENT, CSCE Doc. No.
1-2, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1987).
484. How the visa issue would have been resolved if it had been decided
by the Justice Department rather than by the test ban action channel is
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Government's decisions with respect to establishing the seismic stations on federal land never entered the test ban action
channel. While difficult to determine what would have happened had those land use applications been debated by the
Working Group or referred to the National Security Advisor,
the possibily that the permits would have been denied (subject to litigation) on the ground that they were not consistent
with the "public interest. " 4 85

C. Bargaining and Compromise
The Government's export license and visa decisions resulted at least partially from inter-agency bargaining. The
former occured in the Working Group which achieved consensus on processing the application in the normal course of
business: The latter occured in both the Working Group
and in "off-line" communications between senior departmental officials and the President's National Security Advisor. The final, critical decision was a compromise between
positions of disagreeing officials, drawn from elements they
proposed. Once the agencies reached an impasse and referred the visa issue to the NSC staff, compromise was an
inevitable outcome because the NSC staff wanted to avoid
impossible to know. But perhaps the visas would not then have been conditioned, because it was the custom of the Immigration and Naturalization
service to condition visas very rarely, and only when unrestricted travel of
the applicant threatened the United States with loss of technological
secrets. Even those restrictions, however, seem to result from decisions
made in other departments. The only court to have addressed this issue
believed that independentjudgment by Department of justice officials on
visa applications was an important part of the statutory scheme. The idea
that the bureaucratic model of decision-making could be used to design
systems that would help to ensure that the laws would be faithfully executed was attributed to Congress, and the division of visa denial responsibility between the State and justice Departments was even analogized to
the constitutional separation of powers between branches of government.
"Congress apparently designed the [McGovern] Amendment with the
traditional division of responsibility between the two executive departments in full view. Such divisions of responsibility, and the closely kept
balance of powers that results from them, have long been regarded as an
effective check on the disingenuity of individual public officials." Ahourc.k
v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1986 (citing THE FEDERAL·
IST No. 51)), ajf'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. l (1987).
485. Forest Service, 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h)(2) (1986); Bureau of Land
Management, Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4(a)(2) (1986).
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outright "winners" and "losers" in the line departments. 4 86
D.

Rules of the Game

The bargaining power of the players was governed not
only by their personal persuasiveness or by long-term interdepartmental power relationships, but also by specific laws
and understandings applicable to this case. In the Working
Group, the bargaining over the export license was strongly
influenced by pre-existing regulations governing export controls. The decision not to impose arbitrary delays was influenced, at least for some players, by a sense that such delays
were unfair, or, if reported in the press, would be perceived
by the public as unfair. The visa decision was made in the
context of a web of statutes and regulations which opened
some options (e.g., conditioning the visas) and closed others
(e.g., making no decision at all). Similarly, law and custom
highly regulated the process governing grants of authority to
use federal lands. This process included widespread understandings that the job of the relevant licensing officials consisted only in examining environmental factors and ignoring
national or global political implications.
E.

Maneuvers to Affect the Channels for Decision
and Implementation

The Working Group made a decision to allow the Commerce Department and related agencies to handle the export
license application regardless of how long that might take.
In all probability, none of the Working Group members
knew, when the decision was made, that Commerce had two
implementation channels-a slow lane, for 98% of the cases,
and a fast track for the rest. A key maneuver was to move
this application from one channel to the other, and at least
part of that play was executed by someone at the State Department, probably although not necessarily, Bismark Myrick
or someone in his office. The NRDC itself executed a second key play to the same effect when DeWind contacted Secretary Baldrige and was able to have Baldrige's name invoked as an authority for expedition. Similarly, action on the
486. This competitive dynamic is a central-feature of Model III. See supra
note 296 and accompanying text.

Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1988]

POliCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE

119

visa applications might have been different if the determination of the applicants' excludability had been left, as it must
legally be left, to the consular officer in Moscow. In order to
avoid the risk of policy makers' eventual exercise of discretion being determinative, officials at State in Washington
sent the telegram ordering the consular officer to request an
advisory opinion through a "Donkey Chipmunk" cable. In
addition, the NRDC dramatically influenced the decision
channel for the station permits by applying in the name of
the University of Nevada, and by omitting any reference to
nuclear test monitoring in their applications. Although officials at all three recipient offices knew that the proposed seismic research stations were part of a nuclear test monitoring
project involving transmission of data to the Soviet Union,
the fact that the applicant was a respected Nevada institution, technically, a part of the state government, and that the
application documents did not overtly refer to nuclear tests
helped to prevent challenges to the applications that might
have caused them to be referred to policy officials at higher
levels or in other departments.

F.

The Introduction of New Pla)'ers

After the action channel reached the export license decision, the manner in which the decision was implemented was
affected by the introduction of a whole new cast of characters. These characters included the Secretary of Commerce,
the Director of the Exporter Assistance Division, the "emergency processing officer of the day," a Commerce Department official not responsible for acting on the application
but who became NRDC's Samaritan, and the Director of the
Defense Department's Office of Strategic Trade Policy.

G. Misperception, Misunderstanding, and Luck
In any real, complex, human interaction, people do not
act with machine-like precision. The outcome is at least partially influenced by factors such as misperception, misunderstanding, and luck. The policy-makers in the Working
Group, and their senior officials to an even greater extent,
were too busy to devote a significant amount of time to reacting to the NRDC. Although Cochran had told Whitehead
that the Soviets would need visas, the Working Group did
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not even attempt to address the visa issue until it had resolved the export license issue that had arisen first. Hence,
the Group denied itself the opportunity to formulate for the
government an internally consistent policy affecting both issues.
Senior officials also lacked the time to explore aspects of
the problem beyond those brought to their attention. They
were unaware, therefore, that NRDC also needed permission
to establish stations on federal land, even though NRDC's
need was evident from the nature of the project and from the
fact that Nevada land is owned almost exclusively by the U.S.
Government. 487 The Working Group members did not perceive the possibility of expedition in their decision to let the
normal processes of export licensing take their course. The
officials of the Office to Strategic Trade Policy may have mistakenly taken Perle's acquiescence in the export and his instructions not to delay the license for concurrence in expedited licensing.
The role of luck is illustrated most dramatically by the
fortuity of personal connections linking the Chairman of the
Board of NRDC with both Whitehead and Baldrige, the
arrest of Daniloff as the Working Group completed its visa
option paper (which at least delayed the decision and may
have made the Group less favorable to the project), and the
fact that the House was debating a testing funds cut-off just
as Perle was asked to take a stand on visas for the Soviet
scientists (which became a factor, though not the decisive
one, in the position he took).4SS
To the Model III analyst, an understanding of how a
governmental decision was made must derive from a close
examination of motivating factors. As evidenced in the
NRDC case, the factors affect how real people interact with
487. In addition, Cochran had told the press that NRDC needed permission to emplace the monitoring instruments on federal land, and the press
had reported that fact. Blakeslee, supra note 476.
488. Another less dramatic example of the role of luck is the processing
of the Nelson station application. Chance factors completely unrelated to
the NRDC project (the fact that the University of Nevada had recently
made other applications to use BLM-managed land, the current controversy over the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, and the Air Force's
encroachments on public uses of land) caused a delay in the permitting
process while the Nelson application was reviewed by the State Director.
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each other under conditions of: pre-existing relationships;
institutions (including action channels); constraints; incomplete information; limited time; multiple agendas; and divided power. In principle, sufficient information about the
interactions of officials (and others) in this milieu could enable the analyst to "explain" the government behavior.
VI.

THE THREE MODELS

Describing the Government's response to the NRDC
project three ways suggests that just as major crises, deployments, and negotiations can be understood from multiple
perspectives,489 relatively routine national security decisions
can usefully be examined through Allison's three different
"lenses."490 Each of the three models contributes additional
information to our understanding of government behavior.491 This study also intimates that Allison may underesti489. That scholars have not yet been able to formulate more definitive
theoretical statements about national security policy, such as a statement
that bureaucratically negotiated decisions are never rational or a claim that
ideology conquers bureaucracy in all decisions involving East-West confrontations may be unsettling. Foreign policy analysis over the last two
decades "has not developed a generally coherent and validated set of theories, as the spirit of scientific advances requires." Hill & Light, Fortign
Policy Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 153 (A. Groom & C.
Mitchell eds. 1978}. The "state of the art is still one of competing paradigms [and] most scholars agree that real-world decision processes are
marked by a mix of the procedures postulated by [the various] models."
Maoz, The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision A7!al)•sis Applied to Crisis Behavior,
25]. CoNFLICT RESOLUTION 677, 677-78 (1981). The present study is, in
part, a response to Allison's call for further research to develop a "typology of decisions and actions that would serve as a guide to the analyst
about predominant reliance for a first cut." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at
276.
490. The metaphor is Allison's. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 2.
491. There is no reason to think that the behavior of the U.S. Government is unique although, as a result of inadequate information, even sophisticated analysts who understand the bureaucratic determinants of U.S.
Government actions tend to treat other countries as if their officials made
national, rational decisions. Allison cites the example of a U.S. Government interagency meeting on Middle East desalination in which representatives of twelve different agencies disagreed strenuously with one another
and revealed that their agencies were acting at cross-purposes. They then
proceeded to discuss "the Israeli policy on desalination" as if that policy
had been dictated by one individual. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 14647.
But see W. WALLACE & W.E. PETERSON, FoREIGN PoLICY MAKING IN WEST-
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mate the significance of two aspects of his paradigms: the
role of laws and regulations in Model II and the role of interpersonal initiative by people who are not leaders in Model
III. The study enables speculation on ways in which one of
the models may possess relatively greater explanatory power
as the decisions under examination move down the ladder
from crises and other "major" events492 to more routine national security concerns.
The case study confirms that the new kinds of information developed in the context of Models II and III add additional dimensions to reason, dimensions that deepen an understanding of why a decision was made. 493 At the same
time, the case study demonstrates that none of these models,
standing by itself, presents an adequate picture of a very
complex reality. A Model I explanation of the Government's
reaction is the easiest to develop, and it comports with our
innate hope that governmental decisions are reasonable and
ERN EuROPE 1-2, 19-20, 124 (1978) for the view that "[p]luralist politics in
Washington, encouraged by the division of powers in the American constitution, do not necessarily provide representative data for generalisations
that will extend to the one-party systems of Eastern Europe, or the narrowly based elites of many less developed countries." Id. at 20 (citation
omitted).
Applying the three models to a study of why the Soviet government
responded as it did to various aspects of the NRDC project would be very
interesting. Why did it agree, early in 1986, to allow NRDC scientists to
monitor its nuclear test site from stations in Kazakhstan? Why did the
Soviet Government agree to send its scientists to the United States even
though they were refused access to the potential station sites? Why did it
at first refuse to allow NRDC monitoring during nuclear tests and then, in
june 1987, reverse this position? The author is not in a position to answer
these questions in depth, since addressing them on more than a superficial
level would require interviews with Soviet officials. Perhaps glasnost will
one day permit issues like these to be explored by Soviet scholars.
492. See the rough distinction between critical and second-level national
security problems at supra note 21.
493. From a more practical perspective, appreciation of Models II and
III could make decision-makers better able to achieve the results they desire, by helping them to predict how standard operating routines and interpersonal interactions will cause their desired outcomes to be modified
in the course of decision-making and implementation. For an outline of
advice to decision-makers based on these paradigms, see the "planning
guide" developed by Allison & Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm
and Some Policy Implications, in THEORY AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40, 77 (R. Tanter & R. Ullman eds. 1972).
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within the control of accountable public officials.4 9-1 But after learning the fuller contexts developed under Models II
and III, the Model I analysis of this case, like Allison's Model
I description of the Cuban Missile Crisis, "seems somewhat
disembodied,"495 and since, by definition, it must demonstrate rationality, it is hard pressed to account for the full
range of governmental responses to the NRDC project.
Still, Model I must not be rejected altogether.496 The
officials whose representatives bargained in the interagency
Working Group were motivated, at least in part, by their
conceptions of a unitary, rational "national interest." However, particular notions of where that interest lay varied from
person to person. The State Department actors thought
there might be some merit to the project, and that the national interest would not be served if the U.S. Government
were seen by the world as attempting to strangle the project
through delay or denials. Perle believed that the project
could mislead the American public into premature enthusiasm for testing restraints and could encourage the Soviets to
continue to refuse to negotiate TTB Treaty amendments encompassing a CORRTEX system. Each of the major policy494. Model I analyses "are perfectly coincident with the ethical assumptions of democratic politics" while the "machines" that make policy under
Model II "cannot be held responsible for what they do, nor can the men
caught in their workings," and Model III analyses suggest that "[p]olicy
results from compromises and bargaining[, not] the values of the President let alone of lesser actors." Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?, in
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POUCY 411,412,414 (C. Kegley & E.
Wittkopf eds. 1983). Ifformer National Security Advisor john Poindexter
is to be believed, the diversion of Iran arms sales profits to the Contras in
Nicaragua in 1986 offers a spectacular example of Krasner's ethical criticism of bureaucratic analysis. If Model I is generally accepted, the public
would put the blame squarely on the President for the policies carried out
in his name and the illegal means used to implement them, while the other
models, and Poindexter's testimony, tend to exonerate the President and
blame a flawed system of national security decision-making or its less accountable minor actors. Cf U.S. TOWER COMMISSION, REPORT OF TilE
PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REVIEW BoARD IV-3 (1987).
495. G. ALusoN, supra note 1, at 247.
496. Krasner's characterization of Allison notwithstanding, Krasner,
supra note 488, at 410, Allison himself concedes a place for Model I reasoning as a "quick, imaginative sorting out of a problem ... a productive
shorthand." G. ALusoN, supra note 1, at 254.
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makers was probably moved in large measure497 by individual conceptions of a rational response to the NRDC. 4 0 8
Whether or not that was the case, in the bargaining that followed each actor had to argue as if he held such a conception.499
If any one of the individual, human players had controlled the entire decision, the final results, in terms of the
combination of decisions on export licensing, visas, and station permits, might have been internally consistent. Undoubtedly on some occasions one player does "win," and
perhaps some in which the players' views of the world are
nearly congruent. Model I may be a more useful theory for
such cases. 500
497. In the view of Morton Halperin, "much of what goes on in the government involves efforts to analyze an issue from the point of view of
shared images and to persuade others that the requirements of national
security, flowing from those shared images, require that a particular stand
be taken. However, what is in fact in the national interest is often elusive
despite shared images .... In such cases [participants] will often look to
organizational interests." M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, BuREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND fOREIGN POLICY 25 (1974).
498. The point has also been made that Model III is more of a "rational" process than it would at first appear to be, because the act of compromise is itself intentional. "[T]he compromise that results from the
pulling and hauling was deliberately intended by the participants. The exact nature of the compromise that results may be unintended or unforeseen, but not the initial intent to achieve some sort of compromise." Art,
Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique, 4 PoLICY SciENCES 467, 471 (1973). Whether the result can qualify as "rational" is
unclear if it is one that no bargainer intended or would have desired, any
more than a decision to decide a foreign policy question by throwing dice
would be made "rational" by the deliberate intention of the gamblers to
have the decision made in that way.
499. That is, the informal "rules of the game" would have ruled out a
claim that the NRDC project should be scuttled because it could lead to a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that might impair weapons designers'
employment security.
500. In a particular case, bureaucratic routines could support rather
than undercut rational decision-making. In the case of the Israeli raid on
Entebbe, the existing standard operating procedure militated against negotiation with terrorists, even to buy time, for events in Israel or friendly
countries, but allowed such negotiation for events in hostile countries.
This routine "instead of constraining the decision-makers, provided a useful guide for the exploration of multiple options, had a built-in element of
value tradeoffs, and [was] sufficiently flexible to allow on-the-spot improvisations." Maoz, supra note 489, at 704.
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Furthermore, to overlook the role of deliberate, rational
decision-making in establishing the very routines that characterize Model II would be an error. For example, some irrational inconsistencies in the export licensing controls may
exist, and the controls may have curious impacts in unusual
cases (e.g., disabling senior officials from having discretion
to prevent NRDC's export). But the control list was created
as an attempt to impose some rational ordering on export
licensing. The plan was intended to be useful, in the great
majority of cases (i.e., typical commercial trade matters) to
protect the nation from its own commercial entities which,
through ignorance or the profit motive, might otherwise be
inclined to sell to other nations technology or goods that
could be used in military actions against the United States. so•
Model II considerably enhances an understanding of the
Government's response to the NRDC. To begin with, the
model discards the assumption (which a Model III investigation shows to be erroneous for this case) that the export license, visas, and station permits were all part of a single "decision" and substitutes two assumptions more plausible to
virtually everyone who has ever worked in a large bureau501. In addition to influencing the thinking of individuals who engage in
Model III bargaining and the creation of Model II institutional mechanisms, rational planning may affect the Model III game through individuals' commitments to policies that transcend the case at hand. As strongly
as Perle believed that the NRDC project was harmful to U.S. foreign policy, he may have been committed even more strongly to a principle (or
policy) of "fair dealing" which caused him to accept what he thought
would be the "standard procedures" routine (as opposed to deliberate delay) of export licensing. This relatively rational explanation is not, of
course, the only possible hypothesis concerning the fact that he did not
hold up the license for any period of time. In pure Model II terms, Perle's
bureaucracy may not have had an available routine for deliberate delay, or
the trouble to try to deviate from routine altogether might not have been
worthwhile. (Indeed, the Office of Strategic Trade Policy had been criticized for excessive delay in the average case, and the bureaucratic imperative was to reduce it. The Office was very proud of the fact that it had
reduced the average West-to-East case processing time from 70 to 15 days
in only two years. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY
SECURITY PROGRAM, A REPORT TO THE 99TH CoNe., 2o SESSION 28 (1986).)
In pure Model III terms, a strategy of deliberate delay in the face of the
working group consensus (which had been ratified by the interagency
group) might have incurred the wrath of other officials from whom Perle
needed action on other occasions.

Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

126

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 21:1

cracy. The new assumptions are that each ,part of the bureaucracy usually works on only the part of the "decision"
for which it has principal responsibility, and that a bureaucracy usually reacts only to the matter immediately before it.
A bureaucracy does not anticipate related problems or evaluate all of their ramifications before taking action on part of
the problem. Seen in this light, no "government" decision
was made. Rather various bureaucracies undertook a series
of separate responses to particular parts of the NRDC's proposed project. These bureaucracies included the Office of
Export Licensing in Commerce, the Office of Strategic Trade
Policy in Defense, and various offices in the Departments of
State, Agriculture and the Interior. This effect resolves the
central problem of the Model I explanation-the inability to
integrate all of the parts of the Government's response into a
single, internally consistent rational explanation.
In addition to offering this central insight, the Model II
description highlights a world in which decision-making institutions are not free to do whatever seems best or most reasonable under the circumstances. Instead, decisions are
channelled and constrained by formal and informal operating procedures. Some of these are standard routines developed by an agency itself for convenience in most of its case
load. These include some classically Allisonian SOP's:
Commerce Department's procedure of according very quick
review to a small percentage of export license cases, and assigning to junior officers the power to decide when cases fall
into that category; the Forest Service's routine of having District Rangers or Forest Supervisors in the field rule on applications for rights-of-way in the National Forests, rather than
sending such applications to Washington for high-level review; and the justice Department's tradition of allowing
State Department officials to decide when the Attorney General should exercise his statutory power to waive the exclusion of an alien or to condition a visa.
The constraints on bureaucratic judgment also include,
to a surprising extent, a welter of statutes and regulations,
which share with the informal SOP's their historical attachment to the "typical" case rather than to any particular decision to which they must be applied. Allison is not concerned
with the web of legislative and regulatory limits on govern-
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mental freedom to act in the area of national security,S 02 despite their emergence as an increasingly significant feature of
the national security landscape. 503 Given the detailed nature
of the regulations governing export licenses, for any level of
government to reach a "policy" decision that could have prevented the export would have been difficult. However, delay
would have been available if the policy-makers had reached a
consensus to stall the project.
This regulatory constraint was based more in history
than in conscious planning. It was essentially fortuitous that
off-the-shelf seismometers were uncontrolled; that the data
recorders the NRDC wanted to use fit the guidelines for export to the Soviet Union, and that only "national security"
and not "foreign policy" controls applied to the export of
such recorders to the U.S.S.R. (depriving those who might
have opposed such a license of the additional argument that
the export of the devices in the NRDC project undercut foreign policy).
Similarly, had the governmental leaders reached consensus, after the Soviet visit, on a "policy" of denying the use
of federal lands to seismic stations monitoring U.S. nuclear
tests, they would have found it virtually impossible to impose
that choice. The existing land use regulations simply did not
recognize such a policy. The standard routines for changing
the regulations 504 are slow and cumbersome, and denying
the rights-of-way despite the regulations would quite probably have resulted in litigation and perhaps an embarrassing
court defeat for the Reagan Administration. 505
502. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
503. This emergence oflegislative limits reflects the increasing role that
Congress is playing in foreign policy, but may also indicate that, as FrederickS. Young put it, "laws are an attempt [by Congress] to make Model III
questions into Model II questions." Memorandum to Philip G. Schrag,
July 22, 1987. There is, of course, disagreement as to whether, in most
cases, decisions will be more reasonable if the relevant officials are less
restricted.
504. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1982).
505. To rationalize such a decision, the Government probably would
have to claim that granting of the permits was not in the "public interest,"
a ground for denial under 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h}(2) (1986) and 43 C.F.R.
§ 2802.4(a)(2) (1986}, because it undercut U.S. pressure for CORRTEX.
This claim would have given the NRDC the opportunity for a highly publicized court test of whether its seismic verification project was in the public
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Even in the matter of the visas, where the Government
was able to impose its policy decision, its ability to do so was
based in large measure on luck. That the Soviet scientists
were excludable at all (as a result of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act's ban on the entry of those with Communist affiliations) was an historical accident favoring the Government,506
and a countervailing fortuity favoring the NRDC that a McGovern Amendment was on the books, creating a presumption in favor of waiving the exclusion. 507 Luck favored the
Government, in that the 1979 Solarz amendment had
changed the McGovern amendment so that it did not apply
to the Soviet Union,sos but luck favored the NRDC, in that
State had interpreted the Solarz amendment in a way that
did not, in fact, lift the presumption of ineligibility for Soviet
nationals. 509 The final stroke of luck benefitted the Government's position: a little-used 1917 statute permitti~g the visits of excludable aliens to be "conditioned" still remained on
the books. 510
interest, and given the fact that the "public interest" provisions are rarely
if ever used for this purpose, the NRDC might well win such a case.
506. The purpose of these provisions was to exclude "subversives," see
H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 251, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE GoNG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1703, but their existence gave the government an opportunity to control the visit of the Soviet scientists for reasons of foreign policy, notwithstanding the fact that no one argued that their presence would
endanger U.S. security.
507. The purpose of the McGovern Amendment was to implement the
Helsinki Final Act, designed to encourage the free flow of people and
ideas. Few of the legislators who voted for it could have contemplated
that it might have the effect of preventing the U.S. from employing visa
restrictions for this purpose, namely, pressuring a foreign government to
bow to a U.S. position on a nuclear test ban treaty. The resulting standard
procedure of waiving exclusions was significant in this case, for it both
created genuine pressure to admit the Soviet visitors (departing from standard practices is harder to explain than adhering to them, and it can invite
lawsuits) and armed the State Department representatives to the Working
Group with a rationale for opposing the Defense position.
508. For a historical discussion of laws governing visas, see supra note
243.
509. /d.
510. In writing the 1917 statute that created the visa-conditioning routine, Congress was in no way addressing the use of visas as instruments of
foreign policy, or even the control of visiting Communists (the Communist
exclusion was added to the law 35 years later). The "policy" was to create
a humane exception to the absolute prohibitions on admission to the
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The legal restraints on the government's reaction to the
NRDC project were at least as significant as the informal bureaucratic routines, and like the pre-existing routines, they
had no strong relationship to the particular issues posed by
the seismic monitoring exchange. It may be the case that
statutory constraints exert more influence on second-level
national security decisions (like those involved in this case)
than on major controversies. Although major aspects of foreign policy are increasingly governed by statutes, those statutes may be phrased in more general terms in order to afford
flexibility to the President.s11
Sometimes, formal and informal routines interact in curious ways. For example, the State Department was statutorily required to allow the consular officer in Moscow to make
an initial and final decision on the Soviet scientists' visit. But
State had long ago developed an SOP (sending a cable instructing a consular officer to request a Donkey Chipmunk
advisory opinion) for ensuring that, in significant cases, such
decisions are really made in Washington. Like the Attorney
General's de facto deference to the State Department, this situation represents an informal SOP taking precedence over a
formal one.
Model III resolves some of the questions that neither
Model I nor Model II can explain: where no standard procedure exists or where the Government succeeds in deviating
from rote behavior. Model III also introduces the element of
United States in prior laws and in the 1917 amendments, particularly the
1917 prohibitions on visits by illiterates. Indeed, the policy considerations
that led to the creation of this routine appear to have been focused primarily in the direction of allowing students to enter the United States temporarily regardless of their inadmissibility. The bill introduced into the House
(in an era in which the main focus of debate was on the exclusion of illiterates, see, e.g., 53 CoNG. R.Ec. H4775-4816 (1916)), 54 CoNG. REc. 8158162 (1916}, would have allowed the Government to make discretionary
exceptions for "students and others"; this language was amended in the
Senate Committee on Immigration to include the entire class of inadmissible aliens, eliminating the explicit reference to students. S. REP. No. 352,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916).
511. The author is indebted to Peter Schuck for this observation. On
the other hand, some statutes regulating very significant foreign policies
such as the Boland Amendment and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act appear to be fairly specific in their commands and prohibitions, if not always
free from ambiguity or even escape clauses.
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humanjudgment and interaction. 512 In Model III, individual
people, working through established action channels, make
the critical differences. Whitehead's warmth to the project
gave it a chance. Perle's hostility created significant obstacles. In this respect, Allison's paradigm may be due for some
revision, for the case study suggests that many human hands
make a difference. National security policy decisions are affected not only by the heads of traditional national security
related agencies, but also by the leaders of peripheral agencies, lesser officials in agencies, and people outside of government. Bayless Manning, who was able to put the NRDC
in direct contact with the Secretary of Commerce, was instrumental in expediting the export license, as was Donald Hammond, a junior official in Commerce whose only connection
to the project was his interest in it and his proclivity to help
members of the public who were having trouble with his bureaucracy. Very junior officers such as Larry Gillham and
Eric Watson, in agencies far removed from foreign policy issues, helped the NRDC project develop by their decisions
not to include in the seismograph station right-of-way applications the information they had learned about the nuclear
test monitoring function of the equipment. Only in the case
of the visa requests was the outcome determined almost exclusively as a result of bargaining, through representatives of
senior officials of the relevant agencies-State, Defense and
the NSC, with some input by the Department of Energy, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
The interpersonal maneuvering at the heart of Model III
does not take place in a vacuum. To overlook the impact of
standard procedures on what kind of bargaining or other in512. In a 1972 essay co-authored with Morton Halperin, Allison described what he called Model III in a way that imported many Model II
concepts, though he did not suggest that he no longer regarded distinctions between Model II and Model III as useful. Allison & Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications, in THEORY AND
PoLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 (R. Tanter & R. Ullman eds.
1972). This publication has led one author to observe that Models II and
III are "analytically distinct" but that "the evidence is often fuzzy-it can
fit either model. This helps us to understand why even Graham Allison,
author of the best description of the two models, can be found at various
times using the two together or each one separately." P. MORGAN, THEORIES AND APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 83 (1981).

Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

1988]

POUCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE

131

terpersonal contact takes place or on how these interactions
are translated into action would be erroneous. Most dramat~
ically, standard routines affect the central participants in the
bargaining process. Routines determine which action chan~
nel is most relevant. No new negotiating group was created
to deal with the NRDC. Instead, the project was thrown into
an existing interagency group, with an established member~
ship. Indeed, the State Department's decision to refer the
NRDC problem to such a group (as opposed, for example, to
Whitehead simply determining the U.S. policy) was itself an
example of following a standard operating procedure. Similarly, the standard procedures of the Forest Service and
BLM, to grant rights-of~way at the local level, without Defense or State Department consultation, determined which
player or players had a voice in deciding the station permits.
On a less dramatic level, standard operating procedures limit
the types of possible bargains and significantly affect their
implementation. The existence of an expedited system in
the Department of Commerce (which was one of that Department's standard procedures) helped to undercut the
Working Group's decision, through an interpersonal process, to avoid expediting the request.
While generalizing from a single case study is a dangerous undertaking, an analysis of the Government's reactions
to the NRDC enables speculation on which model might be
more or less appropriate when the decision at issue is a second-level national security matter. For several reasons, the
structures, laws, and standard operating routines of Model II
may have more effect in determining policy in second-level
cases than they do in major ones.
First, in a crisis or other major decision, the issue will
directly implicate the "shared images" of the decision-mak.ers.513 With exceptions,5 14 most of the players will generally
agree on the type of solution necessary to resolve a major
513. Halperin identifies sixteen "shared images" which frequently affect
American foreign policy specialists. These include such statements as,
"the surest simplest guide to US interests in foreign policy is opposition to
Communism," and "[c)oncessions made under pressure constitute appeasement which only whets the appetite of aggressors." M. HAl.PERJN
WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, supra note 497, at 11-12.
514. One such exception is the disagreement between Secretaries
George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, on one hand, and CIA Director

Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

132

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 21:1

problem such as whether to deploy troops to Grenada, bomb
Libya, negotiate a missile reduction with the Soviet Union,
or build the Stealth Bomber. By contrast, broad principles
such as belief in military strength or opposition to Communism may be less helpful to decision-makers dealing with second-level matters. Second-level issues involve questions of
judgment as to which of several courses (e.g., pressuring the
Soviets to observe CORRTEX or encouraging them in their
willingness to accept seismic monitoring of their territory) is
more likely to lead to a broadly desired result (negotiated,
verifiable constraints on nuclear arms competition). The
broad principles may be even less helpful in addressing matters that are essentially questions of implementation (e.g.,
would the United States be more damaged by allowing the
Soviets to operate seismic stations in Nevada or by appearing
to try to prevent them from doing so). To the extent shared
images determine outcome, both Model I 515 and Model
III5 16 may be more significant than Model II.
Second, because of the greater need for secrecy, major
problems may be addressed by a smaller circle of players.
Instead of leaving such problems to the bureaucracies of the
departments and to the multiple layers of interagency
processes, Presidents are more likely to bring them directly
into the White House, calling upon the immediate personal
attention of the relevant department heads and a few other
advisors, as President Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis.517 The bargaining at the core of Model III is most feasible when the number of players is so limited. By contrast,
when a large number of government actors can play some
role in the decision process, no clear action channel may
emerge, and bureaucratic routines may simply take over.
William Casey and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, on the
other, on the desirability of secret sales of arms to Iran.
515. "If shared images dominate ... are we not talking about a 'unitary
purposive actor'? ... Have not the cases of shared mind sets occurred on
precisely the pivotal decisions of American foreign policy since 1945?"
Art, supra note 498, at 4 76.
516. When what is in the national interest appears "elusive," the players
often "look to organizational ... interests." M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP &
M. KANTER, supra note 497, at 25.
517. Policy in that crisis was essentially made by a group of seventeen
people in a group called the "ExCom." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at 185.
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In the case of the Government's reaction to the seismic
monitoring project, the export license decision was channeled to the small Working Group. But, as so often happens, implementation was left to the large, indeterminate
number of people in the bureaucracy, enabling numerous
lower level officials to whisk the license through in close to
record time. By contrast, the visa decision stayed within the
control of the Working Group and the organizations to
which it reported, and the results of the bargaining became
the decision of the Government.s1s
Third, bureaucratic routines may tend to predominate
in second-level cases because only the most important national security cases are worth the extraordinary effort necessary to change those routines. For example, routines established by statute, or regulation, or effective order, can only
lawfully be altered by amending the law, regulation, or order. Escalation to the Presidential or Congressional level, or
going through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
may not be warranted if the problem is ofless than immense
importance. That any Defense Department official would
even consider beginning a process of amending the export
control regulations or seeking an Act of Congress to frustrate the NRDC project is doubtful.
Fourth, because of the nature of second-level decisions,
they are worth less time and attention than major ones, less
effort is expended in investigation of the problems. In particular, the decision-makers may make fewer attempts to scan
the horizon for related decisions, or neglect to make certain
that they have considered as many alternative courses of action as possible. In the case of the NRDC project, the Work518. However, once the first visa application was decided in September
1986, a new standard operating procedure was born within the Department of State. Each time the Soviets would apply for a visa, they would be
given the choice of having the trip they proposed along with a CORRTEX
measurement at the Nevada Test Site, or having a curtailed trip and not
being allowed to go to the seismic station sites. See supra note 441 and
accompanying text. A decision dominated by Model III had become one
in which Model II factors were controlling because, in Henry Kissinger's
words, "an attempt to change course involves the prospect that the whole
searing process of arriving at a decision will have to be repeated." I. M.
DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POUCY 76 (2d ed.
1974).
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ing Group dealing with the export license and visa requests
never attended to the station permit questions, even though
the station permits were more central to the establishment of
Soviet stations in the United States than were the visas. 519
Finally, Model II may be a more significant determinant
of outcome in second-level cases because leaders are likely to
give less attention to questions of implementation than in
major cases. The literature contains numerous examples of
significant leadership decisions in the area of national security being ignored or sabotaged by the bureaucracy. For example, President Kennedy was shocked during the Cuban
missile crisis to learn that the order he had twice given to
remove obsolete U.S. missiles in Turkey had never been effectuated.520 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had
decided to begin construction of a small ABM system, capable of defending against a Chinese attack, but the military
constructed a large anti-Soviet system. 521 The State Department authorized the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
to declare, contrary to President Truman's directive, that the
United States did not support partition of Palestine. 522 Obstruction of these decisions could take place because the
leaders who made them were too busy with other problems
to ascertain whether their instructions were being obeyed. 523
With respect to those decisions deemed most critical, leaders
can and do attend to details, including details of implementation.524 Severe limits exist, however, as to how much lead519. Allison implicitly makes this point about second-level decisions
when he says that in the Cuban missile crisis, "a small group of men, unhitched from the bureaucracy, weighed the options and decided. Such
central, high-level crisis decisions would seem to be the type of outcome
for which Model I analysis is most suited." G. ALLISON, supra note l, at 9.
520. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 95 (1969).
521. M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, supra note 497, at 80406.
522. Id. at 252.
523. McNamara, for example, was so preoccupied with the war in Viet
Nam that he had to hand over implementation of the ABM decision,
among other responsibilities to his Deputy Secretary, Paul Nitze. Nitze
favored keeping open the option of having a large system, as did the
Army, and the Defense Department engineers resisted having to redesign
components so that they could not be used against Soviet ICBMs. Id. at
305.
524. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy himself gave
positioning orders to the commanders of the submarines conducting the
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ers can attend to the implementation of second-level decisions, such as whether the bureaucracy expedites an export
license that was intended to be processed routinely.
Both the suggestion that Model II is relatively more useful for smaller decisions and the specific hypotheses about
why that might be the case must be tested through additional
case studies of governmental decision-making. If the general
proposition appears to be true, then the great majority of
national security decisions-those not prominently featured
in the headlines-may be subject to most of the inherent defects of suboptimal decision processes and lack of accountability inherent in the organizational process paradigm. In
that event, those who would reform the system to make decisions more coherent and more responsive to elected authority have an even greater task ahead of them than was previously thought. 525
VII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND LAWYERS

The bulk of this study has considered the Government's
reaction to the NRDC project from the perspective of the
academic analyst, testing the hypotheses advanced by Allison
two decades ago. The study, however, also has implications
for legislators and practicing lawyers.

Legislators
For legislators, a multi-model analysis of executive
branch decision-making is a useful component in planning
effective policy change. Imagine ten years after enactment of
the McGovern Amendment, certain members of Congress
believe that continuing governmental denials of nonimmiA.

blockade, speaking to them by radio from the White House. G. ALUSON,
supra note 1, at 128. (Even so, his orders were countermanded by the
Navy's bureaucracy. /d. at 130.) President Carter's lengthy, personal involvement in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty negotiations at Camp David is
another example.
525. On the need for reforms of the national security decision system,
see generally G. .ALLISON & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FoREIGN Poucv: TuE
ORGANIZATIONAL CoNNECTION (1976); 1. M. DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, BuREAUCRATS AND FoREIGN PouCY (2d ed. 1974). Most of the organizational
problems identified by Destler in his first edition in 1971 have become
even greater problems since then, as the Iran-Contra hearings in Congress
have shown in a dramatic way.
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grant visas to certain Communist speakers and other visitors
are embarrassing the nation and undercutting the Congressional goal of encouraging worldwide freedom of travel. Imagine, further, that these members are attempting to design
an effective legislative response.s2s
To the extent that Model I accurately describes the
world, repealing the statutory language mandating the exclusion of Communists, 527 or declaring the policy of the United
States to be that waivers should be liberally granted or denied only where strong foreign policy or national security interests so required would be enough for these legislators.
Congress would presume good faith efforts by the executive
branch to honor the new law, or to carry out the new policy.
On the other hand, if Models II and III more accurately
account for bureaucratic responses, tliis type of legislation
might not suffice. Offices or individuals with responsibility
for visa issuance might have their own agendas, and might
claim legal support, despite the new statute, to carry out
their goals. For example, they might claim that the repeal of
the Communist exclusion provisions left the executive
branch of the government with inherent authority, under the
President's power to administer foreign relations, to exclude
undesirable aliens. 528 Alternatively, they might seize on any
vaguely worded exceptions to a new "policy," claiming those
exceptions covered the individuals they were seeking to exclude.
A legislator attuned to Model II explanations of "decisions" might, therefore, be somewhat less concerned with
the scope of the prohibition on exclusion and more attentive
526. The 1987 withdrawal of governmental authority to deny visas was
limited to visas sought between jan. 1, 1988 and Feb. 28, 1989. Pub. L.
No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1399 (1987). Sponsors of the law planned to usc
that time to influence a comprehensive revision of the McCarran-Waltcr
Act. Blumenthal, Congress Lifts Political-Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under McCarranWalter Act, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1987, at All, col. l.
527. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982).
528. Indeed, executive branch officials determined to retain the power
to exclude individual Communists might even argue inherent Constitutional authority despite contrary statutes, justifying nonconformance with
direct statutory prohibitions on exclusion. Simple repeal of the McCarran-Walter exclusions, however, would not require so dramatic a claim.
Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) Uackson, J., concurring).
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to the administrative procedures for implementing the new
policy. The legislator might determine, for example, that exclusions or domestic travel restrictions were likely to endure
primarily because several people were employed in processing exclusions and restrictions. A legislator who diagnosed
the problem this way might require a written report to Congress within days after each exclusion was made, or after
each admission with travel restrictions, stating the reasons
for the exclusion or the restrictions. Exclusions and restrictions might become less frequent because denials and restrictions would involve more work and more political exposure than grants. This procedure is, in fact, part of the approach taken by the McGovern Amendment, which provides
that the Secretary of State may refrain from recommending
waiver to the Attorney General only upon certifying to the
Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that granting a waiver would be
contrary to United States security interests. 529 Curiously,
the bureaucratic burden for denials was placed only on the
Department of State, while the power to deny waivers continued to reside ultimately in the Attorney General. Therefore, the "Model II" solution predictably failed. The Attorney General could deny waivers (with or without off-the-record coaching by State Department officials) without having
to report to Congress. Additionally, although the imposition
of domestic travel restrictions on admitted aliens had to be
reported annually to Congress for the first three years after
the McGovern Amendment was enacted, this deterrent expired in 1982.5 SO
529. 22 U.S.C.A. § 269l(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1986).
530. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L No.
95-426, § 126(c)(1), 92 Stat. 973 (1978). The law was therefore not in
effect when the Government conditioned the visas of the Soviet seismologists.
A more severe set of legislated Model II procedural controls could
have come into play if the seismic equipment to be exported by the NRDC
had been subject, on the export control list, to "foreign policy" as well as
"national security" controls. See supra text accompanying notes 167-180.
In that case, the Secretary of Commerce could have prohibited the export,
but to do so, he would have had (a) to have engaged in prior consultation
with U.S. industries, and (b) to have testified before two Congressional
Committees. In addition, the President would have had (a) to have consulted with U.S. allies, (b) to have engaged in prior consultation with the
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Procedural controls are less relevant to the extent that
the intervention of leaders, rather than the purring of the
bureaucratic machine, accounts for the problem that the legislator seeks to address. Perhaps the hypothetical legislators
discover that the relevant bureaus in the State and justice
Departments are headed by officials who strongly believe
that sooner or later, a Communist speaker will steal industrial secrets or inspire violence by a domestic group. These
officials are thought to have instructed their offices to deny
or condition visas where legally possible to do so. Alternatively, perhaps one or more of the relevant bureaus is
headed by an official whose appointment to that post has
been engineered by a particular anti-Communist Senator to
whom the official is especially responsive. If one of these
Model III explanations accounted for the Government's
"policy," neither a substantive statutory change nor an alteration of procedural routines might suffice to put a stake
through the heart of visa denials. The best approach might
be to impose counterpressure on the particular bureaucrats
responsible for the policy, either through hearings (exposing
the officials to public scrutiny), budget reductions (which
might prompt their staffs to exert pressure from below in
favor of less confrontation with Congress) or efforts to persuade the President or Secretary to change or reorganize
personnel.
Sanctions represent an important special case of how
multi-model analysis can play a role in legislation. Consider
an example of a problem that might have seemed a "secondCommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House and the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and (c) to have sent a
lengthy written report to Congress responding to numerous statutory inquiries. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(d) and (f) (West Supp. 1988).
For a purely domestic example of Congressional sensitivity to Model
II issues, see the Civil Rights oflnstitutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1997 (1981). The justice Department is authorized to bring suits in federal court to protect the legal rights of prisoners, juveniles, or medical
patients confined to state institutions, but it must make certain certifications to the court (e.g., of good faith efforts to negotiate a resolution with
state officials), and the certifications must be "personally signed" by the
Attorney General. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(b)(2) (1980). This requirement
prevents such suits from being processed routinely by the Department's
Civil Rights Division and makes it likely that the Attorney General will personally inquire into the need for each case brought under the Act.
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level" problem when Congress first considered it, but which
developed into the most significant foreign policy issue of
1987: the Iran-Contra Affair. How could a foresighted Congress have prevented the executive branch of the government from providing funds to insurgents in Nicaragua despite Congressional defeat of a proposed appropriation for
this purpose, trading arms to Iran in exchange for American
hostages in order to finance this effort, and seeking to establish an all-purpose off-the-books covert action operation?5Sl
If Model I correctly describes the behavior of the executive branch, the appropriate legislative precautions would
have been to pass the Boland Amendment, barring the Government from giving financial aid to the Nicaraguan rebels
"directly or indirectly," 532 and barring the government from
selling arms abroad without meeting certain criteria, including prior Congressional notification. 533 In normal times,
such measures as these suffice. No specific sanctions need be
attached to them, because Congress expects its legislative
mandates to be obeyed.
Imagine that members of Congress intent on achieving
these objectives had fully understood the bureaucratic structure within the executive branch. They knew that a small
group of officials on the National Security Council staff, together with a few officials at the State Department and the
Central Intelligence Agency, were planning to circumvent
the Boland Amendment by raising and using money from
foreign officials, by selling arms to Iran for a concealed
profit, and by misleading Congress about these activities in
executive branch testimony. 534 In such a case, Congress
might have strengthened its substantive law-making by substituting specific operational requirements for general provisions in the laws themselves, 535 enacting "whistle-blower"
531. See REPORT OF THE CoNGRESSIONAL CoMMITTEES INVESTIGATING TilE
IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR, H.R. Rep. No. 433, lOOth Cong., lst Sess. 41-78,
269-74, 332-33 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Report].
532. Pub. L. No. 98-473 (1984).
533. 22 u.s.c. § 2753(d) (1981).
534. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 531, at 381-82,411-20.
535. For example, Congress would require the President to notify it of
all covert action operations within 48 hours, rather than "in a timely fashion," as the law specified during the period of the Iran Arms Sales. 50
u.s.c. § 413(b) (1981).
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provlSlons and requiring routine oath-taking by executive
branch witnesses testifying on national security matters.
Finally, if Congress had understood that the relevant executive branch group consisted of determined, ideologically
driven officials who would not easily have been deterred by
procedural devices from skirting the law, Congress might
have resorted to the tool most particularly appropriate for
deterring individual misconduct. Specific criminal penalties
might have been attached to the Boland Amendment, which
could have reminded the relevant officials of their personal
accountability, and of the risks they ran by using their positions to conduct a covert foreign policy. 536
B. Lawyers
Practicing lawyers, too, may use the Allisonian models
to hone their ability to effectively bargain with a government
bureaucracy. Returning once again to issues suggested by
the case study, imagine a lawyer who is seeking, on behalf of
a client, to obtain a Commerce Department export license.
Assume, also, that the lawyer has never before dealt with this
particular entity.
Model I would suggest that the lawyer simply research
the statutory and regulatory requirements, and then file the
client's application. If meritorious, the government, being
rational, will grant the application.
The lawyer attuned to Model II would, however, also
engage in considerable research on the structure of the
Commerce Department. She would look into the substructures and subroutines of each relevant office. In the course
of that work, she would discover, among other things, the
Department's unpublished "fast track" routine. If her client
wanted to export quickly, she would try to make her application fit the "fast track" criteria.
The lawyer would not merely file the application. Realizing the application had to go to several offices, each with its
own concerns, she would attempt to make written or oral
presentations to each of them. Each presentation would be
536. For a more detailed look at how multi-model analysis can help a
legislature to devise an appropriate sanctions regime, this time in a domestic context, see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate
Crime, 85 YALE LJ. 1090 (1976).
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designed to move the application to the top of the pile and
would be tailored to the concerns of that office. If necessary,
she would work with her client to alter the nature of the export to avoid issues which would bring about delay or objections in any office.
The lawyer who believes that government proceeds
through the actions of people rather than through policies or
procedures would first identify the key players, both among
the senior officials of the Commerce Department and among
those on whose desks the license applications would actually
reside. She would use all possible personal contacts to affect
their judgments and to get them on her client's side. The
staff of the NRDC did this very effectively with respect to the
Commerce Department, the Bureau of Land Management,
and the Forest Service. But NRDC's analysis did not extend
sufficiently to reveal the involvement of those who were really making the visa decisions: the members of the Nuclear
Test Ban Working Group and the three arms control experts
on the National Security Council staff.
Many practitioners work on all three levels instinctively.
Despite their lack of familiarity with formal Allisonian theory, they already make sophisticated multi-level approaches
to key governmental groups and officials. By systematically
applying Allison's three theories of decision-making, lawyers
might nevertheless be able to exert greater influence over
governmental and other bureaucracies. Formal models such
as those developed by Allison can help them to think more
clearly about what kinds of information they need to gather
before acting for a client, and how to link their appeals to the
needs and goals of bureaucratic organizations and their key
personnel. 537
VIII. THE NRDC PROJECT: A POSTSCRIPT
By the middle of 1987, the NRDC's seismic verification
project was in a curious stage of development. American
scientists had already spent a year in residence at seismic
537. Enhanced planning ability is one of lhe most important \'alues of
models as lhey are used by policy analysts. Using a formal model "forces
you to identify lhe levers lhat will influence outcomes, which are in actuality lhe true policy alternatives." E. STOKEY & R. ZECKIJAUSER, A PRIMER ON
POLICY ANALYSIS 19 (1978).
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monitoring stations in Kazakhstan, and the NRDC had built
virtually identical stations in California and Nevada to monitor nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. But the
hopes of the project's initiators had been frustrated in two
ways. First, the Soviet scientists had not been given the same
right to work in the United States that their American counterparts were enjoying in the Soviet Union. Second,
although the NRDC's operation of the stations in the United
States was unrestricted, so that these stations could provide
continuous monitoring of test site activity, the Soviets required the Kazakhstan stations to be shut down during Soviet nuclear tests.
In June 1987, NRDC and Soviet Academy officials renegotiated their agreement. For 1988, the Soviets agreed to
permit the American scientists to leave their equipment running during Soviet tests, and to expand the number of stations in the Soviet Union from three to five. At the same
time, the stations were required to be relocated to sites six
hundred miles, rather than one hundred miles, from the
Semipalatinsk test area. 538 Although the new and relocated
stations would provide continuous data to the Americans,
they would be operated primarily by Soviet scientists, "with
occasional assistance as required and requested from the
NRDC." 539 The revised agreement also provided that nonnuclear calibration explosions would be detonated in each
country so the scientists could better determine what magnitudes of explosions could be detected at various distances. A
side benefit of the calibration explosions would be that scientists could use them to make better estimates of the yields of
538. According to NRDC, this requirement, which appeared to be a
political retreat on the part of the Soviets (and was probably imposed at
the request of the Soviet military authorities responsible for testing at
Semipalatinsk) was actually better from a research perspective, and it was
welcomed by the American scientists on the NRDC team. The original
stations were so close to the Soviet test site that they could easily pick up
even very small seismic events there. To be able to monitor low-yield Soviet tests from locations as far away as 600 miles would better demonstrate
the verifiability of restrictions on such testing. Interview with S. jacob
Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1988).
539. Natural Resources Defense Council and Soviet Academy of Sciences, USA-USSR Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Agreement
§ 13(e) Uune 25, 1987).
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nuclear tests detected by the seismic equipment.54 0
Shortly thereafter, with their American counterparts on
site, the Soviets set off two explosions of ten tons of TNT
and one of twenty tons of TNT, as provided by the agreement to detonate calibration tests. The American scientific
team in the Soviet Union watched the seismic monitors at
project stations, some of which were 400 miles from the
blast. Despite the distances and the low yield of the explosion, all of the NRDC stations detected the explosion, and its
waves were clearly distinguishable from those caused by a
distant earthquake which occurred, coincidentally, at almost
the same moment as the test explosion. 54 1
Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration continued to oppose ratification of the 150-kiloton Threshold Test Ban
Treaty, conditioning acceptance on Soviet agreement torenegotiate its verification provisions to utilize CORRTEX
measurements to check the yields of Soviet tests. Early in
1987, Soviet opposition to consideration of CORRTEX began to dissolve, and in November, 1987, Soviet negotiators
agreed to conduct experiments.· As part of these experiments, the Soviets would permit U.S. Government representatives_ to tour Semipalatinsk, would send Soviet representatives to visit the Nevada Test Site, and would participate with American scientists in demonstration
measurements of monitoring equipment, including both
seismic and CORRTEX instruments. 542 Notwithstanding
this new Soviet willingness to observe a CORRTEX demonstration at the Nevada Test Site, the government continued
to deny Soviet Academy scientists the right to operate or
even visit the three project stations in Nevada and California.543
540. /d.; interview with S.Jacob Scherr, supra note 538.
541. Broad, American Scientists in Soviet Getting Read)' to Monitor Atom Tt.rts,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
542. Smith, U.S., Soviets Move Toward Treaty RevisioriS, Wash. Post, Nov.
21, 1987, at A23, col. 1.
543. In December, 1987, the NRDC requested that federal officials undertake a "reconsideration of U.S. policy on visas for Soviet seismologists," noting that the "rationale" of the Soviets' unwillingness to witness
a CORRTEX demonstration "is no longer applicable and appropriate."
Letter to Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for
Politico-Military Affairs, from Dr. Thomas B. Cochran and S.Jacob Scherr,
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By the spring of 1988, when NRDC applied once again
for the Soviet scientists to visit the stations-this time to participate in experiments in which a calibrating TNT explosion
would be set off in Nevada-not only had the Soviets acceeded to observing the use of CORRTEX, but two other
events of significance had occurred. First, both Richard
Perle and his deputy Frank Gaffney had resigned from the
government. 544 Second, for reasons having nothing to do
with the NRDC project or nuclear testing,545 Congress had
suspended, from January 1988 through February 1989, the
government's power to deny or condition nonimmigrant
visas on the basis of the applicants' beliefs or associations.54 6
This suspension appeared to require a change in the routine
that the government had established for dealing with NRDC
applications.
In March 1988, the NRDC applied once again for unrestricted visas for the Soviet scientists, to allow the scientists
to participate fully in calibration and monitoring experiments with NRDC scientists. 547 The Soviets wanted to visit
all of the NRDC station sites in Nevada and California, to
visit the sites of NRDC's TNT calibration explosions in
northern Nevada, and to bring with them a ton and a half of
their own equipment which they would use to monitor the
NRDC (Dec. 10, 1987). The response stated that because "direct, bilateral
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union arc the only
proper forum for addressing nuclear testing issues I do not anticipate the
current US policy will be revised." Letter from William F. Burns, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, to Dr.
Thomas B. Cochran, NRDC (Dec. 29, 1987). See also the visa issued to
Igor L. Nersesov, a Soviet scientist working on the NRDC project, on
which the following legend is inscribed: "Invited by NRDC.
212(d)(3)(A)(28) Stay Auth: Nov. 28 until Dec. 8, 1987 only. NY, DC, San
Diego, SF, and Reno only. NO SEISMIC STATION VISITS." Visa No.
012411 Issued at Moscow (Nov. 27, 1987) (emphasis in original).
544. Blumenthal, Richard Perle, Disarmed but Undeterred, Wash. Post, Nov.
23, 1987, at B1, col. 1.
545. See Blumenthal, Congress Lifts Political-Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under McCarran-Walter Act, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1987, at All, col. 1.
546. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989,
Pub. L. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1399 (1987).
547. Letter from Terence]. Fortune, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison (representing the NRDC), to Lt. Col. Michael Fry, Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,
Department of State (March 18, 1988).
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calibration explosions and the Nevada Test Site.54S
In a legal memorandum attached to the application,
NRDC argued that because of the suspension of statutory
authority, the expected presence of the Soviet scientists at
the NRDC stations was .. an impermissible basis for denial or
restriction of the requested visas." This legal memorandum
was co-signed by the Director of the National Security Litigation Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, which implied, at least, that NRDC was prepared to test a denial in
court.549 The State Department responded, "we disagree
with your interpretation [of the suspension legislation]. In
our view that section does not limit the Executive's authority
to deny or restrict the admission of aliens where such action
is necessary to protect important internal security or foreign
policy interests of the United States. [Nevertheless], the instant case does not require denial or restriction of the
visas."550
One month later, for the first time in history, scientists
from the Soviet Union began to operate a seismic monitoring station on American soil.

548. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, supra note 538.
549. Letter from Terence]. Fortune, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and
Garrison, and Kate Martin, Director of the National Security Litigation
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, to Abraham D. Sofaer,
Legal Advisor, Department of State {March 18, 1988), appemud to letter to
Lt. Col. Michael Fry, supra note 547.
550. Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of
State, to Adrian W. DeWind, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison
{March 31, 1988).
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